美国节假日列表

第一篇：美国节假日列表

节日按时间顺序先后有：

1.元旦节(New Year's Day），每年1月1日庆祝新的一年开始。人们举办各种各样的新年晚会，到处可以听到“辞旧迎新”的钟声，为美国的联邦假日。

2.林肯诞辰（Abraham Lincoln's Birthday）, 每年2月12日，庆祝林肯诞辰，为大多数州的节日。

3.圣瓦伦丁节（St.Valentine's Day），每年2月14日，是3世纪殉教的圣徒圣瓦伦丁逝世纪念日。情人们在这一天互赠礼物，故又称“情人节”（the lovers' day）。

4.华盛顿诞辰（George Washington's Birthday），每年2月22日，庆祝华盛顿诞辰，为美国的联邦假日。

5.圣帕特里克节（St.Patrick's Day），每年3月17日，是悼念爱尔兰的守护神圣帕特里克的节日。

6.复活节（Easter Day, Easter Sunday），一般在每年春分后月圆第一个星期天，约在3月7日左右。该节是庆祝基督(Jesus Christ)的复活，过节人们吃复活节彩蛋(Easter Eggs)，为美国的联邦假日。

7.愚人节（April Fool's Day），每年4月1日，该节出自于庆祝 “春分点”(Venal equinox)的来临，在 4月1日受到恶作剧愚弄的人称为“四月愚人”(April Fools)。

