毕业论文英文文献总结《品牌》

第一篇：毕业论文英文文献总结《品牌》

毕业论文中英翻译

Brand

05051

1班

陈

露

20051235 Concepts Some people distinguish the psychological aspect of a brand from the experiential aspect.The experiential aspect consists of the sum of all points of contact with the brand and is known as the brand experience.The psychological aspect, sometimes referred to as the brand image, is a symbolic construct created within the minds of people and consists of all the information and expectations associated with a product or service.People engaged in branding seek to develop or align the expectations behind the brand experience(see also brand promise), creating the impression that a brand associated with a product or service has certain qualities or characteristics that make it special or unique.A brand is therefore one of the most valuable elements in an advertising theme, as it demonstrates what the brand owner is able to offer in the marketplace.The art of creating and maintaining a brand is called brand management.Careful brand management, supported by a cleverly crafted advertising campaign, can be highly successful in convincing consumers to pay remarkably high prices for products which are inherently extremely cheap to make.This concept, known as creating value, essentially consists of manipulating the projected image of the product so that that the consumer sees the product as being worth the amount that the advertiser wants him/her to see, rather than a more logical valuation that comprises an aggregate of the cost of raw materials, plus the cost of manufacture, plus the cost of distribution.Modern value-creation branding-and-advertising campaigns are highly successful at inducing consumers to pay, for example, 50 dollars for a T-shirt that cost a mere 50 cents to make, or 5 dollars for a box of breakfast cereal that contains a few cents' worth of wheat.A brand which is widely known in the marketplace acquires brand recognition.When brand recognition builds up to a point where a brand enjoys a critical mass of positive sentiment in the marketplace, it is said to have achieved brand franchise.One goal in brand recognition is the identification of a brand without the name of the company present.For example, Disney has been successful at branding with their particular script font(originally created for Walt Disney's “signature” logo), which it used in the logo for go.com.Consumers may look on branding as an important value added aspect of products or services, as it often serves to denote a certain attractive quality or characteristic(see also brand promise).From the perspective of brand owners, branded products or services also command higher prices.Where two products resemble each other, but one of the products has no associated branding(such as a generic, store-branded product), people may often select the more expensive branded product on the basis of the quality of the brand or the reputation of the brand owner.Brand name The brand name is often used interchangeably within “brand”, although it is more correctly used to specifically denote written or spoken linguistic elements of any product.In this context a “brand name” constitutes a type of trademark, if the brand name exclusively identifies the brand owner as the commercial source of products or services.A brand owner may seek to protect proprietary rights in relation to a brand name through trademark registration.Advertising spokespersons have also become part of some brands, for example: Mr.Whipple of Charmin toilet tissue and Tony the Tiger of Kellogg's.The act of associating a product or service with a brand has become part of pop culture.Most products have some kind of brand identity, from common table salt to designer jeans.A brandnomer is a brand name that has colloquially become a generic term for a product or service, such as Band-Aid or Kleenex, which are often used to describe any kind of adhesive bandage or any kind of facial tissue respectively.Brand identity How the brand owner wants the consumer to perceive the brandHoward Schultz(president, ceo and chairman of Starbucks “No-brand” branding Recently a number of companies have successfully pursued “No-Brand” strategies, examples include the Japanese company Muji, which means “No label, quality goods” in English.Although there is a distinct Muji brand, Muji products are not branded.This no-brand strategy means that little is spent on advertisement or classical marketing and Muji's success is attributed to the word-of-mouth, a simple shopping experience and the anti-brand movement.Another brand which is thought to follow a no-brand strategy is American Apparel, which like Muji, does not brand its products.[3] [4] [5]

