经济类论文（共五篇）

第一篇：经济类论文

中职学校《市场营销学》的教学思考

张家口机械工业学校席冬英

内容提要：市场营销学是一门应用性很强的学科，面对广大的中职生，如何运用现代信息技术，创新教学，激发学生兴趣，取得教学效果，需要教育工作者积极尝试、不断探索。

关键词：中职学校市场营销学教学思考

在中等职业教育中，《市场营销学》是一门以培养和提高学生理解市场营销基本原理及初步运用营销组合策略为基本能力的学科，这对培养能快速适应市场经济变化，具有一定营销推广工作能力的适用型人才具有重要的作用。针对中职生学习基础薄弱的特点，通过近几年的教学实践与探索，我在《市场营销学》教学方面有以下几点思考。

一、传统教学现存问题

1、学生素养有待提升

在现有中职学校教学中，市场营销学课程通常作为一些专业特点不明显的综合类专业的选修课程，开设在第二学年。在教学实践中我发现，大部分学生对该专业有很大的兴趣，但由于学习基础薄弱和未接触过社会知识，对市场、企业及企业管理缺乏基本认识，对营销知识缺乏深入理解的能力，难以掌握营销的基础理论，更谈不上案例分析与实际运用。

2、教学目标不够明确

作为一门选修课程，不同专业对市场营销学课程有不同的诉求，不能以一概全。而在现实教学中，大多数情况下，我们是以一套教材、一本教案、一个课件面对所有学生，既无法体现市场营销学的重要性，也无法因材、因专业施教。

3、就业市场要求较高

有调查显示，市场营销专业的用人单位均对学生的人际交往能力、语言表达能力、商品推销能力、营销策划能力和市场调研能力这五种专业技能有很高的期望和迫切的需求，但在中职学校中市场营销专业学生在课程教学过程中并

没有专门有针对性地进行重点能力的培养。

二、创新教学的几点建议

1、课程设置进一步合理化。

在课程设置上，既要考虑学生未来的就业可能及能力要求，也要考虑到专业的就业倾向，可以引导学生认识市场营销学课程与自身专业及未来发展之间的联系，提高学生认知能力和重视程度。通过课程设置和时间的合理化，使学生具备一定的基本理论知识，便于其理解营销的相关概念和理论。通过介绍专业特点、就业方向、学习方法及手段引导学生从依赖性学习向自主性学习转化。

2、注重专业能力培养。

应注重帮助学生建立起市场营销学的整体理论框架，通过关键理论的讲授、案例教学、实践教学培养学生的营销能力，形成学生对组织营销管理的系统性认识。并针对用人单位的需求对学生的人际交往能力、语言表达能力、商品推销能力、营销策划能力和市场调研能力这五种专业技能侧重培养。

3、不断创新教学手段

（1）采用“情景式”教学。“情景式”教学是模拟教学的一种，通过借助于对环境、角色、活动的模拟来帮助学生理解市场营销专业理论知识，了解市场运作规律，掌握营销管理方法和操作技能，成为具有创新意识和合作能力的营销人才的教学方法，让学生在熟悉知识点的情况下，扮演不同的情景角色，从而在模拟实践中学习和运用营销知识和操作技能，达到提高学生实践能力的教学目标。

（2）善于运用案例启发。在教学过程中，让学生围绕各章节前的引导案例，综合运用所学知识与方法对其进行分析、推理，提出解决方案，并在师生之间、同学之间进行探讨、交流的实践性教学形式。通过让学生自己分析问题和解决问题的方式，培养学生主动学习、独立思考、综合分析和创造性地解决问题的能力。

（3）发挥多媒体教学的作用。这是一种通过多媒体教学软件演示和解说理论知识的实践性教学形式。这种方式一般与日常课堂教学活动结合运用，通过图文并茂的课件演示，可以帮助学生对所学（或即将学）的知识建立感性认识，为进一步学习打好基础。

（4）积极开展实践教学。提前布置课题，让学生进行方案策划，利用课余时间开展多种形式的专题调查和实践性教学活动。通过组织到商场参观、广告分析、市场调查等活动，让学生以小组的形式组织完成，既培养团队协作能力，又有利于同学之间集思广益、取长补短。

4、进一步改进教学方式

目前，在市场营销学教学中仍以传统的教师单向授课为主。主要表现在：一般市场营销课程教学模式往往以传统教材为主，以理论讲授为重点，强调概念、注重理论，而对实践性较强的方法技巧、策略不够重视。这就造成理论与实践课之间的失衡，难以取得理想的教学效果。在遇到实际问题时，分析问题、解决问题能力较差。在讲授方式上，主要表现为单向的自上而下的垂直传输方式，拘泥于书本理论架构，“填鸭式”教育痕迹严重，应该改变原有传统模式。

在中职学校教学中，我们既不能照搬大学教学模式，又要面对中职生现状，以合理性、可行性原则组织教学，在提升学生专业素养、培养适用性人才上取得实效。

参考文献：

1、《市场营销基础》，华东师范大学出版社，作者孙天福

第二篇：经济类论文

ＷＴＯ与世界贸易自由化展望

［摘要］ＧＡＴＴ对世界贸易自由化的推动发挥了巨大的作用。如今，取代ＧＡＴＴ而成立一年多的ＷＴＯ，为坚持全球贸易秩序化和法制化轨道上运行等方面取得一定的成绩，但同时也面临着种种的考验，如非关税壁垒、大国称霸、区域贸易与全球贸易关系、保护民族工业与自由贸易关系等问题有待解决。应该 清醒地认识到自由贸易的必然性和ＷＴＯ能力的局限性。并能客观地看待中国加入ＷＴＯ问题。［关键词］国际贸易组织、关税贸易总协定、贸易自由化

一、ＧＡＴＴ与贸易自由化的进展

诞生于１９４７年的ＧＡＴＴ，是世界上国家（地区）间签署的、具有约束力的多边贸易契约，是一套系统管理各国（地区）间贸易行为的多边贸易通则。虽然它只是一个贸易协定，但是实际上早已机构化了，只是法律上从未获得真正的国际组织的地位。其主要职能是组织多边贸易谈判和对缔约方之间的贸易争端进行和作出仲裁。按照其宗旨：在国际贸易中，通过相互削减关税、清除非关税壁垒和国际贸易中的歧视待遇，以实现提高生活水平、保证充分就业和实际收入及有效需要的巨大持续增长、扩大世界资源的充分利用以及发展商品的生产与交换为目的，在ＧＡＴＴ成立以来的近半个世纪中，形成了１０项基本原则，包括非歧视性贸易原则；关税保护原则；贸易稳定原则；公平竞争原则，反进口数量限制原则；公开与透明度原则；豁免与例外原则；区域性贸易原则；对发展中国家的优惠原则；服装及纺织品的全外原则等。并主持举行了８轮全球性多边贸易谈判，包括决定建立ＷＴＯ的“乌拉圭回合”谈判。结果是，世界工业品贸易的关税平均税率由１９４７年的４０％减至目前发达国家的４％和发展中国家的１２％的水平；其缔约方由从初创时的２３国发展到ＷＴＯ成立前的１２８个国家和地区；其成员国的贸易额自最初只占世界贸易总量的２５％至今已占全球贸易的９０％。尽管ＧＡＴＴ只是个临时性的协定，其缔约方仍然实施关税特别是非关税保护，也存在“灰色区域”，但在过去的近半个世纪中，作为管理国际贸易的唯一多边协议，还是把世界贸易自由化向前推进了一大步。１９９５年，全球贸易在１９９４年取得９．５％的较大幅度增长的基础上又增长了８％，这与ＧＡＴＴ推动是分不开的。

二、过渡期间的ＷＴＯ对贸易自由化的推动。

已经结束的“乌拉圭回合”产生了多项重要的积极成果，其中之一便是使这ＧＡＴＴ这一准国际贸易组织正规化，决定于１９９５年元旦成立ＷＴＯ。

与ＧＡＴＴ相比，ＷＴＯ所涉及的领域不仅包括工农业产品贸易，而且还包括服务贸易和知识产权，其解决贸易争端的机制也更加有效。

在ＷＴＯ成立以来的一年里，经历了不少困难和曲折，但基本上完成了机构建设；同时还增加了新成员，包括中国在内的二十来个国家和地区正在申请加入ＷＴＯ。ＷＴＯ组织规模不断扩大，表明它对各国的吸引力增强，目前ＷＴＯ中发展中国家以及东欧转轨经济国家已占２／３，有助于发展中国家在多边贸易体系中发挥更大的作用；组织了新的多边贸易谈判，并且正在勾画自身的发展蓝图，准备迎接世界经济发展所带来的各种挑战。

作为一个新成立但具有永久性法律效力的ＷＴＯ，刚成立就面临三大挑战：巩固“乌拉圭回合”成果；完成该回合已涉及但尚未完成的谈判；研究国际贸易的新课题。面对实施期长达１０年，对所有缔约方具有普遍适用性、卷帙浩繁、空前复杂的“乌拉圭回合”的协议，其实施难度之大是不难想象的。为此，ＷＴＯ在ＧＡＴＴ原有基础上建立了一整套管理机构，其中一个重要的机构就是贸易制度审议机制，ＷＴＯ对各成员方的贸易政策定期进行审议，以确保其透明度和与多边协议的一致性；还建立了新的解决争端机制，以强化多边贸易体系。这一机制与以往ＧＡＴＴ比较零散的解决争端机制相比较具有更高的效率和更强的实施仲裁结果的能力，它规定所有争端最长必须在１８个月内解决，如果该机制作出的仲裁结构得不到实施，有关方面将会受到制裁。在１９９５年一年中，它受理的贸易争端已超过二十多起，比ＧＡＴＴ任何一年受理的争端都要多，其中有６起是发展中国家针对贸易大国的。在这些争端中最引人注目的当属美日汽车贸易纠纷，尽管此案最终通过双方谈判得以解决，但不能否认ＷＴＯ解决争端机制的威慑力对双方达成协议起的促进作用。以往在ＧＡＴＴ时期，贸易大国常常可以藐视该组织作出的裁决而不会受到惩罚，弱小国家的利益往往因此得不到保护。在这一问题上，ＷＴＯ有了新进展，如１９９５年４月，香港有关部门将美国对香港纺织品限制案报送ＷＴＯ裁决后，使美国取消了对香港纺织品采取的限制措施；同年７月份，哥斯达黎加和洪都拉斯就美国对其内衣进口采取限制措施向ＷＴＯ起诉，结果使美国又一次取消了限制措施。

ＷＴＯ在１９９５年还组织了“乌拉圭回合”未完成的４项服务贸易谈判：金融服务、劳工流动、基础电信和海运谈判。在金融服务谈判中，美国坚持高要价，谈判一度几乎破裂，但最终还是在欧盟的倡议下达成了一项没有美国参加的临时性协议，这可以说是史无前例的。结果，３０多个国家作出了提高其金融市场开放程度的承诺。此外，ＷＴＯ已经成立了一个委员会专门研究环境问题，并计划把所有新课题提交１９９６年１２月在新加坡召开的ＷＴＯ第一次部长级会议讲座，以为将来组织新贸易谈判做准备。总之，从ＧＡＴＴ到ＷＴＯ的新旧交替进行得还比较平稳，为多边贸易体系的发展奠定了基础。ＷＴＯ在这一年中为坚持全球贸易在秩序化和法制的轨道上运行，所作的努力是可贵的。但在一系列问题上，特别是在维护ＷＴＯ信誉和权威方面，这一新生的组织还面临着严峻的考验。

