Ted韩雪演讲：积极的悲观主义者(中文)

第一篇：Ted韩雪演讲：积极的悲观主义者(中文)

韩雪ted演讲全程英文_演讲主题----积极的悲观主义者 大家下午好：

首先请允许我我大家放一段音乐，我知道弹的很不好

因为那是我弹的，很抱歉这还不是本场最差。

我还要给大家看另外一个东西不要笑 这些话描述了一个完整的故事

如果你们真的想知道里面讲的内容 你们待会可以看下我的微博 这一幅画是我去年画的 我还有另外一幅作品比这个要好很多 但这一幅是我20年前画的 你们一定想问 怎么越画越差了？ 我猜你们的结论一定是 我越来越缺乏想象力了 那这是为什么呢 我想这是因为我长大了 长大了以后 我们开始变得害怕犯错了

我们要么不做，要做就做好的 所以总是尝试着不去犯错误 我们似乎将自己困在了一个保护过度的世界中 于是乎我们渐渐失去了想象力与创造力

怎么办呢 对于我来说答案就是要做一个积极的悲观主义者 让我来解释一下 做一个悲观主义者意味着你放低对自己的要求 接受可能会失败的事实 那么积极有意味着什么 其实很简单 就是你拼尽全力 要去赢得游戏 把这两个观念放在一起似乎有一些矛盾 我也同意 但是我的认为这就是世界本来的样子 就是这样 我们总能在生活中找到完全对立的事物

但是他们很好地共存在一起 那么如何做一个积极地悲观主义者呢 我来分享一些我的经历吧 或许我还没有老到可以大谈自己的经历 但是这些故事对于我个人而言非常宝贵

第一个故事发生在2012年 我第一次成为了一名电视制片人 但是正如你们所知道的我是一名演员和歌手

制片人的角色我还是很不熟悉 所以请记住 我首先得是一个悲观主义者 我要去设想最坏的结果 最坏或许就是没有人愿意花钱去买它了吧 而我所有的花费和时间都付诸东流

这项投资金额大概相当于我这几年演艺生涯赚到的钱的总和 电视市场是怎样的呢

在国内只有20%的电视剧能成功卖出去并在电视台播放剩下的80%呢？ 过去制作团队只剩下了一堆录像带

现在情况更糟 我们只能剩下（硬盘里的）一堆数据 所以我不断问自己 “你到底能不能接受这个最坏的结果” 我的答案是肯定的，至少我能试一下所以我们开始了拍摄 接下来 还记得吗我要做的就是要保持积极心态

因为我是一个数字产品迷所以我还决定要在自己的电视中采用高科技 我专注在实现4k分辨率 我来解释一下这是一个什么概念 通常我们在电影院屏幕上看到的电影分辨率是2k 而4k是2k的四倍分辨率 当然这也意味着文件每帧都有50mb大小 如果你还有点迷糊的话 没关系 你只需要记住这是在中国电视界的 一个巨大的挑战 在我们之前只有很少一部分人尝试过4k分辨率 他们做到了4k输入但并不是输出 因为它实在是太难了 张艺谋导游在他的电影《归来》中第一次使用了4k 当我们结束了拍摄的工作并开始制作后期 噩梦才真的降临在我们头上

我仍然记得我们打算为北京电视节做一段5分钟的试片 但是辛苦工作了一整天后

我们只输出了50秒钟 而且这个时候电脑瘫痪了 我快要急疯了 我能够做点什么吗？一部30集的电视剧 我只输出了50秒钟的视频 于是我去问我们的顾问 我们的技术顾问来自美国最大的数字影像公司red 他们告诉我们在美国他们使用的是ｈｐ基础站 但是在中国我们并没有ｈｐ基础站

它实在是太贵了我们根本买不起 所以我们决定自己组装自己的设备 我们尝试了数十种组合的输出模式 经过了六个月之后我们成功了 我的《淑女之家》成为了首部 真正4k输出的电视剧 而且我成功地把它卖给了电视台并获得了不错的收视率 这次的经历让我学会了不要去害怕接受巨大的挑战 你可以做好失败的心理准备但是靠毅力去征服它