Derived brands In this case the supplier of a key component, used by a number of suppliers of the end-product, may wish to guarantee its own position by promoting that component as a brand in its own right.The most frequently quoted example is Intel, which secures its position in the PC market with the slogan “Intel Inside”.Brand extension The existing strong brand name can be used as a vehicle for new or modified products;for example, many fashion and designer companies extended brands into fragrances, shoes and accessories, home textile, home decor, luggage,(sun-)glasses, furniture, hotels, etc.Mars extended its brand to ice cream, Caterpillar to shoes and watches, Michelin to a restaurant guide, Adidas and Puma to personal hygiene.Dunlop extended its brand from tires to other rubber products such as shoes, golf balls, tennis racquets and adhesives.There is a difference between brand extension and line extension.When Coca-Cola launched “Diet Coke” and “Cherry Coke” they stayed within the originating product category: non-alcoholic carbonated beverages.Procter & Gamble(P&G)did likewise extending its strong lines(such as Fairy Soap)into neighboring products(Fairy Liquid and Fairy Automatic)within the same category, dish washing detergents.Multi-brands Alternatively, in a market that is fragmented amongst a number of brands a supplier can choose deliberately to launch totally new brands in apparent competition with its own existing strong brand(and often with identical product characteristics);simply to soak up some of the share of the market which will in any case go to minor brands.The rationale is that having 3 out of 12 brands in such a market will give a greater overall share than having 1 out of 10(even if much of the share of these new brands is taken from the existing one).In its most extreme manifestation, a supplier pioneering a new market which it believes will be particularly attractive may choose immediately to launch a second brand in competition with its first, in order to pre-empt others entering the market.Individual brand names naturally allow greater flexibility by permitting a variety of different products, of differing quality, to be sold without confusing the consumer's perception of what business the company is in or diluting higher quality products.Once again, Procter & Gamble is a leading exponent of this philosophy, running as many as ten detergent brands in the US market.This also increases the total number of “facings” it receives on supermarket shelves.Sara Lee, on the other hand, uses it to keep the very different parts of the business separate — from Sara Lee cakes through Kiwi polishes to L'Eggs pantyhose.In the hotel business, Marriott uses the name Fairfield Inns for its budget chain(and Ramada uses Rodeway for its own cheaper hotels).Cannibalization is a particular problem of a “multibrand” approach, in which the new brand takes business away from an established one which the organization also owns.This may be acceptable(indeed to be expected)if there is a net gain overall.Alternatively, it may be the price the organization is willing to pay for shifting its position in the market;the new product being one stage in this process

毕业论文英文翻译

050511

班

陈

露

20051235

一、概念

（一）、概念

一些人区别一种品牌的心理是来自经验方面。经验方面包括来自其它本身已知的各种品牌经验的总和。在心理方面，一些如涉及到商标图像，就是一种在人的头脑内被创造和形成的包括所有由符号、信息、期望以及产品服务等的关于一种符号的修建。

人们参与品牌化目的是为寻求开发或者排列在品牌经验之后的期望（参见品牌诺言）。创造这样一种印象，一个品牌的产品或服务以及相关的某些质量或特征可以使品牌具有特别或独特的印象。因此品牌是其中一个在一个广告的题材中最可贵的元素，同时它又是一个品牌拥有者在市场中所要展示的重要元素。创造和维护品牌的艺术称为“单项产品管理”。

详细的“单项产品管理”是由非常聪明并且成功的广告战略所支持。而这种广告战略就是在产品极其高的价格和极端低廉的产品成本中使消费者信服产品的本质。这个概念，叫做“创造价值”，本质上包括操作产品的投影图象以便消费者所看见的商品是广告商希望他或者她所期望的购买价格。而不是包括各种材料的费用，加上制造的费用，再加上推销成本等更加逻辑的估价。现代价值创作，品牌化和广告化的竞争是非常成功在诱导消费者消费，例如，市场价值是50美元的T恤杉，而它的制作成本仅仅只有50美分；由麦子制成的谷物早餐，它的售价在5美元左右，而它的制作成本仅仅只有几美分而已。

一种品牌成功是通过市场的广泛熟知来获得市场的公认的。当品牌公认加强了这个品牌在市场上享受正面情绪临界质量的这一点时，这时就可以说达到了“品牌特权”。品牌公认的一个目标是目前在即使没有公司名字的情况下也可以使品牌得到证明。例如，迪斯尼就曾成功的品牌化了他们的特殊剧本字体(最初创造为华特.迪斯尼的“署名”商标)，它在商标上使用为“go.com”。

消费者也许把品牌化看作为产品或服务的一个重要增值方面，因为它经常表示代表某一种具有吸引力的质量或特征的服务(也参见品牌诺言)。从品牌所有者的角度上说，被品牌化的产品或服务也控制在更高的价格上。这就相当于俩个可替代产品，但其中一个产品没有伴生品牌化（例如普通，年代久远的商品）。人们也许经常会根据品牌的质量或品牌所有者的信誉选择高价品种的产品。

（二）、品牌的名称

品牌的名称经常被用在可交换的“品牌”中，虽然它恰当地被用于明确地表示所有产品的书面或讲话的语言元素中。在上下文中，如果品牌的名称可以用来完全辨认品牌所有者作为产品或服务的商业来源的话，那么 “品牌的名称”也就构成了商标的类型。品牌的所有者可以通过商标注册来寻求保护关于品牌名称的所有权。为某些品牌做广告代言的人也可以成为品牌名称的一部分，例如：“Charmin卫生纸”的Whipple先生、“凯洛格的老虎”的托尼先生。