三、ＷＴＯ在推进贸易自由化过程中的严峻考验

从理论上说，ＧＡＴＴ宗旨是符合通行的国际贸易理论原则的；从条文上看已为ＷＴＯ的运行提供了制度化的保证；从实践来观察，尽管ＷＴＯ已取代了ＧＡＴＴ，但已取得的成绩距离其宗旨要求却相去甚远。并且，随着世界经济一体化的发展，一些新的课题摆到了ＷＴＯ的面前，如贸易与贸易环境、贸易与投资政策以及贸易与各国企业的竞争政策等。

首先，ＧＡＴＴ在推进贸易自由化已取得的成绩中，削减关税最为突出，这也是世界贸易量增长１０倍的主要原因之一；但同时，在另一方面，尤其是非关税壁垒障碍上，却无能为力。各国在其经济发展中，客观上有保护的需要，但由于关税减让太多，不便利其实现保护的目的，遂转而大量使用非关税壁垒措施。目前全世界关税壁垒措施已达２７００多种，成了贸易自由化的最大障碍。ＷＴＯ仍然将面对这块难啃的硬骨头。

其次，ＷＴＯ并未消除国际贸易秩序中存在的各种弊端。最突出的问题之一是，大国左右局面情况依然存在。譬如说，由于少数贸易大国的阻挠，贸易额居世界第１１位的中国至今仍未能成为ＷＴＯ的成员国；由于欧美互不相让，ＷＴＯ总干事人选拖９个月才确定下来；另外美国动辄采取单方面贸易报复措施，这对其他国家构成了重大威胁；失业严重、贸易不平衡等因素导致发达国家贸易保护主义有增无减，它们以劳工标准、环境保护等借口对广大发展中国家推行新型贸易保护主义，并在向发展中国家转让技术问题上设置了种种障碍。过去，由于主要西方国家背离ＧＡＴＴ宗旨，致使发展中国家负担沉重，两者之间的贫富差距拉大，至今依然如故；不仅如此，这种行为也使发达国家之间不断爆发贸易争端。这些倾向都对ＷＴＯ产生破坏性作用。所以，ＷＴＯ面临的最严峻考验是，当主要工业化贸易大国缺乏竞争力时或在自身短期经济利益受到威胁时，它们是否仍然愿意尊重ＷＴＯ的规则，而不凭借其经济实力去破坏它。再次，世界经济的“一体化”和集团化问题。在世界贸易的发展中，区域性贸易集团成员之间的商品交换量比重在不断增加，截止１９９４年底，在ＧＡＴＴ秘书处登记的区域性贸易规定已有１０８个。区域经济一体化具有贸易创造和贸易转移双重效应，区域贸易集团在促进贸易和经济增长的同时，也难免具有排它性，这有可能会带来贸易集团间的磨擦，甚至动摇多边贸易体系的基础。在ＧＡＴＴ第２４条区域贸易安排上，允许缔约国建立自由贸易区和关税同盟，而不必按最惠国待遇条款将同等待遇给予非成员国，这是与ＧＡＴＴ的非歧视原则相违背的。尽管规定了自由贸易区和关税同盟建立的条件和目的，并在程序上加以规范和约束，但由于这一规定本身的歧视性，以及它在规定上的法律缺陷和漏洞，使一些缔约国有可乘之机，危害其它缔约国的贸易（冯予蜀，第８１页），特别是发展中国家。势均力敌的区域化经济集团的存在和发展，意味着相互抗衡、对峙、讨价还价能力的增强，这就削弱了多边贸易谈判的效果。协调区域贸易与全球贸易之间关系就成了世界贸易组织成立之后无法回避的问题。ＷＴＯ坚持区域性贸易与全球贸易应该是互为补充的关系而不是竞争的关系，两者都应在ＷＴＯ的框架内进行，为此，ＷＴＯ成立了６９个特别工作组，具体负责协调这两者之间的关系。在加拿大倡议下，ＷＴＯ决定１９９６年初成立一个区域贸易集团委员会，以协调这些集团与多边贸易体制的关系。但其作用还有待于实践的检验。

最后，发展中国家事实上为了经济发展的需要也要对民族工业进行一定程度的贸易保护。甚至一些中等发达国家和地区为了自身利益也设法在各种程度上游离于自由贸易原则之外。如１９９６年元旦，ＷＴＯ“政府采购协议”正式生效，政府作为各国最大的买主，其对外开放意味着，在政府采购中凡是超过１５万特别提款权（ＳＤＲ）的政府采购合同都要对外招标。但签字国却只有美、日、加、以、韩、挪、瑞士等１５个国家，并较之“东京回合”的“政府采购协议”又少了瑞典、香港和新加坡。专家称此协议为“诸边（Pluralateral）协议”，以区别于其他“多边（Multilateral）协议”。ＷＴＯ的“政府采购协议”成为一个“富人俱乐部”和自由贸易的一个死角。究其原因，一方面发展中国家离政府采购的开放还相当遥远，即便有个别国有限开放，也是保护国内工业优先。如印尼立法要求“政府采购”要以最有利的价格购买外国产品，而且数额越大的合同，须以对方反购本国非油产品为条件；另一方面，签字国对等开放，由于国力相当谁也吃不了亏，但他们更大的胃口是争夺第三国的政府采购合同。如１９９４年夏，美国雷声公司与法国汤姆森电子公司在巴西争夺一个１４亿美元的亚马逊工程的开办权，最后是依靠中央情报局的帮助，才击败了竞争对手（武跃，１９９６）。

应该说，ＷＴＯ解决争端的能力至今并未受到真正的考验。目前ＷＴＯ正处理在各起争端最早要到今年初才会出初步结果；其受理的最大一起争端——美日汽车贸易争端最终是通过双边谈判得以解决的；在重大问题上，世界头号贸易大国美国往往抛弃多边渠道，采用单边或双边的方式解决问题；大国仍企图操纵ＷＴＯ；新型贸易保护主义对贸易自由化构成威胁。在中国“复关”问题上，ＷＴＯ组织作出了一定努力，遗憾的是由于少数贸易大国要价过高，中国仍然被排斥在外。显然，没有中国的参加，ＷＴＯ就不是一个完整的组织。

总之，随着世界经济的发展，国际贸易关系更加复杂，贸易范围更为广泛，各国的竞争日趋激烈，这一切都注定ＷＴＯ在推动世界贸易自由化过程中将面临更严峻的挑战。世界贸易正逐步走向全球化，如要倒退，那无疑将是把世界带入萧条。

四、自由贸易的必然性与ＷＴＯ能力的有限性

就自由贸易而言，其所以会成为一种必然，是因为９０年以来市场经济在全世界范围的展开已成为一种不可逆转的历史趋势；ＷＴＯ这一较强大的贸易自由化组织的推动；加之全球经济“一体化”的进程等，都为自由贸易的开展提供了有利条件。而且，更重要的是，二次世界大战以来，国际贸易自由化是生产和资本国际化，国际分工的深度与广度上的发展，世界经济的迅速恢复和发展，跨国公司的大量出现的结果，它们反映了世界经济和生产力发展内在必然性。

但是，贸易自由化的发展却是不平衡的：发达国家之间的贸易自由化超过了它们同发展中国家的贸易自由化及发展中国家之间的贸易自由化；区域性经济集团内部的贸易自由化超过了同集团外国家的贸易自由化；就商品而言，工业制成品的贸易自由化超过了农产品的贸易自由化；机器设备的贸易自由化超过了工业消费品尤其是“敏感性”的劳动密集型产品的贸易自由化。从而形成了有选择性的贸易，并在一定程度上与贸易保护相结合。不平衡发展的贸易自由化还具有一定的排它性。就新贸易保护主义的特点来看，它主要是发达国家在贸易自由化的基础上发展而来的，并与之并存；各国“奖出限入”的重点从限制进口转向奖励出口；以非关税壁垒为主，贸易保护措施多样化；被保护的商品不断增加；从贸易保护制度转向更系统化的管理贸易制度，强调政府干预和管理贸易，如克林顿动员了一大批美国政府机构，为美国企业制定了第一个“国家出口战略”，３年里，美国企业的业绩证明他是成功的（武跃，１９９６）。又如，欧洲国家政府投资２５０亿马克研制“空中客车”，并每年巨额补贴维持营运，到１９９３年其营业额终于击败了波音，成为世界第一。

从发达国家新贸易保护主义增长的根源来看：主要是因为世界性产业结构调整与利益集团间的矛盾；世界经济的萧条和不稳定增长；国际贸易与国际收支的不平衡发展。在这里，由于众多不同发展层次的国家存在，产业结构的调整将不断进行下去，世界经济的周期性发展也将继续下去。进而，国际经济的不平衡发展不仅在发达国家之间存在，在发展中国家之间及它们与发达国家之间还将存在，这些根源都将为贸易保护的存在提供土壤。

而且还应当承认，“乌拉圭回合”的结果仍然存在不平衡，并且其贸易自由化措施是逐步实施的，对各

国的影响也将逐步发生和体现出来。发达国家特别是欧、美、日将是主要的受益国，因为世界贸易的大部分是它们之间进行的。由于１０年内彻底取消对发展中国家进口纺织品和服装的非关税壁垒，一些新兴的工业化国家将从中获益，一些经济发展较为落后的发展中国家则面临着更为严峻的考验。关键的问题在于，ＷＴＯ推行的贸易自由化原则无法解决国家之间经济技术水平差距。这样，在其原则前提下的各种例外就完全有可能使不同类型的国家在认可其原则的基础上，又利用有关条款筑起新的贸易壁垒。

不能否认的是，美国等发达国家仍将主宰着ＷＴＯ。它们凭借其经济实力驾驭ＷＴＯ。从克林顿政府主张政府积极参与对外贸易事务，变“自由贸易”政策为“公平贸易”政策，并开始实施战略贸易政策，到克氏政府的一系列贸易行动（包括阻挠中国复关）和态度也提醒我们，一旦ＷＴＯ的有关规定对其不利，就很难保证不被践踏，毕竟在国际经济中，国家利益还是至高无上的。作为一个经济“联合国”，其所起的作用恐怕不会比联合国强多少，虽然它能在某种程度上起到抑制强权的作用，但也不能保证不被强权所利用。有鉴于此，中国对加入ＷＴＯ应有足够的思想准备。ＷＴＯ也只是一个国际组织，实质上是各成员国利益均衡和分配的结果，它不可能建设成为一个具有超国家性质的组织机构，因而它无法平衡来自内部或外部的冲击。不仅如此，它还必须面对现实的国际政治变化作出灵活反应，否则它就无法生存下去。尽管ＷＴＯ能推进贸易自由化，贸易保护也决非是暂时的，它将与自由贸易并存于世界贸易自由化的进程之中。ＷＴＯ并不能保证成员国一定能自动享受到ＷＴＯ的益处，而只是提供了一个参与竞争的机会。加入ＷＴＯ并不仅仅是单纯为获得稳定的最惠国待遇等ＷＴＯ所规定的益处，更为重要的是，通过加入ＷＴＯ将国际贸易中通行的规则和规范适用于中国的对外经济和贸易，引入更高标准的国际竞争压力和动力，来促进外贸和与之相配套的经济体制的全面改革，建立一种开放型的市场机制和一整套与之相适应的规范和宏观调控手段。使国内生产和对外贸易都能按经济规律和国际惯例办事，进而促进经济的发展，增强经济实力和国际竞争力，逐步迈向自由贸易。