8．母亲节（Mother's Day）, 每年5月份的第2个星期日，政府部门和各家门口悬挂国旗，表示对母亲的尊敬。在家里，儿女们和父亲给母亲买些礼物或做些家务。

9.阵亡烈士纪念日(Memorial Day), 每年5月份的最后一个星期一，纪念为美国献身的阵亡烈士，为美国的联邦假日。

10.国旗日（National Flag Day），每年6月14日，庆祝国旗的升起。

11.父亲节（Father's Day）, 每年6月份的第3个星期天，表示对父亲的尊敬。在家里，儿女们和母亲给父亲买些礼物。

12.国庆节（Independence Day）, 每年7月4日，庆祝美国建国，为美国的联邦假日。

13.劳动节（Labor Day）, 每年9月份的第一个星期一，表示对劳工的敬意，为美国的联邦假日。

14.哥伦布日（Columbus Day），每年10月12日，纪念哥伦布在北美登陆，为美国的联邦假日。

15.万圣节（Halloween；Eve of All Saint's Day），每年10月31日，孩子们多化装成鬼，打着灯笼或点燃篝火尽情地玩耍。

16.万灵节（All Soul's Day）, 每年11月2日，祭奠所有死者灵魂之日。

17.退伍军人节（Veterans Day），每年11月11日，表示对退伍军人的敬意

18.感恩节(Thanksgiving Day)，每年11月最后一个星期四，干且上帝所赐予的秋收，为美国的联邦假日。

19.大选日(Election Day)，每年11月份的第一个星期一后的星期二，选举美国总统。

20.清教徒登陆纪念日(Forefather's Day)，每年12月21日，纪念清教徒在美洲登陆。

21.圣诞节.(Christmas Day)，每年12月25日，基督徒庆祝基督诞生的日子，是美国最隆重的节日。

第二篇：美国B2签证材料列表

1.由签证申请人提供的材料：

（签证申请人：*，*）

1.1.DS-160签证申请表

1.2.签证申请费收据

1.3.护照

1.4.邀请人的出生公证，亲属关系公证

1.5.房产证

1.6.银行存款证明，退休金存款证明

1.7.单位退休证明信

1.8.公费医疗保险卡

1.9.身份证

1.10.户口本

1.11.家庭照片

2.由邀请人提供的材料：

（邀请人姓名：*，*）

邀请人*和*共同的文件：

2.1.邀请人写给签证官的信

2.2.邀请人写给签证申请人的邀请信

2.3.结婚证和结婚公证（复印件）

2.4.银行存款证明

邀请人*的文件：

2.5.护照，I-94卡，过往美国签证（复印件）

2.6.J-2 的历年DS-2019表格（复印件）

2.7.J-2的历年工作许可证（复印件）

2.8.驾驶执照（复印件）

2.9.社会安全卡（复印件）

2.10.医疗保险卡（复印件）

2.11.公司证明信，近期工资单

2.12.2007年税表W-2（复印件）

2.13.中国身份证（复印件）

邀请人*的文件：

2.14.护照，I-94卡，过往美国签证（复印件）

2.15.J-1 的历年DS-2019表格（复印件）

2.16.驾驶执照（复印件）

2.17.社会安全卡（复印件）

2.18.医疗保险卡（复印件）

2.19.学校职位及工资证明信

2.20.学校导师写给签证官的支持信函

2.21.大学聘书（复印件）

2.22.大学工作身份卡

2.23.2007年1042税表（复印件）

2.24.中国身份证（复印件）

第三篇：美国2013年法定节假日

美国2013年法定节假日

1． New Year＇s Day 元旦（1月1日）------一般在美国都会在圣诞节以前1周开始放假！一直放到元旦之后的周一。

2． Washington＇s Birthday 华盛顿生日（二月份的第三个星期一）------放假一天。

3． Memorial Day 阵亡将士纪念日（五月份的最后一个星期一）------放假一天。

4． Independence Day 独立纪念日（7月4日）------放假两天。加上周六周日，应该是四天。

5． Labor Day 劳动节（九月份的第一个星期一）------放假一天。

6． Columbus Day 哥伦布日（十月份的第二个星期一）------放假一天。

7． Veterans Day 退伍军人节（11月11日）------放假一天。

8． Thanksgiving Day 感恩节（十一月份的第四个星期四）------原则上放假一天，但很多学校从星期四一直放到星期天。

9． Christmas Day圣诞节（12月25日）------一般是20号到6号，放假2周。在法定假日里，银行、学校、办事处一般都放假，邮件也不递送。

第四篇：2018年美国法定节假日安排

2018年美国法定节假日安排

2018年就要来了，很多在国内的学生很关心美国那边的放假安排，那么2018年美国法定放假时间安排是怎么样呢？很多出国人士比较关心的问题，那么和出国留学网一起来了解了解2018年美国法定节假日安排，欢迎阅读。2018年美国法定节假日安排 美国法定节假日

时间节假日名称节假日类型1月1日新年Newyear'sDay全国假日1月15日马丁·路德·金纪念日MartinLutherKingDay全国假日2月19日总统日Presidentialday全国假日5月28日阵亡将士纪念日MemorialDay全国假日7月4日美国独立日IndependenceDay全国假日9月3日劳动节LaborDay全国假日10月8日哥伦布日Columboday大多数地区会休息10月22日老兵节VeteransDay全国假日11月22日感恩节Thanksgiving全国假日12月25日圣诞节Christmas全国假

第五篇：美国公司法证券法历年经典论文列表

美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至2008年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。

以下是每年入选的论文列表：

2008年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：

1.Anabtawi, Iman and Lynn Stout.Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders.60 Stan.L.Rev.1255-1308(2008).2.Brummer, Chris.Corporate law preemption in an age of global capital markets.81 S.Cal.L.Rev.1067-1114(2008).3.Choi, Stephen and Marcel Kahan.The market penalty for mutual fund scandals.87 B.U.L.Rev.1021-1057(2007).4.Choi, Stephen J.and Jill E.Fisch.On beyond CalPERS: Survey evidence on the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance.61 Vand.L.Rev.315-354(2008).5.Cox, James D., Randall S.Thomas and Lynn Bai.There are plaintiffs and…there are plaintiffs: An empirical analysis of securities class action settlements.61 Vand.L.Rev.355-386(2008).6.Henderson, M.Todd.Paying CEOs in bankruptcy: Executive compensation when agency costs are low.101 Nw.U.L.Rev.1543-1618(2007).7.Hu, Henry T.C.and Bernard Black.Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: Importance and extensions.156 U.Pa.L.Rev.625-739(2008).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock.The hanging chads of corporate voting.96 Geo.L.J.1227-1281(2008).9.Strine, Leo E., Jr.Toward common sense and common ground? Reflections on the shared interests of managers and labor in a more rational system of corporate governance.33 J.Corp.L.1-20(2007).10.Subramanian, Guhan.Go-shops vs.no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications.63 Bus.Law.729-760(2008).2007年：