同一种产品或服务的组合销售可以使一个品牌变成流行文化的一部分。大多数产品都有某种品牌的身份。例如普通的食用盐到服装设计师设计的牛仔裤。口语化的品牌的名称成为了一般的术语从而代表了某一项产品或者服务。例如：“护创胶布”(商标名)或者“克里内克斯”纸巾(商标名)，分别常用来描述任何黏着性绷带或任何面巾纸。

（三）、品牌身份

品牌的所有者必须要知道怎么引领消费者察觉该品牌和该品牌化的公司、组织、产品或者服务。品牌所有者将寻求缩小商标图象和品牌身份之间的差距。品牌的身份对于消费者的公认和区别竞争者的不同的商标是根本的也是必须的。

二、品牌化的方法

（一）、公司的名称

通常，尤其是在工业部门，这样的公司名称是需要被宣传的（举一个最具说明力的例子说明，当IBM公司走下坡路时，它们的宣传标语就是“没人会因为买IBM的产品而被解雇”）。

在这种情况下一个非常强势的品牌名称（或者公司名字）被用做一定范围内产品的宣传工具（例如，“梅塞德斯-奔驰”或者美国最大的电工工具大厂“Black & Decker”）或者是一系列品牌的辅助工具（比如美国的“吉百利牛奶”、“吉百利玉米片”、“吉百利手套”）。

（二）、单一品牌策略

每一品牌有一个单独的名字（比如，美国百事公司的“七喜”、德国拜尔斯道夫公司的“妮维雅防晒霜”），对于同一个公司甚至还会有相互竞争的不同品牌的同类产品（比如，联合利华的“宝丝”洗衣粉、“奥妙”、“Surf”和“Lynx”）。

（三）、品牌化的态度

消费者对品牌化的态度是代表了对一种更好感觉的选择，尤其是当产品或者产品用量之间没有必然联系的时候。品牌化的态度营销包括：美国的“耐克”、“星巴克”、英国的“美体小铺”、澳大利亚的“safeway”超市、美国的“苹果电脑”。在2000本关于营销的书籍中没有商标品牌的品牌化态度营销被描述为“迷信战略”。

“一个伟大品牌的延伸，使它变的更加巨大、更具有目的性、吸收着更多的经验，它是否在挑战你的健康，又或者在影响你对一杯咖啡的态度呢？”霍华德·舒尔茨（美国星巴克创始人）。

（四）、没有品牌的品牌化策略

最近很多家公司成功地使用了“无品牌”战略，其中的例子包括日本的“无印良品”集团，它们的产品就没有标签甚至是关于产品的质量保证。虽然在产品上有一个标有“无印良品”集团的标签，但是“无印良品”集团的产品仍然是没有任何品牌宣传的。这种“无品牌战略”意味着在广告方面或者传统营销方面的花费几乎为零并且“无印良品”集团的成功仅仅归因于口头表达，简单的说就是通过消费者的一种简单的购物经验和反品牌运动来实现成功的。另一个也同样采用“无品牌”战略的公司是美国的“American Apparel”服装公司，它同日本的“无印良品”集团一样，同样在自己产品上不加任何商标和品牌化宣传。

（五）、品牌的获得

在这种情形下，一个关键部件的供应商为了制造完整商品使用了多个其它供应商的部件，供应商可能希望产品因为使用了自己的核心部件而确保自己作为品牌的位置。最常见的例子就要属英特尔公司了，在个人电脑的市场上“英特尔”电脑常常被称为“电脑里面的英特尔”。品牌延伸

现有强势的品牌名称可以被用来作为一件新产品或者改进后产品的宣传工具，例如，许多追随流行时尚的服装设计公司将自己的品牌扩展到香水、鞋、女士用品、家用纺织品、家用装饰品、行李包、太阳眼镜、家具、宾馆用具、帽子等等。英国的“火星”公司也扩大了它对冰淇凌的品牌，还有美国“卡特彼勒”集团的手表和鞋子、“米其林”集团的饭店旅游指南、“阿迪达斯”公司和“标马”公司的个人保健学等等。英国的“邓禄普”体育用品公司对它旗下的产品的品牌也同样扩大到了其他橡胶产品上，比如鞋、高尔夫球、网球球拍和球拍胶粘剂等。

品牌的延伸也存在横向和纵向的延伸。当可口可乐公司推出了“特殊饮食碳酸”饮料和“樱桃碳酸”饮料时，在横向同类产品上又推出了“非酒精碳酸化合”饮料。“宝洁”公司做了同样推出了横向品牌延伸的产品（比如“花仙子”香皂），还有其他同类产品（“花仙子”洗涤液、“花 仙子”洗衣粉）。