显然，即使中国加入了ＷＴＯ，在自由贸易问题上，中国的国情也不允许一步到位，而只能采取过渡性贸易政策。即，要恰当地把握贸易的进程，对幼稚工业还要适度保护。这一政策既要符合国情，使国际竞争在中国目前所能承受的范围内，又要能有利于发展中国的生产力，充分发挥国内市场机制在提高生产效率和资源配置效率中的作用，并与国际市场机制保持有机联系。逐步向ＷＴＯ所要求的国际规范靠拢。期间应该联合大多数的发展中国家与贸易大国的强权进行不懈的斗争，以维护ＷＴＯ的信誉和权利，保证发展中国家的自身利益不受或少受侵犯。

总之，尽管有ＷＴＯ的推动，世界经济的发展贸易自由化将会是主流的，但贸易保护并不会因此消亡，甚至有可能并行不悖。世界贸易自由化的进程将是非常缓慢、曲折以至有可能会反复。

参考文献

武跃：“政府采购：自由贸易的雷区”《国际商报》１９９７年１月５日。

杨广志：“周岁看„世贸‟牛刀已初试”《经济日报》１９９５年１２月１５日。

班玮：“ＷＴＯ蹒跚周岁”《中华工商时报》１９９５年１２月１３日。

任烈：《贸易保护的理论依据研究》中国社会科学院研究生院博士论文，１９９５年。

冯予蜀：《国际贸易体制下的关贸总协定与中国》对外经济贸易出版社，１９９２年。

第三篇：一篇经济类英文论文(含中文翻译)

The Problem of Social Cost

社会成本问题

RONALD COASE 罗纳德·科斯

Ronald Coase is Professor Emeritus at University of Chicago LawSchool and a Nobel Laureate in Economics.This article is fromThe Journal of Law and Economics(October 1960).Several passages devoted to extended discussions of legal decisions

have been omitted.罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。本文是其外法学与经济学杂志（1960年10月）。专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个

段落已被省略。

I.THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINED This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harm-ful effects on others.The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties.The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economies of Welfare.The conclusion to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory li-able for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts(and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others).It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.一、要检查的问题

本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占领邻近物业的有害影响。在这种情况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。这种分析的结论，似乎使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最后，它会导致排除住宅区（大概是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响）工厂厂主不同的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。行动的建议的课程是不合适的，因为它们导致的结果是不一定，甚至是通常情况下，可取的，它是我的论点。

II.THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made.The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong.We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.To avoid the harm to, B would inflict harm on A.The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.I instanced in my previous article the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery disturbed a doctor in his work.To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner.The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products.Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land.If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, all increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops.The nature of the choice is clear: meat or crops.What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.To give another example, Professor George J.Stigler instances the contamination of a stream.If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes possible.It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.二、互惠性的问题

传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B上一个敌人造成的伤害和什么要决定的是：我们应该如何抑制一个？但这是错误的。我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。为了避免伤害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必须决定是：应该允许A损害B或应允许B伤害吗？问题是要避免更严重的伤害。我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械不安医生在他的工作情况。为了避免伤及医生会造成伤害的糕点。基本上这种情况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供应减少，成本篡改。另一个例子是给予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。如果这是不可避免的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得所有的肉类供应增加作物供应减少开支。选择的性质是明确的：肉类或农作物。应给予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。给另一个例如，教授乔治·J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。如果我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的鱼，将要决定的问题是：是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。

III.THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a compeletely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly(strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is without cost).A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land.Let us sup-pose that a farmer and cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring properties.Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd increases the total damage to the farmer’s crops.What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases is another matter.This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors.For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, 2 to 3 steers is $3 and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this into account along with his other costs.That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced(assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle)is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed.Of course, if, by the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost.Given that the annual cost of fencing is $9, the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply.When the fence is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time.But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical example, with 3 or fewer steers.It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property.But this is not so.If the crop was previously sold in conditions of perfect competition, marginal cost was equal to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer.In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given production would remain the same, since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged.Of course, if cattle-raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then extend their planting.But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting, by the farmer to increase.In fact, if the cattle-raising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting.The reason for this is that, for any given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land, it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated.This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example.Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred in cultivating this tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the land being $2.I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land.Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is $1.In this case $11 is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains $2.Now suppose that the cattle-raiser finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to $3;which means that the value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 payment for damage.But the total payment for damage is now $3.The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still $2.The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than $3.The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than $2.There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation.* But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the fanner but also to any subdivision of it.Suppose, for example, that the cattle have a well-defined route, say, to a brook or to a shady area.In these circumstances, the amount of damage to the crop along the route may well be great and if so, it could be that the farmer and the cattle-raiser would find it profitable to make a bargain whereby the farmer would agree not to cultivate this strip of land.But this raises a further possibility.Suppose that there is such a well de-fined route.Suppose further that the value of the crop that would be obtained by cultivating this strip of land is $10 but that the cost of cultivation is $11.In the absence of the cattle-raiser, the land would not be cultivated.However, given the presence of the cattle-raiser, it could well be that if the strip was cultivated, the whole crop would be destroyed by the cattle.In which case, the cattle-raiser would be forced to pay $10 to the farmer.It is true that the farmer would lose $1.But the cattle-raiser would lose $10.Clearly this is a situation which is not likely to last indefinitely since neither party would want this to happen.The aim of the farmer would be to induce the cattle-raiser to make a payment in return for an agreement to leave this land uncultivated.The farmer would not be able to obtain a payment greater than the cost of fencing off this piece of land nor so high as to lead the cattle-raiser to abandon the use of the neighbouring property.What payment would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargain-ers.But as the payment would not be so high as to cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this location and as it would not vary with the size of the herd, such an agreement would not affect the allocation of resources but would merely alter the distribution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value of production elsewhere will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in increasing the size of the herd.This cost will be weighed against the value of the additional meat production and, given perfect competition in the cattle industry, the allocation of resources in cattle-raising will be optimal.What needs to be emphasized is that the fall in the value of production elsewhere which would be taken into account in the costs of the cattle-raiser may well be less than the damage which the cattle would cause to the crops in the ordinary course of events.This is because it is possible, as a result of market transactions, to discontinue cultivation of the land.This is desirable in all cases in which the damage that the cattle would cause, and for which the cattle-raiser would be willing to pay, exceeds the amount which the farmer would pay for use of the land.In conditions of perfect competition, the amount which the farmer would pay for the use of the land is equal to the difference between the value of the total production when the factors are employed on this land and the value of the additional product yielded in their next best use(which would be what the farmer would have to pay for the factors).If damage exceeds the amount the farmer would pay for the use of the land, the value of the additional product of the factors employed elsewhere would exceed the value of the total product in this use after damage is taken into account.It follows that it would be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and to release the factors employed for production elsewhere.A procedure which merely provided for payment for damage to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop.But given the possibility of market transactions, a situation in which damage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endure.Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay(if the farmer was himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and would maximise the value of production.Even when the farmer is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market, this will be a purely short-term phenomenon and may be expected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will cease.The cattle-raiser will remain in that location and the marginal cost of meat production will be the same as before, thus having no long-run effect on the allocation of resources.三、损害赔偿责任的定价制度 我建议开始我的分析，通过审查案件，其中多数经济学家大概会同意将在完全令人满意的方式解决问题的破坏性业务时支付所有所造成的损害和定价体系工程进展顺利（严格来说，这意味着定价制度的运作是无成本）。

正在讨论的问题的一个很好的例子是误入牛毁坏庄稼邻近土地上生长的情况下给予。让我们支持对一个农民和牛募集邻近物业经营。让我们进一步假设，没有任何围栏之间的属性，在牛募集的畜群规模的增加而增加农民的作物的总伤害。会发生什么情况，以增加畜群的大小的边际损害的，则是另一回事。这取决于牛是否会跟随一个或是否他们往往是牛群的增加和规模上其他类似的因素或多或少不安，漫游并排。对于我的直接目的，它是无关紧要的假设边际损害为增加畜群的大小。

鉴于这是承担，造成损害的额外费用的牛的序幕征收，如果他增加从2至3阉他的畜群的牛是$3，并在决定牛群的大小，他将考虑到这一点，随着他的其他费用。也就是说，他不会提高畜群的大小，除非额外的肉产生的价值（假设牛的序幕屠宰的牛）的额外费用，这将意味着，包括摧毁了其它作物的价值更大。当然，如果就业的狗，农牧民，飞机，移动无线电和其他手段，可以减少损失数额，这些手段将通过他们的成本是低于价值的作物，它们可以防止丢失。由于是在击剑成本是$9，在牛的提出者谁希望有一群4装载机或更多将围篱支付到被架设和维护，假设，其他手段达到同样的目的，不是做这样更便宜。当围栏架设，由于损害赔偿责任的边际成本变为零除的程度，在牛群规模的增加，需要一个更强大，因此更昂贵的围栏，因为更多的公牛有责任向它倾斜在同一时间。但是，当然，这可能是牛募集便宜没有围墙受损的作物，在我算术例如，作为3个或更少的公牛，并支付。

有人可能会认为牛募集将支付所有损坏庄稼的事实将导致农民增加他的种植牛募集来占据邻近物业。但事实并非如此。如果以前在完全竞争的条件下出售作物，边际成本等于价格进行种植量，任何扩大农民的利润将减少。在新形势下，农作物损失的存在就意味着农民将在公开市场上出售的，但他的收入为一个给定的生产将保持不变，因为牛募集支付任何破坏作物的市场价格。当然，如果养牛通常涉及毁坏庄稼，到一个养牛业存在的到来可能会引发涉及农民将扩大其种植的农作物的价格。但我希望把我的个体农民的关注。