1.Baker, Tom and Sean J.Griffith.The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer.95 Geo.L.J.1795-1842(2007).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A.The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise.93 Va.L.Rev.675-732(2007).3.Choi, Stephen J.and Robert B.Thompson.Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA.106 Colum.L.Rev.1489-1533(2006).4.Coffee, John C., Jr.Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation.106 Colum.L.Rev.1534-1586(2006).5.Cox, James D.and Randall S.Thomas.Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions.106 Colum.L.Rev.1587-1640(2006).6.Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller.Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements.59 Vand.L.Rev.1975-2013(2006).7.Gordon, Jeffrey N.The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices.59 Stan.L.Rev.1465-1568(2007).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B.Rock.Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control.155 U.Pa.L.Rev.1021-1093(2007).9.Langevoort, Donald C.The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley.105 Mich.L.Rev.1817-1855(2007).10.Roe, Mark J.Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets.120 Harv.L.Rev.460-527(2006).11.Subramanian, Guhan.Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence.36 J.Legal Stud.1-26(2007).(NOTE: This is an earlier working draft.The published article is not freely available, and at SLW we generally respect the intellectual property rights of others.)

2006年：

1.Bainbridge, Stephen M.Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.119 Harv.L.Rev.1735-1758(2006).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A.Letting Shareholders Set the Rules.119 Harv.L.Rev.1784-1813(2006).3.Black, Bernard, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner.Outside Director Liability.58 Stan.L.Rev.1055-1159(2006).4.Choi, Stephen J., Jill E.Fisch and A.C.Pritchard.Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.83 5.Cox, James D.and Randall S.Thomas.Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements.58 Stan.L.Rev.411-454(2005).6.Gilson, Ronald J.Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy.119 Harv.L.Rev.1641-1679(2006).7.Goshen , Zohar and Gideon Parchomovsky.The Essential Role of Securities Regulation.55 Duke L.J.711-782(2006).8.Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire.Law and the Rise of the Firm.119 Harv.L.Rev.1333-1403(2006).9.Hu, Henry T.C.and Bernard Black.Empty Voting and Hidden(Morphable)Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms.61 Bus.Law.1011-1070(2006).10.Kahan, Marcel.The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 22 J.L.Econ.& Org.340-365(2006).11.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock.Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law.58 Vand.L.Rev.1573-1622(2005).12.Smith, D.Gordon.The Exit Structure of Venture Capital.53 UCLA L.Rev.315-356(2005).2005年：

1.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye.The case for increasing shareholder power.118 Harv.L.Rev.833-914(2005).2.Bratton, William W.The new dividend puzzle.93 Geo.L.J.845-895(2005).3.Elhauge, Einer.Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest.80 N.Y.U.L.Rev.733-869(2005).4.Johnson,.Corporate officers and the business judgment rule.60 Bus.Law.439-469(2005).5.Milhaupt, Curtis J.In the shadow of Delaware? The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan.105 Colum.L.Rev.2171-2216(2005).6.Ribstein, Larry E.Are partners fiduciaries? 2005 U.Ill.L.Rev.209-251.7.Roe, Mark J.Delaware?s politics.118 Harv.L.Rev.2491-2543(2005).8.Romano, Roberta.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance.114 Yale L.J.1521-1611(2005).9.Subramanian, Guhan.Fixing freezeouts.115 Yale L.J.2-70(2005).10.Thompson, Robert B.and Randall S.Thomas.The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits.57 Vand.L.Rev.1747-1793(2004).11.Weiss, Elliott J.and J.White.File early, then free ride: How Delaware law(mis)shapes shareholder class actions.57 Vand.L.Rev.1797-1881(2004).2004年：