下一个故事就发生在去年 我接受了贝尔的邀请 有人知道他吗？ 你们可能会想我简直疯了 是的就是这个号称站在食物链顶端的男人 他几乎什么都吃 我也是 你们或许觉得我疯了，是的在那儿之前 我几乎没做过体育锻炼 我的体能也不太好 我害怕很多事情 我恐高 而且害怕昆虫 我甚至连过山车都不敢做 但是我几乎马上就接受了他的邀请 因为我知道如果我放弃这次机会 我这一辈子都不会再得到它了 所以我决定去冒一次险 在20天里面 我抓过老鼠 吃过昆虫

但是（还好）我没有喝过尿液 在前半段的旅程中我几乎每天都在哭泣 印象最深刻的是倒数第二天 我记得那一天我们要通过悬挂在悬崖两边 的绳子穿越一个峡谷 就是这张图片 但是你们看不到宽度，很宽的 标准的姿势是将整个身体都悬挂在绳索上面

用一只脚的脚踝缠绕住绳子 然后用力将自己从一边拉到另一边去 轮到我的时候 贝尔对我说 你确定你要尝试吗

如果你想要退出这一项也是可以的因为我知道你无法保持身体的平衡 你不能使用你的左胳膊

在那项任务的两天前我不幸地将自己的左手弄伤了 而且伤到了神经系统 我的手指会不受控制地颤抖

我几乎无法使用我的左手 作为一名悲观者，我不得不设想最坏的情况 这可是一个真人秀节目

真人秀可能会是非常危险的 如果做不到百分百的完美

你可能会在网上受到网友的批评 我可能会再次跌倒然后伤到我右手 我问自己真的要尝试吗 我想至少我死不了 那就不管那么多了 接受挑战

当时当我真的将我的身体挂在那根绳子上的时候

比我想象中的要难很多了 你们可以从照片中看到我的姿势 我的团队成员跟我说 “你真是太丑了” 她说你看上去像一只死掉的毛毛虫 我身体的一半在这一边，另外一半在另一边

这还不算最糟糕的 最糟糕的是我的手臂支撑不起我的上半身和脑袋 我抬不起头去看终点在哪里 我该怎么办？ 我知道我必须怀有积极的心态 我还知道

积极并不是说简简单单地说出一些话 你必须积极地作出点什么 那个时候我只能看到前面3米处的一块石头 我决定设定一个小小的目标 专注子啊那块石头上 当我心里面只想着那块石头的时候 神奇的事情发生了 我忘记了悬崖的高度 也忘记了要去保持平衡

我甚至忘记了终点 我只记得自己要专注 然后不断拉自己 然后我开始朝前寻找一个又一个的目标 然后任何小的物体都成为我前面闪闪发光的图像 多次以后 我意识到我离终点已经很近了