我曾经说过，占领邻近由牛募集的属性不会导致农民增加的生产量，或者更准确的种植量。事实上，如果有任何影响的养牛，它会减少种植量。这样做的原因是，任何土地道，如果受损作物的价值是如此之大，从出售完好作物的收入少于培育，大片土地的总成本，这将是为农民和牛的序幕，留下大片土地荒废，使讨价还价，即有利可图。这可以通过一个算术例子明确。最初假设，作物耕种的土地道获得的价值是12美元，在培育这一大片土地所需的费用是$ 10，$ 2耕种土地的净收益。我想简单，农民拥有土地的目的。现在假设，在牛的提出者开始，损坏农作物的价值$ 1.In这种情况下$ 11获得由农民从销售市场和$ 1是从的牛的序幕获得损害遭受的邻近物业经营净收益仍然为2美元。现在想，在牛的提出者认为它盈利增加他的畜群的大小，即使损坏的数量上升到3美元;的额外肉类生产的价值大于的额外费用，包括了额外的$ 2支付损坏。但损害的支付总额是$ 3。农民耕种土地的净收益仍然是2元。牛的序幕，将是富裕农民都同意，如果不培养他的土地，任何支付不到3美元。农民将没有培养任何大于$ 2支付土地的认同。显然是这将导致放弃种植一个双方都满意的讨价还价的余地。*但同样的论点不仅适用于整个道由电风扇培养的，而且也给它的任何细分。假设，例如，牛有一个明确的路线，比方说，一条小溪或阴凉的区域。在这种情况下，对沿线作物受损金额也可能是巨大的，如果是这样，可能是，农民和牛募集会发现是有利可图的讨价还价，农民同意不以培养狭长土地。

但是，这引发了进一步的可能性。假设有这样一个罚款的好路线。进一步假设，作物的价值将获得通过培育这个地带是10元，但种植成本11元。在牛募集的情况下，土地不会种植。然而，给予牛募集的存在，它可能是，如果带钢培养，整个作物将牛销毁。在这种情况下，牛募集将被迫支付10美元的农民。这是真正的农民将损失$1。但牛的序幕，将失去10美元。显然，这是一个情况，这是不可能无限期地持续下去，因为任何一方都不希望这种情况发生。农民的目的是诱导牛募集的支付换取了一项协议，离开这片土地荒废。农民将无法获得支付大于围栏这片土地的成本，也没有这么高，导致牛募集放弃使用邻近物业。哪些付款将在事实上将取决于作为讨价还价的精明的农民和牛募集。但作为付款就不会那么高，容易引起牛募集放弃这个位置，因为它不会随畜群的大小，这样的协议不会影响资源的分配，但仅仅是改变的分布牛提出者和农民之间的收入和财富。

我认为这是明确的，如果牛募集造成的损失承担责任和定价体系工程进展顺利，其他地方减少产值将考虑在计算涉及的额外费用，提高畜群的大小。这笔费用将额外的肉类生产的价值权衡，完美的比赛，在养牛业，养牛将是最佳的资源分配。需要强调的是，牛募集费用，将考虑在其他地方的生产价值的下降可能是小于牛会导致在日常事件对农作物的损害。这是因为它是可能的，作为市场交易的结果，停止种植的土地。在所有情况下的破坏，会导致牛，牛募集愿意支付超过数额的农民支付土地使用，这是可取的。在完全竞争的条件下，农民支付土地使用量等于总生产值之间的差异的因素时，在这片土地上雇用和其他产品的价值在他们的未来产生最好的使用（这是什么农民将不得不支付的因素）。如果损害超过数量的农民支付土地使用，其他地方就业的因素更多的产品价值将超过在此使用的产品总价值的考虑后损坏。它如下放弃种植的土地，并释放其他地方生产的因素，这将是可取的。一个程序，它只是提供付款为牛，但是这并没有让被停止种植的可能性造成作物受损将导致太小，养牛和太大的就业因素的生产要素的就业在作物的种植。但考虑到市场交易的可能性，这种情况在对农作物的损害超过土地租金，就不能忍受。是否牛募集支付农民离开土地荒废，或自己租土地，由土地所有者支付金额略高于农民将支付（如果农民自己租用的土地），最终的结果将是相同的，将最大限度地提高生产的价值。即使诱导农民种庄稼，它不会是有利可图的培养，在市场上出售，这将是一个纯粹的短期现象，预期可能会导致根据该协议将停止种植。牛募集将保持在该位置和肉类生产的边际成本会像以前一样，因此，资源的分配上没有长期的效果。

IV.THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH NO LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE I now turn to the case in which, although the pricing system is assumed to worksmoothly(that is, costlessly), the damaging business is not liable for any of the damage which it causes.This business does not have to make a payment to those damaged by its actions.I propose to show that the allocation of resources will be the same in this case as it was when the damaging business was liable for damage caused.As I showed in the previous case that the allocation of resources was optimal, it will not be necessary to repeat this part of the argument.I return to the case of the farmer and the cattle-raiser.The farmer would suffer increased damage to his crop as the size of the herd increased.Suppose that the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd is 3 steers(and that this is the size of the herd that would be maintained if crop damage was not taken into account).Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to $3 if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to 2 steers, up to $5 if the herd were reduced to 1 steer and would pay up to $6 if cattle-raising was abandoned.The cattle-raiser would therefore receive 53 from the farmer if he kept 2 steers instead of 3.This $3 foregone is therefore part of the cost incurred in keeping the third steer.Whether the $3 is a payment which the cattle-raiser has to make if he adds the third steer to his herd(which it would be if the cattle-raiser was liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop)or whether it is a sum of money whichhe would have received if he did not keep a third steer(which it would be if the cattle-raiser was not liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop)does not affect the final result.In both cases $3 is part of the cost of adding a third steer, to be included along with the other costs.If the increase in the value of production in cattle-raising through increasing the size of the herd from 2 to 3 is greater than the additional costs that have to be incurred(including the $3 damage to crops), the size of the herd will be increased.Otherwise, it will not.The size of the herd will be the same whether the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused to the crop or not.It may be argued that the assumed starting point—a herd of 3 steers—was arbitrary.And this is true.But the farmer would not wish to pay to avoid crop damage which the cattle-raiser would not be able to cause.For example, the maximum annual payment which the farmer could be induced to pay could not exceed $9.the annual cost of fencing.And the farmer would only be willing to pay this sum if it did not reduce his earnings to a level that would cause him to abandon cultivation of this particular tract of land.Furthermore, the farmer would only be willing to pay this amount if he believed that, in the absence of any payment by him, the size of the herd maintained by the cattle-raiser would be 4 or more steers.Let us assume that this is the case.Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to $3 if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to 3 steers, up to $6 if the herd were reduced to 2 steers, up to $8 if one steer only were kept and up to $9 if cattle-raising were abandoned.It will be noticed that the change in the starting point has not altered the amount which would accrue to the cattle-raiser if he reduced the size of his herd by any given amount.It is still true that the cattle-raiser could receive an additional $3 from the farmer if he agreed to reduce his herd from 3 steers to 2 and that the $3 represents the value of the crop that would be destroyed by adding the third steer to the herd.Although a different belief on the part of the farmer(whether justified or not)about the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser would maintain in the absence of payments from him may affect the total payment he can be induced to pay, it is not true that this different belief would have any effect on the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser will actually keep.This will be the same as it would be if the cattle-raiser had to pay for damage caused by his cattle, since a receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same amount.It might be thought that it would pay the cattle-raiser to increase his herd above the size that he would wish to maintain once a bargain had been made, in order to induce the farmer to make a larger total payment.And this may be true.It is similar in nature to the action of the farmer(when the cattle-raiser was liable for damage)in cultivating land on which, as a result of an agreement with the cattle-raiser, planting would subsequently be abandoned(including land which would not be cultivated at all in the absence of cattle-raising).But such manoeuvres are preliminaries to an agreement and do not affect the long-run equilibrium position, which is the same whether or not the cattle-raiser is held responsible for the crop damage brought about by his cattle.It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them.But the ultimate result(which maximises the value of production)is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.四、无损害赔偿责任的电价体系

现在我想谈谈案中，虽然定价体系工作的顺利开展（即，无成本），损坏业务是不会造成任何损害承担责任。此业务并没有使那些破坏其行动付款。我建议，以表明在这种情况下，资源的分配将是相同的，因为它是破坏性的企业造成的损失承担责任时。正如我在前面的例子表明，最佳的资源分配，它不会是必要的重复这部分的说法。我回到了农民和牛募集的情况下。农民会受到他的牛群的规模增加作物的伤害增加。假设牛募集的畜群的大小是3装载机（，这将保持对作物的损害，如果不考虑畜群的大小）。那么，农民将是愿意以支付高达3美元的牛的提出者是否会减少他的畜群2装载机，高达500如果牛群被减少到1引导和将支付高达6元如果养牛被遗弃。牛序幕从农民将因此获得53，如果他保持2装载机，而不是3。这个耗资3损失，因此在保持第三督导所需的费用的一部分。无论是3美元，是1支付其中的牛的提出者有，如果他增加了第三次带领他的羊群（其中它会是在牛的提出者是否可农民对作物造成的损害）或是否它是1钱，他将已收到的，如果他不保持第三督导（这将是牛募集到农民对作物造成的损害不承担任何责任）的总和，不影响最终结果。在这两种情况下$ 3是第三督导，与其他费用一起被列入成本的一部分。大于，以将招致包括的$ 3损坏农作物的额外成本，通过增加大小鬼从2至3养牛生产价值的增加是否，牛群的规模将是增加。否则，它不会。畜群的大小将是相同的牛募集是否是作物或造成的损失承担责任。

它可能被认为是武断的假定出发点了3肉牛畜群。这是真实的。但农民不希望要避免牛募集将无法造成的农作物损失。例如，可诱导农民支付每年最高支付不能超过9美元。击剑的成本。和农民只会愿意支付这笔如果它没有减少他的收入水平，将导致他放弃这片土地特别是道种植。此外，农民才会愿意支付这笔款项，如果他相信，在任何由他支付的情况下，牛募集保持畜群的大小是4个或更多的指导。让我们假设是这种情况。那么，农民将是愿意以支付高达3美元的牛的提出者是否会减少他的牛群3装载机，6元如果牛群分别减少2装载机，至8元，如果1转向只被保持和上升到$9，如果养牛被遗弃。它将会看到，在起点的变化并没有改变的金额将拨归牛的序幕，如果他任何给定的金额减少了他的畜群规模。它是仍然真实，在牛的提出者可以接收从农民1额外的$3，如果他同意减少他的牛群3装载机2添加第三3美元表示的，将被破坏作物的价值引导到牛群。虽然部分农民对不同的信仰，对大小牛群，牛募集将保持在他付款的情况下（是否正当与否），可能会影响他可诱发支付的总支付，它是不正确的，这种不同的信仰，实际上将保持牛群牛募集规模上有任何的影响。这将是相同的，因为它会是牛的序幕，如果不得不支付他的牛造成的损害，因为收到一个给定的金额损失相当于支付相同数额。

它可能会认为这将支付的牛的序幕，以增加他的畜群以上的规模，他希望保持已经取得了一次讨价还价，以促使农民作出更大的支付总额。这可能是真实的。它在本质上是相似的农民行动（当牛募集的损害赔偿责任），在培养上，为土地了与牛募集的协议的结果，种植随后将被抛弃（包括土地，在养牛的情况下不能种植）在所有。但是，这些演习是达成协议的预赛和不影响长期均衡的位置，这是牛募集与否举行的关于他的牛所带来的农作物损失负责。

它是要知道是否是因为没有建立这种权利的初始划定不可能有没有市场交易，转让和重组造成的损害不承担责任或损害商业。但最终的结果（产值最大化）是独立的法律地位，如果定价体系被假定为无成本。

V.THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED ANEW

The harmful effects of the activities of a business can assume a wide variety of forms.An early English case concerned a building which, by obstructing currents of air, hindered the operation of a windmill.A recent case in Florida which cast a shadow on the cabana, swimming pool and sunbathing areas of a neighbouring hotel.The problem of straying cattle and the damaging of crops which was the subject of detailed examination in the two preceding sections, although it may have appeared to be rather a special case, is in fact but one example of a problem which arises in many different guises.To clarify the nature of my argument and to demonstrate its general applicability, I propose to illustrate it anew by reference to four actual cases.Let us first reconsider the case of Sturges v.Bridgman which I used as an illustration of the general problem In my article on “The Federal Communica-tions Commission.” In this case, a confectioner(in Wigmore Street)used two mortars and pestles in connection with his business(one had been in opera-tion in the same position for more than 60 years and the other for more than 26 years).A doctor then came to occupy neighbouring premises(in Wimpole Street).The confectioner’s machinery caused the doctor no harm until, eight years after he had first occupied the premises, he built a consulting room at the end of his garden right against the confectioner’s kitchen.It was then found that the noise and vibration caused by the confectioner’s machinery made it difficult for the doctor to use his new consulting room.“In particular...the noise prevented him from examining his patients by auscultation for diseases of the chest.He also found it impossible to engage with effect in any occupation which required thought and attention.” The doctor therefore brought a legal action to force the confectioner to stop using his machinery.The courts had lit-tle difficulty in granting the doctor the injunction he sought.“Individual cases of hardship may occur in the strict carrying out of the principle upon which we found our judgment, but the negation of the principle would lead even more to individual hardship, and would at the same time produce a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes.”