（六）、多品牌策略

在二者选一情况下，在被分割的市场的一定数量的品牌之中，生产商为了让自己的产品品牌在市场上更有利销售，故意推出多种同类产品品牌在市场上相互竞争（并且经常与自己旗下拥有共同特征其他品牌的产品进行竞争），目的是为了占有更多的市场份额。这种多品牌策略的基础可以解释为在某个市场上12个品牌商品的竞争中生产商占有3个品牌比生产商在某个市场上10个品牌商品的竞争中生产商占有1个品牌商品更能多的占有市场份额（即使采用的多品牌在市场中仅仅只有一个能被市场接纳）。在最极端的说明下，一个生产商可能为了能在新产品市场下占有更多的市场份额而推出第一种新产品后马上就会推出第二种同类新产品进入市场。

各自品牌的名称可以更灵活使用在不同种类、不同质量的商品上。可以销售给对产品需求有针对性的消费者。

再次，“宝洁”公司就是这种多品牌策略的典型代表，在美国“宝洁”公司有多达十几种品牌的洗涤用品活跃在市场上。这也增加“宝洁”公司在超级市场的售货架上接受“饰面的”的总数。美国的“莎莉”集团，在其他方面，运用多品牌策略在自己旗下的各种产品上，如在宾馆住宿业的“莎莉”集团的蛋糕，到L'Eggs的裤袜。“万豪”国际集团命名了“Fairfield”这样一个连锁宾馆（“万豪”国际集团并且还拥有对消费者消费更加便宜的“Ramada”连锁旅店）。

“自损”是“大型多品牌通路”方法中一个特殊问题。一个新品牌的确立需要远离已经确定品牌市场规则和企业运作模式的品牌方式从而重新建立一套属于自己的新规则和新运作模式。这是可接受的（而且也是可期望的），如果对整体有利，二者择一的，“自损”也可以是企业愿意支付转移它在市场上的位置所需的费用。这是一种新产品推出时所必须经历的阶段。

第二篇：毕业论文 英文文献翻译

_______ 学 院

毕业论文文献资料翻译

原文名称: “Goldilocks” Liberalization: The Uneven Path Toward Interest Rate Reform in China

课题名称:利率市场化对我国商业银行的影响分析

学生姓名:号:

指导老师:

所在系部:专业名称:

年月

译文

“金发”自由化：中国利率市场化改革的不平之路

Shih and Victor

中国政府的自由化

2003年，中国从亚洲金融危机进入到一段时间的持续增长后，利率市场化改革似乎终于在掌握之内。就如以前一样，中国人民银行的热衷者发布几篇报告以支持利率市场化，而四大银行的代表也提供放慢改革（成2002年）的理由。此外,中国在2003终于摆脱通货紧缩的威胁并恢复相对高速的增长，只有在2004年有中等程度的通胀（图3）。一些惊喜，在2004年10月29日，对贷款利率的上限被解除，允许银行以他们想要的高利息收费（人民日报2005）。此外，银行也可以给予储户低于存款基准利率的利率。类似总督戴显龙的几年前的时间表，中国人民银行发布了一份报告，奠定了完全利率市场化的具体计划。

尽管推行这种市场化，但金融体系的基本逻辑任然保持了一样。在存款方面，存款利率上下限的去除主要是象征性的，因为银行没有理由去不必要地降低利率，使其低于他们的竞争对手所提供的利率。因此，很少数的银行利用市场化的优势来给出低于存款基准利率的利率（2006年绿色）。关于贷款利率市场化，央行的理由是，它将使银行“根据客户不同风险的状况给予不同的贷款和利率”（2005年中国人民银行货币政策研究小组）。虽然这听起来像一个显著的效率增益，但这是发出了现实的信号，即银行继续提供廉价融资，给予有更低的官僚风险状况的国家资助项目和国有企业。在此期间，通过存款利率上限和贷款利率的下限，银行之间的“毁灭性竞争”仍然受到严格的限制。因此，银行仍然不能通过提供更高的存款利率互相竞争。同样，银行无法通过提供给借款者更低的利率来相互竞争，因为银行能提供的最低利率为基准利率的90％。中国人民银行的一份报告显示，整个国有银行全部贷款的27％，被设臵于法定最低利率，这表明银行将会通过给出法定最低利率来竞争（中国人民银行货币政策的研究团队 2005）。为了给中国人民银行信贷，促使城市商业银行和农村信用社贷款利率的市场化，通过提供更多高利率的贷款给在私营部门的高风险的的借款人，提供融资给原先被冻结的正规银行系统分部（中国人民银行货币政策的研究团队 2005）。