然后我终于成功抵达 从那以后我知道了失败并不可怕 你只需要设立小小的目标然后全身心投入

这些发生在我身上的故事塑造了我 成为一个积极的悲观主义者 直到今天 我知道自己钢琴弹得很差 画也画不好

也不是一个太棒的制作人 但是我喜欢成为一个积极的悲观主义者 任何事情都不能阻挡我成为更好的人 谢谢大家

第二篇：(TED英文演讲)韩雪：积极的悲观主义者——观后感

To be a positive pessimist.—— Feedback When we were young, we often dare to do whatever we can regardless of anything because we are innocent.As we became more mature after growth, we started being afraid of making mistakes.It’s common that we choose to be the best or nothing.Just like the lecturer Han Xue mentioned, we trapped ourselves in an overprotective world.Everything we are going to do or each situation we may face is unpredictable, but it shouldn’t be the reason for our escaping all hard periods.What if people always get rid of troubles? It seems like a signal meaning a loss of imagination and creativity.So, there must be some solutions that are needed.Han Xue shared her strategies about being a positive pessimist.She suggested that we receive lower expectations to ourselves and prepare to lose.Meanwhile, it doesn’t mean that you can always give in.Spare no efforts and go for it!There won’t be so much pity even if a failure happens.You might have a confusion about the “positive” and “pessimist”, how could a couple of opposite attitudes interweave together? However, we can find such paradoxes surrounding us.Generally speaking, we are expected to show our confidence while taking huge challenges, and conquer them with will power.Particularly, you needn’t be ashamed of losing only if you put your heart into it.A positive pessimist may not have something outstanding, but he(or she)must be better which is unstoppable.

第三篇：TED演讲：了解中国的崛起(无中文)

Understanding the rise of China

了解中国的崛起

Martin Jacques TED演讲：

在TED伦敦沙龙会上，经济学家马丁·雅克Martin Jacques问：在西方我们对中国和它显著的崛起现象有多少认识？作为《当中国统治世界》的作者，他解释了西方国家常常对中国经济的快速增长力感到困惑的理由，他提出3个基础观点来帮助我们理解当代的中国现实和中国未来的展望。

正文：

The world is changing with really remarkable speed.If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy.And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy.And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States.Goldman Sachs projected 2027.The post-crisis projection is 2020.That's just a decade away.China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects.First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world.Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country.Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world--which I think is what China will become--will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.Now, I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that as countries modernize, they also westernize.This is an illusion.It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology.It is not.It is also shaped equally by history and culture.China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West.It will remain in very fundamental respects very different.Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment, by and large, is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas.We can't.Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like, just as a beginning.The first is this: that China is not really a nation-state.Okay, it's called itself a nation-state for the last hundred years, but everyone who knows anything about China knows it's a lot older than this.This was what China looked like with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C.at the end of the warring-state period--the birth of modern China.And you can see it against the boundaries of modern China.Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2,000 years ago.And you can see already it occupies most of what we now know as Eastern China, which is where the vast majority of Chinese lived then and live now.Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China its sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation-state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization-state.I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on.These are all things that come from the period of the civilization-state.In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization-state, rather than as a nation-state.And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people.What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized.You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case.It's never been the case.So this is China, a civilization-state, rather than a nation-state.And what does it mean? Well, I think it has all sorts of profound implications.I'll give you two quick ones.The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization.You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown--the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire.It divided, and it's remained divided ever since.China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization-state, together.The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong.Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was.One country, two systems.And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them.“Window dressing.When China gets its hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case.” Thirteen years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997.We were wrong.Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation-state ways.Think of German unification, 1990.What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West.One nation, one system.That is the nation-state mentality.But you can't run a country like China, a civilization-state, on the basis of one civilization, one system.It doesn't work.So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong--as it will be to the question of Taiwan--was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Let me offer you another building block to try and understand China--maybe not sort of a comfortable one.The Chinese have a very, very different conception of race to most other countries.Do you know, of the 1.3 billion Chinese, over 90 percent of them think they belong to the same race, the Han? Now, this is completely different from the world's [other] most populous countries.India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil--all of them are multiracial.The Chinese don't feel like that.China is only multiracial really at the margins.So the question is, why? Well the reason, I think, essentially is, again, back to the civilization-state.A history of at least 2,000 years, a history of conquest, occupation, absorption, assimilation and so on, led to the process by which, over time, this notion of the Han emerged--of course, nurtured by a growing and very powerful sense of cultural identity.Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together.The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together.The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference.They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not.Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state.Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West.Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think--in these days at least--that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy.The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state.And the reason for this is because--well, there are two reasons, I think.And it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy.And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special--it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization-state.This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged--I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on--for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged.It's had no serious rivals.So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history.The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state.Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all.The Chinese view the state as an intimate--not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family--not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family.This is the Chinese view of the state--very, very different to ours.It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West.And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past.Know that China believes in the market and the state.I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century, said, “The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe.” And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more or less the case ever since.But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state.The state is everywhere in China.I mean, it's leading firms--many of them are still publicly owned.Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage.Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state.And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas--as we are familiar with--with something like the one-child policy.Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft.I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one.But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C.and was finally completed in the seventh century A.D.It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai.So there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China.So there we have three building blocks for trying to understand the difference that is China--the civilization-state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.And yet we still insist, by and large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts.If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong--our predictions about what's going to happen to China are incorrect--this is the reason.Unfortunately, I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality.It's kind of arrogant.It's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure.And secondly, it's ignorant.We refuse to really address the issue of difference.You know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian.And Paul Cohen argues that the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures.But it's not.In many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations.Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way.Whereas those cultures--virtually the rest of the world, in fact, which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West--have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies.And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.I mean, take the question of East Asia.East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc.--a third of the world's population lives there.Now the largest economic region in the world.And I'll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia.Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present.Because what's happening? Back to that chart at the beginning, the Goldman Sachs chart.What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world.We've seen this in terms of the G20 usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8.And there are two consequences of this.First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world.There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago--Copenhagen, climate change conference.Europe was not at the final negotiating table.When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago.And that is what is going to happen in the future.And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with.And at last, I'm afraid--take Europe;America is slightly different--but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing.Some people--I've got an English friend in China, and he said, “The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion.” Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration.But there's another problem which goes along with this--that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world--and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future.I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in its confidence.Take the 19th century, for example.But this, alas, is no longer true.If you want to feel the future, if you want to taste the future, try China--there's old Confucius.This is a railway station the likes of which you've never seen before.It doesn't even look like a railway station.This is the new Guangzhou railway station for the high-speed trains.China already has a bigger network than any other country in the world and will soon have more than all the rest of the world put together.Or take this: now this is an idea, but it's an idea to be tried out shortly in a suburb of Beijing.Here you have a megabus, on the upper deck carries about 2,000 people.It travels on rails down a suburban road, and the cars travel underneath it.And it does speeds of up to about 100 miles an hour.Now this is the way things are going to move, because China has a very specific problem, which is different from Europe and different from the United States: China has huge numbers of people and no space.So this is a solution to a situation where China's going to have many, many, many cities over 20 million people.Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it.But I want to argue, above all, a big-picture positive for this world.For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population.That's what Europe and North America represented.The arrival of countries like China and India--between them 38 percent of the world's population--and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years.Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world.As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation, and we will have to learn about these civilizations.This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa.The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic.(Laughter)Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368.I think they're playing golf.Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.Welcome to the future.Thank you.(Applause)