The court’s decision established that the doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner from using his machinery.But, of course, it would have been possible to modify the arrangements envisaged in the legal ruling by means of a bargain between the parties.The doctor would have been willing to waive his right and allow the machinery to continue in operation if the confectioner would have paid him a sum of money which was greater than the loss of income which he would suffer from having to move to a more costly or less convenient location or from having to curtail his activities at this location or, as was suggested as a possibility, from having to build a separate wall which would deaden the noise and vibration.The confectioner would have been willing to do this if the amount he would have to pay the doctor was less than the fall in income he would suffer if he had to change his mode of operation at this location, abandon his operation or move his confectionery business to some other location.The solution of the problem depends essentially on whether the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner’s income than it subtracts from doctor’s.But now consider the situation if the confectioner had won the case.The confectioner would then have had the right to continue operating his noise and vibration-generating machinery without having to pay anything to the doctor.The boot would have been on the other foot: the doctor would have had to pay the confectioner to induce him to stop using the machinery.If the doctor’s income would have fallen more through continuance of the use of this machinery than it added to the income of the confectioner, there would clearly be room for a bargain whereby the doctor paid the confectioner to stop using the machinery.That is to say, the circumstances in which it would not pay the confectioner to continue to use the machinery and to compensate the doctor for the losses that this would bring(if the doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner’s using his machinery)would be those in which it would be in the interest of the doctor to make a payment to the confectioner which would induce him to discontinue the use of the machinery(if the confectioner had the right to operate the machinery).The basic conditions are exactly the same in this case as they were in the example of the cattle which destroyed crops.With costless market transactions, the decision of the courts concerning liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources.It was of course the view of the judges that they were affecting the working of the economic system-and in a desirable direction.Any other decision would have had “a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes,” an argument which was elaborated by examining the example of a forge operating on a barren moor.which was later developed for residential purposes.The judges’ view that they were settling how the land was to be used would be true only in the case in which the costs of carrying out the necessary market transactions exceeded the gain which might be achieved by any rearrangement of rights.And it would be desirable to preserve the areas(Wimpole Street or the moor)for residential or professional use(by giving non-industrial users the right to stop the noise, vibration, smoke, etc., by injunction)only if the value of the additional residential facilities obtained was greater than the value of cakes or iron lost.But of this the judges seem to have been unaware.The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem strange to an economist because many of the factors on which the decision turns are, to an economist, irrelevant.Because of this, situations which are, from an economic point of view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts.The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximise the value of production.In the case of Bass v.Gregory fresh air was drawn in through the well which facilitated the production of beer but foul air was expelled through the well which made life in the adjoining houses less pleasant.The economic problem was to decide which to choose: a lower cost of beer and worsened amenities in adjoining houses or a higher cost of beer and improved amenities.In deciding this question, the “doctrine of lost grant” is as relevant as the colour of the judge’s eyes.But it has to be remembered that the immediate question faced by the courts is not what shall be done by whom but who has the legal right to do what.It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights.And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.五、存在问题的再目录

业务活动的有害影响，可以承担各种各样的形式。早期的英国案例，涉及建筑，阻碍气流，阻碍了风车的运作。在佛罗里达州的一个最近的案例涉及建筑的小屋投下了阴影，邻近酒店的游泳池和日光浴地区。误入牛和破坏性的作物，这是前两个部分的详细检查，虽然它可能已经出现，而成为一个特殊的情况的问题，实际上是一个问题，在许多不同的形式出现的一个例子。为了阐明我的论点的本质，并展示其普遍适用性，我建议重新参考四个实际案例来说明。

首先，让我们重新斯特奇斯诉布里奇曼的情况下，我在我的文章“联邦通信委员会。”在这种情况下的一般问题的说明，糕点（Wigmore街道）使用了迫击炮和杵在与他的业务（一直在歌剧中，60岁以上和其他在同一位置超过26年）的连接。医生后来占据邻近楼宇（在Wimpole街）。糕点机械医生造成任何伤害，直到8年后，他第一次占领的前提下，他建立了一个在他对糕点的厨房花园年底诊室。它然后被发现，糕点的机械噪声和振动造成难以医生用他的新诊室。“尤其是。。噪音阻止他检查他的病人听诊胸部疾病。他还发现了它不可能与从事任何职业，这需要思想和注意力的效果。“因此，医生带来了法律的行动，以迫使糕点停止使用他的机械。法院给予他寻求医生的禁令点燃地幔困难。“在严格执行的原则后，我们发现我们的判断，个别情况下可能会发生困难，但这一原则的否定甚至会导致更多的个人困难，将在同一时间产生不利影响的发展后1土地作住宅用途。“

让我们先来法院的判决确定，医生的权利，以防止糕点师用他的机械。但是，当然，这将有可能修改在法律裁决的安排设想通过各方之间的讨价还价。医生会愿意放弃他的权利，并让机器继续运作，如果糕点师将付给他一笔钱，这是大于收入的损失，他将遭受不利影响或移动到较为昂贵的不太方便的位置，或从他在这个位置，以减少活动，或者是作为一种可能性的建议，从建立一个单独的墙，这将缓和的噪声和振动。糕点会一直愿意这样做，如果他将不得不支付医生的金额小于收入下降，他将遭受如果他改变他的运作模式，在这个位置放弃他的行动或移动他的糖果业务一些其他的位置。问题的解决，根本上取决于是否继续使用的机械增加了更多的糕点师的收入比从医生的减去。但现在考虑的情况，如果糕点师曾赢得了这场官司。糕点，然后将有权利继续他的噪音和振动产生的机械操作，而无需支付任何费用医生。引导已在另一只脚：医生将不得不支付的糕点，以诱使他停止使用机器。如果医生的收入将通过继续使用这种机器比它添加到糕点的收入下降，显然是有，据此医生支付的糕点停止使用的机械讨价还价的余地。也就是说，的情况下，在其中它会不支付的糕点继续使用机械和以弥补的损失，这会带来医生（如果医生不得不以防止对糕点的用他的机器的权利）将是它会在医生的利益作出支付的糕点，这将促使他停止使用的机器（如糕点有经营权的机械）。正是在这种情况下的基本条件相同，因为他们在牛，庄稼被毁的例子。花钱的市场交易中，有关损害赔偿责任的法院的决定将是没有对资源分配的影响。这是当然的法官认为，他们影响的经济体系，在一个理想的方向工作。有任何其他决定“后，土地开发作住宅用途1的不利影响，”这是一个贫瘠的荒野上通过检查一个铁匠铺操作系统的例子阐述论点。后来发展为住宅用途。法官认为，他们要使用的土地是如何被解决，将是真实的，只有在案件中，开展必要的市场交易的成本超过可能被重排的任何权利方面所取得的收益。，这将是可取的，如果只保留价值的住宅或专业领域（Wimpole街或沼地）（非工业用户有权停止禁令的噪声，振动，烟雾等，通过）获得额外的住宿设施是大于蛋糕或丢失的铁的价值。但法官似乎已经不知道。

在确定的法律权利由法院聘请的推理往往会经济学家似乎很奇怪，因为许多因素上决定轮流，一个经济学家，不相干的。正因为如此，这是的情况下，从经济角度来看，相同的将被视为完全不同的法院。在所有情况下的有害影响的经济问题是如何最大限度地提高生产的价值。在巴斯诉格雷戈里新鲜空气的情况下制定通过的好，这有利于生产的啤酒，但污浊的空气，通过在毗邻的房子不太愉快的生活以及开除。经济问题是决定选择：啤酒更低的成本和恶化，毗邻的房屋或设施的啤酒和改进设施的成本较高。在决定这个问题，“批丢失的教义”，是法官的眼睛颜色有关。但要记住，法院所面临的切身问题不应当由谁来做什么，但谁拥有合法权利做什么。它始终是可能的修改市场上交易的初始权利的法律划界。当然，如果这样的市场交易是无成本，这样的权重排总是会发生，如果它会导致增加产值。