进入2008-2009年的经济衰退，对利率的再次控制促进了大规模的反周期投资驱动器。如图2所示，中国人民银行在全球经济低迷时继续保证银行业稳健的利率传导。移

除贷款利率的上限，银行通过贷款赚更多的钱。因此，当中央要求银行于2008年11月为4万亿人民币经济刺激方案提供融资，银行以极大的热情回应。导致2009年中国的贷款向上急速膨胀，比上年增长了惊人的30％。中国人民银行在2009年原本设臵信贷配额是5万亿人民币向上一点点。到今年年底，银行已经做出了历史上最大量的新增贷款，总额近10万亿人民币（潘克赫斯特,郑,和王 2009）。银行持有的存款利率低于基准利率而贷款利率高于基准利率，实际上可收获可观的利润，即使在经济衰退期间（汉2009）。因此，贷款利率上界的自由化得益于所有有关的政治人物。高层的技术专家保留为最大的反周期投资驱动凑集资金的能力，这在中国的历史上是相对容易的。银行仍然防止“毁灭性竞争”，并继续享有稳健的贷款利率传导。由于银行为经济刺激计划提供资金的意愿，财政部不需要发行很多的债务，从而限制财政赤字的规模。虽然一些大型国有企业由于释放出的贷款利率可能付出更高的借贷成本，银行急于提供大量的融资额给他们，使他们向其他实体转贷资金而赚取利润。随着世界逐步摆脱经济危机，由于前两年的快速信贷扩张，通货膨胀的压力在中国建立的非常迅速。2011年初，通货膨胀调转进入危险的境况。然而中国领导人在危机模式下，利率进一步自由化的任何谈话被搁臵。另一位金发的时刻必须在下一轮利率自由化之前提出，使其可以被理解。

结论

虽然中国并没有回应外部强加给我们的政策改革压力，但是它已经开始自身的重大经济改革。在城市里，许多规模较小的国有企业被私有化或关闭了，而私营部门被允许自由成长（诺顿1996）。大多数商品和服务价格已经被放开（韦德曼2003）。尽管中国经济发生了翻天覆地的变化，但是国家将继续以控制社会的宏观的经济杠杆，允许它通过重要的途径影响经济效果。中央级的技术专家可以通过控制资金的流动和投资方向，确保通胀不上升至无法控制的地步，而增长依然强劲。同时，这些手段也允许他们购买被其他政治局成员保护的利益支持，包括当地官员和国有企业管理人员，特别是在经济停滞的时候。为了保持这些手段的有效性，他们需要储户在中国的国家金融体系的抵押品。如果私人银行出现为存款人提供更高的利率，国有银行必须匹配上更高的利率，从而增加了成本，为大规模的经济刺激计划提供资金。尽管强大的激励促使顶级技术专家保持现状，但是利率市场化改革在中国已经取得了一些进展。即使在20世纪80年代，非正式的银行也提供着很高的存款利率。进入20世纪90年代，央行行长感受到西方关于货币政策以及中国人民银行政治性角色的担忧，开始认真的推行利率市场化。他们在通货膨胀低，经济增长强劲的时候推进自由化改革。

虽然方便政策制定者制定政治目标，但是中国的利率管制将继续使中国的储户以及一些国外的制造商肩负重但。只要银行争夺存款被禁止，数以百万的储户将继续被人为压低存款利率，来补贴国有银行的盈利能力。国家以较低的成本调动大量资金的能力，也有对世界的负面影响。大部分剩余的国有企业主要集中在重工业和大宗商品部门。因此，就如中国政府智囊团指出的那样，通过宽松的信贷政策，使他们得以保留，而在全球经济衰退的时候，或者在某些情况下，他们甚至扩大自己的能力（国际金融研究中心2009年）。这加剧了全球的产能过剩，并导致中国某些行业的商品，特别是钢材，在世界市场上引起倾销。因此，政府的持续努力以操纵利率，这种行为的一个重要受害者是中国国有企业的全球竞争者。