第四篇：韩媒建议总统访华用中文演讲 称此举将感动中国

韩媒建议总统访华用中文演讲 称此举将感动中国

2013年05月23日04:03 环球时报 我有话说(1166人参与)

【环球时报综合报道】 22日首尔传出的消息同样复杂。韩联社援引青瓦台外交秘书的话说，如韩朝重启对话，韩将从小事情上推动韩朝恢复信任。韩国《中央日报》则援引韩国外长尹炳世的话说，朝鲜在赌博，“最终会输得身无分文”。

韩国媒体昨天关注的焦点还包括总统朴槿惠筹划于6月底访华。韩国《中央日报》22日期待朴槿惠届时能在北京用中文发表演讲，哪怕不能全文使用中文，起码可以用中文照着稿子念或只在核心部分用中文，并称重要的不是发音是诚意，认为此举可以带给中国很大的感动。《韩民族新闻》则说，朴槿惠访华是韩国戒掉美韩同盟瘾的契机。

“韩朝美中开始接触，半岛局势或迎转机”，韩联社以此为题说，首尔将崔龙海访华看做平壤主动接触中国的“好兆头”，朴访华时也必然与北京谈朝鲜问题，此外，朝韩外长一直都参加的东盟地区论坛6月底也将在文莱举行。若四方在今后一个月的连锁接触中达成共识，朝鲜与周边对话将进入准备期。韩国《韩国日报》据此说，6月或许会成为左右朝鲜半岛局势的分水岭。