VI.THE COST OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

The argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption(explicit in Sections III and IV and tacit in Section V)that there were no costs involved in carrying out market transactions.This is, of course, a very unrealistic assump-tion.In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed and so on.These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.In earlier sections, when dealing with the problem of the rearrangement of legal rights through the market, it was argued that such a rearrangement would be made through the market whenever this would lead to an increase in the value of production.But this assumed costless market transactions.Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.When it is less, the granting of an injunction(or the knowledge that it would be granted)or the liability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued(or may prevent its being started)which would be undertaken if market transactions were costless.In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other.But unless this is the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it would bring, may never be achieved.The part played by economic considerations in the process of delimiting legal rights will be discussed in the next section.In this section, I will take the initial delimitation of rights and the costs of carrying out market transactions as given.It is clear that an alternative form of economic organisation which could achieve the same result at less cost than would be incurred by using the market value of production to be raised.As I explained many years ago, the firm represents such an alternative to organising production through market transactions.Within the firm individual bargains between the various cooperating factors of production are eliminated and for a market transaction is substituted an administrative decision.The rearrangement of production then takes place without the need for bargains between the owners of the factors of production.A landowner who has control of a large tract of land may devote his land to various uses taking into account the effect that the interrelations of the various activities will have on the net return of the land, thus rendering unnecessary bargains between those undertaking the various activities.Owners of a large building or of several adjoining properties in a given area may act in much the same way.In effect, using our earlier terminology, the firm would acquire the legal rights of all the parties and the rearrangement of activities would not follow on a rearrangement of rights by contract, but as a result of an administrative decision as to how the rights should be used.It does not, of course, follow that the administrative costs of organizing a transaction through a firm are inevitably less than the costs of the market transactions which are superseded.But where contracts are peculiarly diffi-cult to draw up and an attempt to describe what the parties have agreed to do or not to do(e.g.the amount and kind of a smell or noise that they may make or will not make)would necessitate a lengthy and highly involved docu-ment, and, where, as is probable, a long-term contract would be desirable, it would be hardly surprising if the emergence of a firm or the extension of the activities of an existing firm was not the solution adopted on many occasions to deal with the problem of harmful effects.This solution would be adopted whenever the administrative costs of the firm were less than the costs of the market transactions that it supersedes and the gains which would result from the rearrangement of activities greater than the firm’s costs of organising them.I do not need to examine in great detail the character of this solution since I have explained what is involved in my earlier article.But the firm is not the only possible answer to this problem.The admin-istrative costs of organising transactions within the firm may also be high, and particularly so when many diverse activities are brought within the control of a single organisation.In the standard case of a smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities, the adminis-trative costs might well be so high as to make any attempt to deal with the problem within the confines of a single firm impossible.An alternative solution is direct government regulation.Instead of instituting a legal system of rights which can be modified by transactions on the market, the government may im-pose regulations which state what people must or must not do and which have to be obeyed.Thus, the government(by statute or perhaps more likely through an administrative agency)may, to deal with the problem of smoke nuisance, used(e.g.that smoke preventing devices should be installed or that coal or oil should not be burned)or may confine certain types of business to certain districts(zoning regulations).The government is, in a sense, a superfirm(but of a very special kind)since it is able to influence the use of factors of production by administrative decision.But the ordinary firm is subject to cheeks in its operations because of the competition of other firms, which might administer the same activities at lower cost and also because there is always the alternative of market transactions as against organisation within the firm if the administrative costs become too great.The government is able, if it wishes, to avoid the market altogether, which a firm can never do.The firm has to make market agreements with the owners of the factors of production that it uses.Just as the government can conscript or seize property, so it can decree that factors of production should only be used in such-and-such a way.Such authoritarian methods save a lot of trouble(for those doing the organising).Furthermore, the government has at its disposal the police and the other law enforcement agencies to make sure that its regulations are carried out.It is clear that the government has powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost than could a private organisation(or at any rate one without special governmental powers).But the governmental admin-istrative machine is not itself costless.It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly.Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fallible administration subject to political pres-sures and operating without any competitive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the efficiency with which the economic system operates.Furthermore, such general regulations which must apply to a wide variety of cases will be enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate.From these considerations it follows that direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm.But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency.This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.There is, of course, a further alternative which is to do nothing about the problem at all.And given that the costs involved in solving the problem by regulations issued by the governmental administrative machine will often be heavy(particularly if the costs are interpreted to include all the consequences which follow from the government engaging in this kind of activity), it will no doubt be commonly the case that the gain which would come from regulating the actions which give rise to the harmful effects will be less than the costs involved in government regulation.The discussion of the problem of harmful effects in this section(when the costs of market transactions are taken into account)is extremely inadequate.But at least it has made clear that the problem is one of choosing the appro-priate social arrangement for dealing with the harmful effects.All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm.Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects.Economists need to study the work of the broker in bring-ing parties together, the effectiveness of restrictive covenants, the problems of the large-scale real-estate development company, the operation of government zoning and other regulating activities.It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation.But this belief, even if justified, does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed.It does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn.This, it seems to me, has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in different ways.But it would be unfortunate if this investigation were undertaken with the aid of a faulty economic analysis.The aim of this article is to indicate what the economic approach to the problem should be.六、考虑市场交易成本

参数已进行到这一点（在第三节和第四节和第五节默契在明确）有开展市场交易不涉及成本的假设。当然，这是一个非常不现实的假设。为了进行市场交易，这是必要的，发现它是一个愿望，处理，告知人有意愿来处理和在什么条件下，进行讨价还价的谈判，起草合同，进行必要的检查，以确保合同条款等正在观察。无论如何，以防止将进行无成本定价体系工作的世界中，许多交易，这些操作往往非常昂贵，充分昂贵。

在前面的章节中，与重排，通过市场的合法权益的问题进行处理时，有人认为，这种重排，将通过市场时，这将导致产值的增加。但这种假设不花钱的市场交易。一旦考虑到进行市场交易的成本很显然，这样的权重排时，将只进行重排后的生产值增加大于这将带来约涉及的费用。当它是少，授予强制令（或将被授予的知识）或支付损害赔偿的责任，可能会导致被停止活动的（或可能妨碍其正在启动），如果市场交易是无成本的，将进行。在这种情况下，初步划定的合法权利，也有经济体制与经营效率的影响。一个安排的权利，可能会带来更大的价值比任何其他的生产。但除非这是规定的权利的法律制度安排，达到相同的结果，改变，并通过市场相结合的权利的成本可能是最佳的安排，这种权利和生产更大的价值，它会带来如此巨大，可能永远无法实现。经济上的考虑在划定的法律权利的过程中发挥的部分将在下一节中讨论。在本节中，我将采取初步划定的权利和进行市场交易，给定的费用。

这是另一种形式的经济组织可以以更低的成本实现相同的结果，将利用市场发生将使产值提高。正如我解释了很多年前，该公司表示这种通过市场交易来组织生产的替代。在企业内部生产要素之间的各种合作的个人讨价还价被淘汰，市场交易取代行政决定。然后重新安排生产，而不需要对生产要素的所有者之间讨价还价的地方。一个地主有一大片土地的控制，考虑各种用途的土地纯收益的效果，各项活动的相互关系，将有可能把自己的土地，从而使开展的各项活动之间的不必要的讨价还价。大型建筑，或在某一领域的几个毗邻物业的业主可能在大致相同的方式行事。效果，在使用我们前面的术语，该公司将收购所有各方和重排的活动不会按照一个由合同权利的重排的合法权益，但作为一个行政决定的权利应该如何使用。

当然，它不遵循，通过企业组织交易的行政费用是不可避免的比被取代的市场交易成本。但合同是独有很难邪教组织制订和试图说明什么各方都同意这样做或不这样做（如气味或噪音，他们可能不会让的数量和种类）将须漫长和高度参与的实况，并在那里，是可能的，长期的合同将是可取的，这将是不足为奇的，如果出现公司或扩建现有企业的活动是不是解决问题的方法通过多次处理有害影响的问题。该解决方案将通过时，该公司的行政费用不到的，它取代了市场交易的成本和收益，这将导致重排的活动大于组织他们公司的成本。我不需要非常详细的检查，因为我已解释过什么是我以前的文章中涉及的这一解决方案的特点。

但该公司没有这个问题的唯一可能的答案。该公司筹办事务内的行政成本，也可能是高的，尤其是当许多不同的活动，在一个单一的组织控制。在烟雾滋扰的标准的情况下，这可能会影响广大的人在从事各种各样的活动，行政成本可能如此之高，使一个范围内来处理这个问题的任何企图单个企业是不可能的。另一种方法是政府直接调控。提起的权利的法律制度，这可以通过交易市场上的修改，而不是政府可能提高对法规，这说明人们必须或不能做，哪些必须遵守。因此，政府（法规或者更可能通过行政机关），处理与一定的生产方法应该或不应该被用来（应安装防止设备的egthat烟雾或烟雾滋扰的问题，法令煤或石油不应该被烧毁）或某些地区区划法规可能限制某些类型的业务。

从某种意义上说，政府是一个superfirm（但一个非常特殊的一种），因为它是能够通过行政决定影响生产要素的使用。但普通的公司是在其他公司的竞争，这可能会以较低的成本管理同样的活动，也因为其操作的脸颊，因为总是有替代市场交易，对组织在企业内部，如果行政成本成为太大了。政府是可以的，如果它希望，以避免完全的市场，坚决不能做。该公司拥有市场的协议，它使用的生产要素的所有者。正如政府可以征兵或扣押财产，所以它可以法令，生产要素只应在和这样一种方式使用。这种专制的方法节省了很多麻烦（那些做主办）。此外，政府已在其处置的警察和其他执法机构，以确保其法规进行。

很显然，政府有可能使其能够在较低的成本比私人组织（或在任何率没有特殊的政府权力之一）做一些事情的权力。但政府的行政机本身并不是无成本的。事实上，它可以是上一次极其昂贵的。此外，也没有理由认为，限制和区划法规，1犯错误行政受到政治压力措施和经营没有任何竞争力的检查，一定会永远是那些提高效率与经济体制的运作。此外，这样的一般规定必须适用于种类繁多的情况下将被强制在某些情况下，他们显然是不合适的。从这些方面考虑，政府直接监管不一定会提供更好的结果比离开市场或企业要解决的问题。但同样没有任何理由为什么，有时，这种政府的行政法规不应导致经济效率的改善。这似乎特别容易时，通常是烟雾滋扰的情况下，大量的人参与和因此在处理的问题，通过市场或公司的成本可能很高。

当然，这是在所有有关问题做了进一步的替代。并给予解决的问题，由政府行政机发出的规例所涉及的费用往往是沉重的（特别是如果费用被解释为包括从政府从事这类活动的后续的一切后果），它不会无疑是通常的情况下，增益来调节而引起的有害影响的行动将少于政府监管所涉及的费用。

在本节（当市场交易成本的考虑）的有害影响的问题的讨论是非常不足。但它至少已明确表示，问题是选择合适的处理的有害影响的社会安排。所有的解决方案成本，并没有任何理由假设政府监管，干脆就叫市场或企业，因为这个问题没有得到很好的处理。令人满意的政策意见只能来自病人的研究了如何在实践中，市场，企业和政府处理的有害影响的问题。经济学家需要研究的经纪人带来的各方一起工作的限制性条款的效力，大型房地产开发公司，政府区划和其他规管活动的运作问题。这是我的信念，经济学家和决策者，都倾向于高估的优势，从政府监管。但这样的信念，即使有理，不会做多建议应削减政府的监管。它并没有告诉我们应制定边界线。这一点，在我看来，有来自一个详细的调查，以不同的方式处理问题的实际效果。但它会是不幸的，如果这个调查是一个错误的经济分析的援助承诺。这篇文章的目的是要表明，经济的解决问题的方法应该是什么。

VII.THE LEGAL DELIMITATION OF RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC

PROBLEM

The discussion in Section V not only served to illustrate the argument but also afforded a glimpse at the legal approach to the problem of harmful effects.The cases considered were all English but a similar selection of American cases could easily be made and the character of the reasoning would have been the same.Of course, if market transactions were costless, all that matters(questions of equity apart)is that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.But as we have seen, the situation is quite different when market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to change the arrangement of rights established by the law.In such cases, the courts directly influence economic activity.It would therefore seem desirable that the courts should understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences into account when making their decisions.Even when it is possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out.A thorough examination of the presuppositions of the courts in trying such cases would be of great interest but I have not been able to attempt it.Nevertheless it is clear from a cursory study that the courts have often recognized the economic implications of their decisions and are aware(as many economists are not)of the reciprocal nature of the problem.Furthermore, from time to time, they take these economic implications into account, along with other factors, in arriving at their decisions.The American writers on this subject refer to the question in a more explicit fashion than do the British.Thus, to quote Prosser on Torts, a person may make use of his own property or...conduct his own affairs at the expense of some harm to his neighbours.He may operate a factory whose noise and smoke cause some discomfort to others, so long as he keeps within reasonable bounds.It is only when his conduct is unreasonable,in the light of its utilitliy and the harm which results [italics added], that it becomes a nuisance....As it was said in an ancient case in regard to candle-making in a town,“Le utility del chose excusera le noisomeness del stink.”