第三篇：9.毕业论文英文文献翻译

Audit Office Size, Audit Quality, and AuditPricing Jong-Hag Choi, Chansog(Francis)Kim, Jeong-Bon Kim, and YoonseokZang SUMMARY: Using a large sample of U.S.audit client firms over the period 2000–2005,this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within anaudit firmhereafter, office size is a significant, engagement-specific factor determiningaudit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national level andauditor industry leadership at the city or office level.For our empirical tests, audit qualityis measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is measured in twodifferent ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office and the otherbased on a total of audit fees earned by each office.Our results show that the officesize has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees, even aftercontrolling for national-level audit firm size and office-level industry expertise.Thesepositive relations support the view that large local offices provide higher-quality auditscompared with small local offices, and that such quality differences are priced in themarket for audit services.Keywords:audit office;office size;audit quality;audit pricing.Data Availability:Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.The way we think about an accounting firm changes dramatically when we shift the unit of analysisaway from the firm as a whole, to the analysis of specific city-based offices within a firm.In termsof DeAngelo’s1981b argument, a Big 4 accounting firm is not so big when we shift to theofficelevel of analysis.For example, while Enron represented less than 2 percent of Arthur Ander-sen’s national revenues from publicly listed clients, it was more than 35 percent of such revenues in the Houston office.INTRODUCTION

As alluded to in the above quote, the size of a city-based audit engagement office could bea more crucial determinant of audit quality and thus audit feesthan the size of anational-level audit firm because the city-based office is a semi-autonomous unit withinan audit firm with its own client base.It is an office-based engagement partner or audit team, notnational headquarters, who actually administers and implements individual audit engagement con-tracts, including the delivery of audit services and the issuance of an audit opinion.In this regard,Wallman(1996)and Francis(2004)argue that the assessment of auditor independence needs tofocus more on the individual office level rather than the entire firm level because most of the auditdecisions with respect to a particular client are made within each individual office.The anecdotalevidence on the collapse of Enron, which was audited by the Houston office of Arthur Andersen,is a good example that demonstrates the importance of office-level audit quality.However, much of extant audit research has focused its attention on two national-level audit firm characteristics asfundamental determinants of audit quality, namely: audit firm size(e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987;Becker et al.1998;Francis and Krishnan 1999;Kim et al.2003;Choi and Doogar 2005), andauditor industry leadership(e.g., DeFond et al.2000;Balsam et al.2003;Krishnan 2005).These studies find, in general, that large audit firms with international brand names(i.e., Big4 auditors)or industry expertise provide higher-quality audit services than small audit firms which lack such brand names or industry expertise.Implicit in this line of research is the assumptionthat audit quality is homogeneous across offices of various sizes located in different cities withinthe same audit firm.As a result, we have little evidence on cross-office differences in audit quality,and in particular, whether and how the size of a local engagement office has an impact on auditquality and/or audit pricing.A natural question

to

ask

is:

Is

the

office

size

an additionalengagement-specific factor determining audit quality and thus audit pricing over and beyond auditfirm size and industry leadership? We aim to provide direct evidence on this unexplored question.Several recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may differacross different engagement offices within an audit firm.For example, in the first U.S.study thatuses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis(2000, 375)find thatwhen client size is measured at the office level using office-specific clienteles, “Big 5 auditorsreport

more

conservatively

for

larger clients.”Further,Ferguson et al.(2003)and Francis et al.(2005)find that city-specific, office-level industry leadership, when combined with the national-level leadership, generates the highest audit fee premiums and thus, by inference, higher auditquality in the Australian and U.S.audit markets, respectively, while national-level industry lead-ership alone has no effect.Subsequently, Francis et al.(2006)document that client earningsquality proxied by abnormal accruals is higher when auditors are city-level industry leaders alone,or they are both city-level and national-level industry leaders.Put differently, their results indicatethat national-level industry leadership alone has no significant impact on audit quality.Morerecently, Choi et al.(2007)show that the geographical proximity of the city-based engagementoffice to clients’ headquarters is positively associated with the accrual quality of clients, suggest-ing that the geographical location of the auditor’s office is an important engagement-specificdeterminant of audit quality.The above findings, taken together, suggest that city-based, office-level characteristics may play an important role in determining audit quality and thus audit pricing.It should be pointed out, however, that none of these studies has paid attention to the question ofwhether the size of a local engagement office is systematically associated with audit quality andfees paid to auditors.To bridge this gap in our knowledge, we investigate a hitherto under-researched question ofwhether, and how, the size of a local engagement office hereafter, office sizeis associated withaudit quality and audit pricing.We first hypothesize that office size is systematically associatedwith audit quality even after controlling for audit firm size at the national level and auditorindustry expertise at the office level.As will be further elaborated in the next section, one would observe a positive association if the audits by large offices are of higher quality than the audits bysmall offices.Second, we also examine the association between the office size and audit fees.Previous research shows that audit quality is priced in the market(Choi et al.2008;Craswell et al.1995;Ferguson et al.2003;Francis et al.2005).To the extent that the office size is positivelyassociated with audit quality, one can predict that the larger is the office size, the higher is theaudit quality, and thus the greater is the audit fee.Therefore, a positive association between theoffice size and audit fees could be viewed as evidence corroborating the positive associationbetween the office size and audit quality.In testing our hypotheses, we assert that biased earnings reporting can be used to drawinferences about audit quality, and we use the magnitude of abnormal accruals as a proxy for auditquality.To measure abnormal accruals, we rely on two alternative models developed by Ball andShivakumar(2006)and Kothari et al.(2005).In addition, we estimate the size of a local engage-ment office using the Audit Analytics database, which provides the identity of audit engagementoffices for all SEC registrant clients.We measure office size in two different ways: one based onthe number of audit clients in each office, and the other based on a total of audit fees earned byeach office.Briefly, our results reveal that in the U.S.audit market, both audit quality and audit fees arepositively associated with office size after controlling for audit firm size at the national levelproxied by a Big 4 dummy variable , industry leadership at the local office level proxied by anindustry specialist dummy variable), and other relevant factors.These results are robust to abattery of sensitivity checks we perform.Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.First, our paper is one of fewstudies which document that audit quality is not homogeneous across local offices within an auditfirm.To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first studies that provide direct evidence that thesize of an