1Arlen, Jennifer and Eric Talley.Unregulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice.152 U.Pa.L.Rev.577-666(2003).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M.The business judgment rule as abstention doctrine.57 Vand.L.Rev.83-130(2004).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Alma Cohen.Firms' decisions where to incorporate.46 J.L.& Econ.383-425(2003).4.Blair, Margaret M.Locking in capital: what corporate law achieved for business organizers in the nineteenth century.51 UCLA L.Rev.387-455(2003).5.Gilson, Ronald J.and Jeffrey N.Gordon.Controlling shareholders.152 U.Pa.L.Rev.785-843(2003).6.Roe, Mark J.Delaware 's competition.117 Harv.L.Rev.588-646(2003).7.Sale, Hillary A.Delaware 's good faith.89 Cornell L.Rev.456-495(2004).8.Stout, Lynn A.The mechanisms of market inefficiency: an introduction to the new finance.28 J.Corp.L.635-669(2003).9.Subramanian, Guhan.Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses.113 Yale L.J.621-686(2003).10.Subramanian, Guhan.The disappearing Delaware effect.20 J.L.Econ.& Org.32-59(2004)11.Thompson, Robert B.and Randall S.Thomas.The new look of shareholder litigation: acquisition-oriented class actions.57 Vand.L.Rev.133-209(2004).2003年：

1.Ayres, Ian and Stephen Choi.Internalizing outsider trading.101 Mich.L.Rev.313-408(2002).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M.Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance.97 Nw.U.L.Rev.547-606(2003).3.Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell.Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law? 90 Cal.L.Rev.1775-1821(2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C.Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian.The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants.55 Stan.L.Rev.885-917(2002).5.Choi, Stephen J.and Jill E.Fisch.How to fix Wall Street: A voucher financing proposal for securities intermediaries.113 Yale L.J.269-346(2003).6.Daines, Robert.The incorporation choices of IPO firms.77 N.Y.U.L.Rev.1559-1611(2002).7.Gilson, Ronald J.and David M.Schizer.Understanding venture capital structure: A tax explanation for convertible preferred stock.116 Harv.L.Rev.874-916(2003).8.Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar.The myth of state competition in corporate law.55 Stan.L.Rev.679-749(2002).9.Langevoort, Donald C.Taming the animal spirits of the stock markets: A behavioral approach to securities regulation.97 Nw.U.L.Rev.135-188(2002).10.Pritchard, A.C.Justice Lewis F.Powell, Jr., and the counterrevolution in the federal securities laws.52 Duke L.J.841-949(2003).11.Thompson, Robert B.and Hillary A.Sale.Securities fraud as corporate governance: Reflections upon federalism.56 Vand.L.Rev.859-910(2003).2002年：

1.Allen, William T., Jack B.Jacobs and Leo E.Strine, Jr.Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law.26 Del.J.Corp.L.859-895(2001)and 56 Bus.Law.1287(2001).2.Ayres, Ian and Joe Bankman.Substitutes for Insider Trading.54 Stan.L.Rev.235-254(2001).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse M.Fried and David I.Walker.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation.69 U.Chi.L.Rev.751-846(2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C.Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian.The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy.54 Stan.L.Rev.887-951(2002).5.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman.Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value.96 Nw.U.L.Rev.521-566(2002).6.Bratton, William M.Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value.76 Tul.L.Rev.1275-1361(2002).7.Coates, John C.IV.Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers.89 Cal.L.Rev.1301-1421(2001).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B.Rock.How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law.69 U.Chi.L.Rev.871-915(2002).9.Kahan, Marcel.Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights.77 N.Y.U.L.Rev.1040-1089(2002).10.Roe, Mark J.Corporate Law’s Limits.31 J.Legal Stud.233-271(2002).11.Thompson, Robert B.and D.Gordon Smith.Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers.80 Tex.L.Rev.261-326(2001).2001年：

1.Black, Bernard S.The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets.48 UCLA L.Rev.781-855(2001).2.Coates, John C.IV.Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: a critique of the scientific evidence.79 Tex.L.Rev.271-382(2000).3.Coates, John C.IV and Guhan Subramanian.A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence.53 Stan.L.Rev.307-396(2000).4.Coffee, John C., Jr.The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control.111 Yale L.J.1-82(2001).5.Choi, Stephen J.The unfounded fear of Regulation S: empirical evidence on offshore securities offerings.50 Duke L.J.663-751(2000).6.Daines, Robert and Michael Klausner.Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs.17 J.L.Econ.& Org.83-120(2001).7.Hansmann, Henry and Reinier Kraakman.The essential role of organizational law.110 Yale L.J.387-440(2000).8.Langevoort, Donald C.The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and accountability.89 Geo.L.J.797-832(2001).9.Mahoney, Paul G.The political economy of the Securities Act of 1933.30 J.Legal Stud.1-31(2001).10.Roe, Mark J.Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control.53 Stan.L.Rev.539-606(2000).11.Romano, Roberta.Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance.18 Yale J.on Reg.174-251(2001).2000年：