The world must have factories, smelters, oil refineries, noisy ma-chinery and blasting, even at the expense of some inconvenience to those in the vicinity and the plaintiff may be required to accept some not unreasonable discomfort for the general good.The standard British writers do not state as explicitly as this that a comparison between the utility and harm produced is an element in deciding whether a harmful effect should be considered a nuisance.But similar views, if less strongly expressed, are to be found.The doctrine that the harmful effect must be substantial before the court will act is, no doubt, in part a reflection of the fact that there will almost always be some gain to offset the harm.And in the reports of individual cases, it is clear that the judges have had in mind what would be lost as well as what would be gained in deciding whether to grant an injunction or award damages.Thus, in refusing to prevent the destruction of a prospect by a new building, the judge stated: I know no general rule of common law, which...says, that building so as to stop another’s prospect is a nuisance.Was that the case, there could be no great towns;and I must grant injunctions to all the new buildings in this town...The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have harmful effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for them.What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm.In a world in which there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the legal system, the courts, in cases relating to nuisance, in effect, making a decision on the economic problem and determining how resources are to be employed.It was argued that the courts are conscious of this and that they often make, although not always in a very explicit fashion, a comparison between what would be gained and what lost by preventing actions which have harmful effects.But the delimitation of rights is also the result of statutory enactments.Here we also find evidence of an appreciation of the reciprocal nature of the problem.While statutory enactments add to the list of nuisances, action is also taken to legalize what would otherwise be nuisances under the common law.The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective government action is, in fact, often the result of government action.Such action is not necessarily unwise.But there is a real danger that extensive government intervention in the economic system may lead to the protection of those responsible for harmful effects being carried too far.七、作者权利的法律界定及经济问题

在第五节的讨论不仅有助于说明的论点，但也给予一瞥法律途径的有害影响的问题。考虑案件都是英语，但类似的选择了美国的情况下可以很容易地和推理的性质本来相同。当然，如果市场交易是无成本，所有这些事项除了股权问题是，各方的权利，应该是定义和法律行动的结果很容易预测的。但是，正如我们所看到的，情况是完全不同的市场交易时，是如此昂贵，使其难以改变法律规定的权利的安排。在这种情况下，法院直接影响经济活动。因此，这似乎是可取的，法院应了解他们的决定的经济后果，只要这是可能的，没有创造太多的法律地位本身的不确定性，应考虑到这些后果时，他们的决定。即使它是可能改变法律划定的权利，通过市场交易，这显然是可取的，以减少此类交易的需要，从而减少就业资源，在执行。

一个前提，法院在这种情况下试图彻底检查，将是极大的兴趣，但我一直无法尝试。尽管如此，它是从一个粗略的研究清楚，法院经常承认他们的决定对经济的影响，并意识到问题的互惠性质（如许多经济学家都没有）。此外，不时，他们考虑到这些经济的影响，加上其他因素，在到达他们的决定。对这一问题的美国作家，是指比英国更明确的方式问题。因此，引用普罗瑟侵权，可能使一个人使用自己的财产。。进行自己的事情，在牺牲一些伤害他的邻居。他可能操作的工厂，其噪音和烟雾，给他人造成一些不适，只要他保持在合理的范围之内。

世界必须有工厂，冶炼厂，炼油厂，嘈杂的马奇内里和爆破，甚至不惜牺牲一些不便，给那些在附近，原告可能会被要求接受一些不讲理的不适，在总体上是好的。

标准的英国作家没有明确说明，产生的效用和伤害之间的比较是在决定是否应被视为滋扰产生有害作用的元素。但类似的看法，如果那么强烈的表达，都可以找到。该学说的有害影响，法院将采取行动之前，必须是实质性的，是毫无疑问的一部分，将有几乎总是会有一些增益，以抵消伤害的事实反映。在个别情况的报告，很显然，法官已经在头脑里将失去什么在决定是否授予强制令或判给损害赔偿，以及将获得什么。因此，在拒绝一个新的建设，以防止破坏的前景，法官说：我知道没有普通法的一般规则。。说，该建筑物，以阻止他人的前景是造成滋扰。的情况下，不可能有伟大的城镇，而我在这个镇的所有新建筑物必须给予禁令。

我们在处理产生有害影响的行动所面临的问题是不是简单地抑制那些对他们负责。已决定是否从防止危害的增益大于将停止行动而产生的危害结果作为其他地方遭受的损失。在这个世界上，其中有重新安排的法律制度规定的权利的费用，法院，有关滋扰的案件，实际上，经济问题上作出的决定，并确定资源是如何被聘用。有人认为，法院都意识到这一点，他们往往在一个非常明确的时尚，什么将得到什么失去防止产生有害影响的行动之间的比较，虽然并不总是。但划定权利也是法定的成文法则的结果。在这里，我们也可以找到证据互惠性质的问题表示赞赏。虽然法定成文法加入的滋扰列表，还采取行动合法化，否则将根据普通法的滋扰。什么样的情况经济学家很容易认为需要纠正的政府行动，事实上，往往是政府行为的结果。这种行动并不一定是不明智的。但有一个真正的危险，可能导致广泛的政府干预经济体制来保护那些负责进行太远的有害影响。

第四篇：读书笔记(经济类)

由劳伦·勃兰特和托马斯·罗斯基主编的《伟大的中国经济转型》是迄今为止解释“中国奇迹”最全面的著作，是理解中国经济增长在世界经济格局中地位的最重要参考书。这部里程碑式的专著为中国过去30年举世瞩目的高速经济增长提供了一个全面而深入的综合分析。我通过阅读这本书，对我国经济有了进一步的了解，并且对我国经济未来的发展有了很高的期望值。现在谈谈读完这本书，我的一部分感触与想法。

首先这本书留给我印象最深的就是其写作思路，在讲每一章节的过程中都会秉承一种思路：先整体叙述一下每一章节的背景，然后针对所要叙述的内容进行数据的搜集，经过对搜集到的数据进行整理，得到数据在进行进一步整理，使其成我们熟悉的折线图、柱状图、数据表等形式，让我们有直观的了解，最后还会给出经过分析得到的结论，这样一种看似简单易行，却写得处处细心、耐读的一种写法、思路，实则让人佩服，并且给读者一个条理很清晰的脉络。比如说作者在阐述：“中国农业的发展——历史教训、今年的成就、未来的挑战”一节中，首先作者引用过去农业在一些国家不被重视，结果导致经济的平衡增长被打破，说明农业对那些国家的经济增长起到了不可或缺的作用，那么作者就提出了一个问题：那么农业对发展中国家的中国的经济又会有什么样的影响呢？因此作者从这一问题出发，对中国农业的过去、现在以及未来进行了相应的回顾、总结、分析以及展望。具体的思路就是把中国的农业以改革开放为界限，将改革开放之前的农业从食物生产的困难、结构型停滞、政策和制度的不完善、农产品定价及市场化的不科学、非农业体制、政策及农业停滞方面进行了深入的剖析，阐述了改革开放之前的农业困境；对于改革时期的农业，作者分析了当时农业的现状，主要从粮食部门的改革以及粮食部门之外农业部门的改革，及其改革从走出农场开始，又进行了生产和市场环境的改革，又受到了市场开放和专业化的影响，使得农业发展从开放时期的停滞不前到改革时期的进步有了明显的体现。其中着重提到了产权改革以及政策的选择譬如：物价政策、引入市场政策、贸易政策等对农业发展产生了巨大的推动效果；最后作者对中国农业在未来发展中存在的挑战进行了深刻的分析，让我们总有一种冲动：让时光飞速到20年后，让我们看看我们国家的农业到底是一个什么状态，会有什么样的格局，如何从一个对我国经济发展贡献较小的行业转变成对我国影响深远的行业呢。

《伟大的中国经济转型》这本书在谈论我国经济发展的过程中，深入的剖析了影响我国经济发展的诸多因素，比如人口因素、劳动力因素、环境资源、农业工业的发展对其的影响等多个方面，还谈到了全球化下我国经济的各种状态以及对未来我国经济的预测等内容。让我印象最深、最想继续深思下去的部分应该是当下最热的全球化问题。《伟大的中国经济转型》一书中，关于全球化问题主要介绍了中国从1978年以来对外贸易和投资的渐进开放过程。主要回顾了1978年到2001年间中国贸易和投资政策的历史改革，并说明了一些重要政策改变对贸易和投资扩张的影响。其中入世标志着中国在这一领域政策演变的一个重要分水岭，因此讨论了中国加入WTO条款的主要特点，并评价了我国迄今为止在履行义务方面所取得的进展。最后阐述了中国的发展具有全球影响力，以及面对日渐突出的全球化趋势，我们国家应做好的准备等等。经过思考，针对全球化问题，我有以下的想法。

在全球化的推动下，世界格局发生了大变革、大调整、大发展，尤其是新兴国家群体性崛起，美欧日困境，俄罗斯之冬等格局的变化。中国不仅加入了WTO的行列，还是“金砖四国”、“灵猫六国”等多个组织之中，由此我们也可以看出在全球化的大潮下，我国国际地位的提高，当然经济实力肯定也得到了肯定并取得了飞速的进步与发展。中国发展到这个阶段，突然出现在世界地平线上，突然跻身于全球俱乐部中，可能自己还没有足够的思想准备，但方方面面的压力都出来了，这是成长的烦恼，也是前所未有的挑战。

2000年前后，世界开始流行“中国威胁论”，100年前，世界上最流行的是“美国威胁论”，因为美国那时候正是发展最快的时候，正在全面超越英国和欧洲列强。那时候围堵美国的急先锋，一个是英国，一个是德国，尤其是英国，还同祖同宗。但看到美国发展得快，又要过去投资，分享它的成长，时冷时热，这样的状态持续了多少年？50年，直到美国完全超过英国，两国的关系就变得非常简单了，小布什说他要打伊拉克，布莱尔说他第一个报名，地缘政治最终取决于一个因素——实力。历史给我们很好的启示，我们可以预见，中美关系、中日关系、中欧关系，在未来的二三十年，将是这么一个锯齿般的关系，既不会天天是蜜月期，也不会降到冰点。对今天的中国来说，最重要的是自己坚定不移地

2成长，保持发展，保持稳定，推进改革。中国在面对全球化的趋势下应该怎么继续让经济继续健康、稳定的发展下去呢？

我个人认为可以采取的措施主要有：要不断改革体制机制，让我们的经济在不断的体制改革中发展；国家要重视政策的建立与调整，尤其是货币制度，让我们国家的各种政策能在经济全球化的潮流中发挥积极、有效地作用；继续扩大对外开放，积极参加国际竞争，并保持或者需要进一步加强我们在国际上的话语权；主动熟悉全球化的规则，加强国家的经济安全防范，毕竟防微杜渐是一种积极的心理；加快产业结构调整，提高产品的科技含量，也就需要我们要加强创新能力，毕竟科学技术是第一生产力；发挥政治、经济大国的优势，积极倡导建立全球化的新规则，以至于我们在全球化横行的时代能够运筹帷幄；加大科教的投入，创造知识资源，以树立应对经济全球化的根本之策；要不断促进各产业的结构和结构内部调整，使得我们国家的产业能够高效、有序的健康发展。