audit

engagement

office

is

an

important engagement-specific determinant of auditquality in the U.S.The results of our study suggest that future research on audit quality differentiation needs to pay more attention to office-level auditor behavior as the unit of analysis and tothe size of a local engagement office.Second, this paper is the first to consider office size as acritical factor in audit pricing.Given that no previous research has examined whether audit feesare influenced by the size of a local office, our evidence helps us better understand the nature ofauditor-client relationships in the context of audit pricing.Finally, the findings in this study provide both regulators and practitioners with useful insightsinto what determines audit quality and thus audit fees.Our results suggest that regulators wouldhave a better assessment of audit quality if they shift the level of quality comparison to smallversus large auditors at the office level, and away from Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors at thenational level.Economic theory on quality premiums claims that producing goods and services ofa uniform quality for various markets and consumers over time is crucial for maintaining qualitypremiums(e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981;Kreps and Wilson 1982;Shapiro 1983).Similarly, ourevidence suggests that large, Big 4 auditors should take care to maintain a similar level of auditquality across offices of different sizes because a systematically poor-quality audit service per-formed by a local office could potentially cause damage to the reputation for the entire audit firm.HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Office Size and Audit Quality A growing body of audit research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the behavior ofauditors in city-based, local engagement offices.However, none of these studies has paid atten-tion to the size of a local office in the context of audit quality.Why does the office size matter inaudit quality over and beyond two well-known audit firm characteristics, i.e., audit firm size orbrand name(Big 4 versus non-Big 4)and industry expertise? In DeAngelo’s(1981b)framework, an auditor’s incentive to compromise audit quality withrespect to a particular client depends on the economic importance of the client relative to theauditor’s client portfolio.Her analysis indicates that large auditors are likely to provide higher-quality audit services to a particular client than small auditors because an auditor’s economicdependence on that client is negligible for large auditors, and large auditors have more to lose(i.e.,bear higher reputation loss)in case of audit failures, compared with small auditors.DeAngelo’s(1981b)theory can also be applied to the analysis of audit quality differentiationbetween large versus small offices, because a local engagement office can be viewed as a semi-autonomous unit in terms of its audit decisions, client base, revenue sources, and other factors(Francis 2004;Francis et al.2006;Wallman 1996).Large local offices are less likely to depend ona particular client than small local offices because the former have deeper office-level clientelesand thus are less economically dependent on a particular client.In other words, large offices areless likely to acquiesce to client pressure for substandard reporting than small offices.Further, local offices, whether small or large, may not bear the full amount of reputationlosses associated with an audit failure because a substantial portion of the reputation losses arelikely borne by the national-level audit firm itself.While the reputation losses in the event of auditfailures are likely to be greater for large audit firms(DeAngelo1981b), the losses are not necessarily greater for large local offices than for small local offices, because these costs are morefirm-wide in nature rather than office-specific.This means that local offices may be more concerned with the economic importance of a particular client than a potential litigation risk fromaudit failures, in particular, when the offices are small in size.The above arguments lead us topredict that large local offices with relatively deep local clienteles are less likely to compromise audit quality with respect to a particular client, and thus that they are likely to provide higher-quality audit services, ceteris paribus, compared with small local offices with relatively thin localclienteles.In such a case, one would observe a positive association between office size and auditquality.We call this prediction the economic dependence perspective.SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS While previous auditing research has examined whether and how audit fees and audit qualityare influenced by audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership at both thenational level and the city level, this line of research has paid little attention to the effect of thesize of a local engagement office within an audit firm(i.e., office size)in the context of auditquality and audit pricing.Unlike previous research, the focus of this paper is on whether the officesize is an additional, engagement-specific factor determining audit quality and audit pricing overand beyond national-level audit firm size and office-level industry leadership.Our results can besummarized as follows.First, we find that the office size is positively associated with audit quality proxied by un-signed abnormal accruals.Our finding is consistent with what we call the economic dependenceperspective: large(small)local offices with deep office-level clienteles are less(more)likely to depend on a particular client, and thus are better(less)able to resist client pressure on substandardor biased reporting.Second, we find that large local offices are able to charge higher audit fees totheir clients than small ones, which is consistent with the view that large offices provide higher-quality audits than small offices, and this quality differential is priced as a fee premium in themarket for audit services.However, the above finding is at odds with the view that large officeshave a cost advantage in producing audit services of similar quality and thus are able to chargelower billing rates compared with small offices.Taken together, our results highlight that officesize is one of the most important engagement-specific determinants of audit quality and auditpricing.Last, while we use two alternative, advanced accrual models to alleviate a concern overthe limitations inherent in the Jones(1991)model estimates of abnormal accruals, our measures ofaudit quality, namely unsigned abnormal accruals, may suffer from nontrivial measurement errors.We therefore cannot completely rule out the possibility that the estimated coefficients on our testvariables are biased.However, given that a contemporaneous study of Francis and Yu(2009)documents the same positive association between audit quality and audit office size using twoadditional proxies for audit quality, i.e., auditors’ tendency to issue going-concern opinion andclient firms’ likelihood to meet earnings benchmarks, we believe that our results are unlikelydriven by possible measurement errors.Overall, our results suggest that both regulators and audit firms should pay more attention tothe behavior of small offices because they are more likely to be economically dependent on aparticular client, and thus to compromise audit quality.In particular, Big 4 audit firms may need toimplement strategies for providing a more homogenous level of audit services across offices ofdifferent sizes because a poor-quality audit by a small office could significantly damage thereputation of the entire firm.In today’s global business environment, the issue of maintaining“uniform quality” should be an even more important concern to reputable auditors because theirbusiness becomes increasingly internationalized in terms of locations and client profiles.Forexample, it may be more difficult for Big 4 audit firms to maintain uniform quality of service atthe office level across different jurisdictions around the world.Further, local offices in differentjurisdictions(e.g., European Union and China)have their own client bases and are likely to bemore autonomous in making audit-related decisions than those within the U.S.It is thereforepossible that the size of a local practicing office plays a more significant role in determining thequality of audit services in other non-U.S.jurisdictions than in the U.S.Given the scarcity ofinternational evidence regarding the effect of audit office size on audit quality and audit pricing,we recommend further research on the issue using international samples from different jurisdic-tions.审计办事处规模，审计质量与审计定价