1.Bratton, William W.and Joseph A.McCahery.Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference.38 Colum.J.Transnat’l L.213-297(1999).2.Coates, John C.IV.Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand? 54 U.Miami L.Rev.783-797(2000).3.Coffee, John C., Jr.Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure.25 J.Corp.L.1-39(1999).4.Fisch, Jill E.The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters.68 U.Cin.L.Rev.1061-1100(2000).5.Fox, Merritt B.Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment.85 Va.L.Rev.1335-1419(1999).6.Fried, Jesse M.Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers.67 U.Chi.L.Rev.421-477(2000).7.Gulati, G.Mitu, William A.Klein and Eric M.Zolt.Connected Contracts.47 UCLA L.Rev.887-948(2000).8.Hu, Henry T.C.Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality.78 Tex.L.Rev.777-884(2000).9.Moll, Douglas K.Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective.53 Vand.L.Rev.749-827(2000).10.Schizer, David M.Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility.100 Colum.L.Rev.440-504(2000).11.Smith, Thomas A.The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty.98 Mich.L.Rev.214-268(1999).12.Thomas, Randall S.and Kenneth J.Martin.The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans.35 Wake Forest L.Rev.31-81(2000).13.Thompson, Robert B.Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue.62 Law & Contemp.Probs.215-242(1999).1999年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：

1.Bankman, Joseph and Ronald J.Gilson.Why Start-ups? 51 Stan.L.Rev.289-308(1999).2.Bhagat, Sanjai and Bernard Black.The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance.54 Bus.Law.921-963(1999).3.Blair, Margaret M.and Lynn A.Stout.A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law.85 Va.L.Rev.247-328(1999).4.Coates, John C., IV.“Fair Value” As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions.147 U.Pa.L.Rev.1251-1359(1999).5.Coffee, John C., Jr.The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications.93 Nw.U.L.Rev.641-707(1999).6.Eisenberg, Melvin A.Corporate Law and Social Norms.99 Colum.L.Rev.1253-1292(1999).7.Hamermesh, Lawrence A.Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 Tul.L.Rev.409-495(1998).8.Krawiec, Kimberly D.Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later.1998 U.Ill.L.Rev.1039-1104.9.Langevoort, Donald C.Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation.99 Colum.L.Rev.1319-1343(1999).10.Langevoort, Donald C.Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others.52 Stan.L.Rev.87-125(1999).11.Talley, Eric.Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine.108 Yale L.J.277-375(1998).12.Williams, Cynthia A.The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency.112 Harv.L.Rev.1197-1311(1999).1998年：

1.Carney, William J., The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S.Cal.L.Rev.715-780(1998).2.Choi, Stephen, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw.U.L.Rev.916-966(1998).3.Coffee, John C., Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s)of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation.52 Bus.Law.1195-1233(1997).4.Langevoort, Donald C., Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors(and Cause Other Social Harms).146 U.Pa.L.Rev.101-172(1997).5.Langevoort, Donald C., The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior.63 Brook.L.Rev.629-676(1997).6.Mann, Ronald J.The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending.86 Geo.L.J.1-44(1997).7.Milhaupt, Curtis J., Property Rights in Firms.84 Va.L.Rev.1145-1194(1998).8.Rock, Edward B., Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L.Rev.1009-1107(1997).9.Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation.107 Yale L.J.2359-2430(1998).10.Schwab, Stewart J.and Randall S.Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions.96 Mich.L.Rev.1018-1094(1998).11.Skeel, David A., Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy.51 Vand.L.Rev.1325-1398(1998).12.Thomas, Randall S.and Martin, Kenneth J., Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals? 73 Wash.L.Rev.41-80(1998).1997年：