针对以上的诸多措施，我主要阐述一下在改革体制机制方面，国家应该如何对待。

我国要在经济全球化的今天保持经济的持续健康发展首要任务是需要不断改革体制机制。中国有一首儿歌，“两只老虎，一只没有耳朵，一只没有尾巴，跑得快。”中国社会有两只老虎，一只叫改革，一只叫社会问题，它们可能都在跑，我们要让改革这只老虎跑得比另外一只老虎快一点儿，这样我们就可以实现未来10年的发展目标，并保持我们经济在全球化下持续的发展。

中国过去30年的奇迹，始于一个产业的市场化改革，农业，从农村的包产到户开始，结果是什么呢？20世纪80年代，美国人写过一本书，书名是《谁来养活8亿中国人》，说中国这个国家人很多，耕地又很少，中国人将来吃不饱饭，天下大乱。今天中国不止8亿人，13亿人了，可能有一半人在减肥，至少吃饭不再是问题。同样的一片土地，同样的人群，会有这么大的变化。中国的改革从农业的市场化开始，随后扩展到轻工业、重工业等各个领域。金融行业推动市场化改革能带来的变化，行业规模从500亿到上万亿的爆炸式增长，除了市场环境

3等客观因素以外，与其他行业的市场化改革一样，每个从业者积极性的调动带来了行业潜能的释放。

今天的中国，也仍然有很多领域需要市场化，也可以市场化。金融领域是一个典型，大量企业找不着资金，大量资金找不着企业。这是因为金融市场不够发达，不够有效，不够市场化。医疗领域可能是另一个典型，一大群病人找不着医院看病，一大群医学院的毕业生找不着工作，也是因为这个领域不够市场化。改革，可以有很多宏大的顶层设计，也可以从经济社会一些明显市场化不足的领域做起，我们相信，这些领域的逐步市场化改革，释放出的生产力，可以成为中国经济未来10年发展和转型的重要动力。

当然，改革开放30年后的今天，改革也不再像30年前那样顺理成章，因为那时候不改革就没有饭吃。中国在遭遇前所未有的金融危机的关键时刻，经济全球化的大潮下，今天的改革涉及利益的重新调整和分配，涉及国有企业改革，建立现代企业制度，从根本上转换企业经营机制，提高企业在国际上的竞争实力；深化行政管理体制的变革一是进一步转变政府职能，实现政企分开。而是政府机构要金库能的精简、高效、统一。三是要是权利和利益脱钩，并加强监督，从源头上消除腐败；进一步建立和完善市场体系，实行“走出去”的开放战略；还要注重建立与完善与社会主义市场经济体制相适应的法律体系。这完全是一个系统性的工程，或许还需要我们有足够的智慧，能够设计好改革的帕累托改进，让参与改革的每个人，都能从改革中合理地受益，包括在政府和市场的人才之间建立起有规则的旋转门机制，才能更好地推进市场化改革。

通过阅读《伟大的中国经济转型》这本书，我了解到我国经济从过去几十年到现在甚至未来的发展情况，让我对我国经济的发展，甚至是和经济有关的政治、资源等其他方面的发展也有了进一步的了解，而且对我而言，读完这本书让我有了关注我国经济发展的基础和兴趣。

201140704411统计张美玲

第五篇：经济类毕业论文

世纪国际贸易发展中电子商务作用及策略分析

孙 王月

（哈尔滨技师学院，黑龙江 哈尔滨

150000）

国际贸易在世纪是知识性经济，电子商务的发展为国际贸

易提供了全球性、无纸化、智能化、低碳化、瞬间性和简易性的环境。

国家竞争力由传统贸易竞争发展为网络贸易竞争，使贸易交易在空 间上与时间上的限制减少，企业与企业、国家与国家之间在决策和

发展上面对更大的挑战，如何做好网络贸易；如何规范国际网络市 场；如何在国家政策上把电子商务平台规整，是国家新的研究课题，也是企业贸易发展最关心的问题

。国际贸易的现状

1.1 国际贸易垄断化。

1.1.1 国际贸易关税保护政策：国家通过关税来限制进出口从 而保护本国的工业产品和农副产品。

1.1.2 国家对进出口产品进行限额：国家通过减少对消费品、奢 侈品的进口，来减少对国有产品的冲击力。

1.1.3 国际贸易外汇的管制和升值。

1.1.4 国家对外贸企业生产进出口产品的代替品方面给予多种 优惠，使它们不被外国产品所排挤。

1.2 国际贸易知识网络化。

国际贸易知识的网络化对现在社会的冲击力很大，随着高科技的发展，高新产品层出不穷，知识贸易竞争越演越烈。二十一世纪是 人才的竞争，从而表现出知识型产品所占比重的分量。知识作为现 在社会的生产因素，它的生产、传递都是由网络信息完成。知识网络

化产业作为未来发展的基础产业，是全球化经济的新型动力火车。这是国际贸易向信息产业化转变的趋势，使贸易企业在库存、管理、采购等等方面的成本大大减少。

1.3 国际贸易的协调化。国际贸易关注点由自然资源转变为知

识资源，高科技领域的谈判已代替原有传统谈判，降低了谈判成本。高科技在国际贸易上的协调已成为不变的事实。电子商务的发展及作用

电子商务自 1995 年以来发展至今，发展速度较快，其的商业价 值巨大。各国陆续出台各种措施、纲要来发展这个新兴产业，从而提 升自己在国际上的竞争力。电子商务打破了传统商务活动对交易时 间、地理和支付方式等方面的限制，使国际贸易交易更为便捷、安

全。在经济发展较快的今天便捷、可靠、安全、迅速是国际贸易所追

求的方向，国际贸易企业可以在最短的时间内得到最有利于自己贸

易发展的信息。电子商务的发展改变了人类的生活模式，没有了各

种壁垒的限制，企业可以更为方便的交易、交流来获得自己所需要的信息。

2.1 业务上。企业之间的商务活动可以由互联网直接进行，缩短

了业务的营运周期，提高了效率。

2.2

业务和消费者

。BTOC

在互联网上的实行，使消费者直接与

企业进行买卖，消费者的消费成本大大降低，消费者对各企业有了

自己的认知，企业同样一手获得消费者的信息，为企业产业的发展

提供了宝贵的资源。

2.3

信息。

电子商务提供世界经济发展最前沿的信息，让贸易企

业了解了未来自己开拓新的市场的发展方向，同样企业也借鉴信息

来提高自己的服务质量。

2.4 网上的管理。通过互联网使企业与分公司的连接更加紧密，减少了一些突发事故的发生率。

电子商务贸易交易是时代的产物，科技的发展带动经济的发

展

。各时期工业、经济的发展都有利与弊，时代进步了但也有不足，电子商务是顺应时代而产生的，国际贸易根据时代的步伐步步跟

进，如

B2B、B2C、C2C、C2G……各种营销模式的出现。虽然 2008 年

经济危机给各国经济带来重创，但国际危机期间

B2B 仍然是发展的主题，B2C仍突破新高。复苏后的经济将出现新气象，对国际贸易

网上贸易的交易带来新的血液。

随着

internet 使用人数的增加，网上购物、网上支付的消费者越

来越多，网购已成为了一种流行趋势，市场的占有比重分量逐年增

加，电子商务网站也在逐年跟进，例如阿里巴巴、京东……这些网站

提供各种网络平台，给商业人士、私企、个体在国际贸易中提供了很

。消费者、生产者、供应者也得到自己有利的商业信息，都找到自己相处融洽的合作伙伴

。市场的竞争力同样也更加严峻，产品的隔代更新速度加快、使用寿命缩短；信息更替速度更加迅速。

各种网站提供空间给予企业展示自己企业形象的机会，通过广告信

息来提高了企业的知名度，节省了资源，保护了环境

。现在都提倡低

碳效应，低碳生活让我们居住、工作的环境新鲜，从而带动我们的好

心情，使我们工作心情愉悦、激情永存，贸易量自然增加。如何利用电子商务来发展国际贸易

国际贸易长期发展中面对不同领域的冲击，各时期都有自己的发展特色。二十一世纪是人才、知识、科技的竞争，互联网在 21 世纪

发展尤为突出。

3.1 政策环境。各国相继出台法律制度、政策标准和方案措施来

规范电子商务的发展，使国际贸易在一个安全、可靠的环境下生存

发展。网络交易是贸易经济交易发展的趋势，是现在各国的竞争重

点。美国、欧洲早在二十世纪末就提出了关于电子商务的发展纲要。

3.2 信息基础设施。各大型网络公司的出现，移动通信业务的发

展，宽带速度的提高，3G 业务都为电子商务提供了良好的基础设

施，便捷了国际贸易交易。

3.3 安全。各国都投入大量的人力、财力、物力保护交易的安全

进行，如电子签名、保护密码等高科技技术出现，国际贸易交易的安

全性正一步步的提升。

3.4 交易。支付方式上如数字钱包、货币的出现，因为消费者需

求的不同又相继出现储蓄卡、货到付款等多种多样的支付方式，让

国际贸易交易更加的便捷、多彩多姿。

3.5 运输。物流在传统国际贸易中处于滞后状态，电子商务的发

展带动了物流的产业地位的提升。传统的供应链供销之间是脱节，供应商难以得到准确无误的销售计划，使采购、生产处于滞后地位。

而电子商务的出现改善了这种现象，传统贸易交易中的弊端有所改

变，国际贸易交易进入新纪元，出现了新的产业———第三方物流。

电子商务的发展带动了国际服务贸易，服务行业作为新兴的产

业发展极为迅速，国际服务贸易把国际贸易拓展化，是企业出口产

品的一面镜子；是网络贸易交易好坏的凭证。

国际贸易在网络贸易

交易中如何做好，如何面对挑战经久不衰蓬勃发展，需要我们去探

索网络的奥妙。

总而言之，国际贸易在电子商务这个积极蓬勃的氛

围中会展现更耀眼的光芒。

[1]

井道龙

.加快流通领域电子商务发展的重要意义

[J].蚌埠党校学

报，2010

（）

.[2]周卞.电子商务发展应用前景分析[J].涟钢科技与管理，2008（1）.[3]

彭今

.关于国际贸易发展形势下我国贸易发展的讨论

[J].经营管理

者，2008

（）

.[4]张莉“.十二五”时期国际服务贸易发展趋势及我国的对策[J].国际

贸易，2011（1）.摘 要：

世纪全球进入了新的经济时代，信息网络使全球经济进入了数字化时代，产品一瞬间就可以在世界各地进行交易，电子商

务的发展开始席卷全球，新的经济形态为各国经济策略的制定开创了一个新的方向。电子商务的发展使国际贸易交易的时间缩短、空间

更加广阔。

关键词：国际贸易；电子商务；策略及作用