1.Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan.L.Rev.1487-1537(1996).2.Arlen, Jennifer and Kraakman, Reinier, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U.L.Rev.687-779(1997).3.Brudney, Victor, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L.Rev.595-665(1997).4.Carney, William J., The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J.Legal Stud.303-329(1997).5.Choi, Stephen J., Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U.Chi.L.Rev.567-651(1997).6.Fox, Merritt B., Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom.95 Mich.L.Rev.2498-2632(1997).7.Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan.L.Rev.1539-1571(1996).8.Mahoney, Paul G., The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va.L.Rev.1453-1500(1997).9.Milhaupt, Curtis J., The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw.U.L.Rev.865-898(1997).10.Skeel, David A., Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va.L.Rev.127-175(1997).1996年：

1.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv.L.Rev.1911(1996)2.Gilson, Ronald J.Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash.U.L.Q.327(1996)3.Hu, Henry T.C.Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J.Corp.L.3(1995)4.Kahan, Marcel & Michael Klausner Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash.U.L.Q.347(1996)5.Kitch, Edmund W.The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L.Rev.763(1995)6.Langevoort, Donald C.Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal.L.Rev.627(1996)7.Lin, Laura The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw.U.L.Rev.898(1996)8.Millstein, Ira M.The Professional Board, 50 Bus.Law 1427(1995)9.Thompson, Robert B.Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo.L.J.1(1995)10.Triantis, George G.and Daniels, Ronald J.The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance.83 Cal.L.Rev.1073(1995)

1995年： 公司法： 1.Arlen, Jennifer and Deborah M.Weiss A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,.105 Yale L.J.325-391(1995).2.Elson, Charles M.The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U.Cin.L.Rev.649(1995).3.Hu, Henry T.C.Heeding Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex.L.Rev.985-1040(1995).4.Kahan, Marcel The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw.U.L.Rev.565-622(1995).5.Klausner, Michael Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va.L.Rev.757-852(1995).6.Mitchell, Lawrence E.Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex.L.Rev.477-537(1995).7.Siegel, Mary Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv.J.on Legis.79-143(1995).证券法：

1.Grundfest, Joseph A.Why Disimply? 108 Harv.L.Rev.727-747(1995).2.Lev, Baruch and Meiring de Villiers Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan.L.Rev.7-37(1994).3.Mahoney, Paul G.Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.Chi.L.Rev.1047-1112(1995).4.Seligman, Joel The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv.L.Rev.438(1994).5.Seligman, Joel The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich.L.Rev.649-702(1995).6.Stout, Lynn A.Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va.L.Rev.611(1995).7.Weiss, Elliott J.and John S.Beckerman Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J.2053-2127(1995).1994年： 公司法：

1.Fraidin, Stephen and Hanson, Jon D.Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale L.J.1739-1834(1994)2.Gordon, Jeffrey N.Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum.L.Rev.124-192(1994)3.Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Lott, John R., Jr.The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L.& Econ.757-802(1993)4.Kraakman, Reiner, Park, Hyun, and Shavell, Steven When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo.L.J.1733-1775(1994)5.Mitchell, Lawrence E.Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J.425-491(1993)6.Oesterle, Dale A.and Palmiter, Alan R.Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 Iowa L.Rev.485-583(1994)

7.Pound, John The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U.L.Rev.1003-1071(1993)8.Skeel, David A., Jr.Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex.L.Rev.471-557(1994)9.Thompson, Robert B.Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand.L.Rev.1-41(1994)证券法：

1.Alexander, Janet Cooper The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.Rev.1421-1469(1994)2.Bainbridge, Stephen M.Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J.Corp.L.1-40(1993)3.Black, Bernard S.and Coffee, John C.Jr.Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich.L.Rev.1997-2087(1994)4.Booth, Richard A.The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U.L.Rev.1187-1212(1993)5.Coffee, John C., Jr.The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L.Rev 837-907(1994)6.Fox, Merritt B.Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich.L.Rev.2088-2203(1994)7.Grundfest, Joseph A.Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv.L.Rev.961-1024(1994)8.Macey, Jonathan R.Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L.Rev.909-949(1994)9.Rock, Edward B.Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L.Rev.987-1031(1994)