Jong-Hag Choi, Chansog(Francis)Kim, Jeong-Bon Kim, and YoonseokZang 摘要：此论文使用2000-2005年间对美国审计事务所大量取样的所得数据，以此调查审计事务所中当地办事处规模大小对审计质量和审计价格。实证检验中，审计质量是由异常应计来衡量的，办事处规模则有两种衡量方法：一个是基于每个办事处的审计客户数量，另一个是基于每个办事处挣得的审计费用总额。调查结果显示，办事处规模大小对审计质量与审计费用都有着明显的正相关关系，即使控制了国家级审计公司的规模以及办公水平行业，结果也是如此。这正相关关系印证了规模大的本土办事处相对规模小的办事处来说，能过提供更高质量的审计。质量上的差异在审计市场中有价码的差别。关键字：审计事务所，办事处规模，审计质量，审计定价 数据可用性：数据皆为公开可用，论文中有指明数据来源。

当我们把对事务所整体的分析转变为对特定的城市中的办事处的分析时，我们对审计事务所的看法同时也有了剧烈的变化。根据迪安哥罗在1981年的论证，当分析办事处规模时，四大会计师事务时也就没有那么大了。举例来说，如果安然公司代表安达信会计事务所上市客户小于2%的收入，那他代表的就是休斯敦办事处大于35%的利润。

简介

正如前文所说，相对于国家级办事处来说，市级审计办事处的规模对审计质量有着更为重要的决定作用。因为市级办事处是半自治的单位，在审计公司中有他专属的客户群。真正管理和执行审计委托合同（包括审计服务的交付和审核意见的发表）的并不是全国总部，而是办事处合作伙伴。就这点而言，威廉与弗兰西斯提出观点，审计独立性的评估需要更多地关注办事处的程度而不是整体公司的程度。因为特定客户的大多数的审计决定都是由单独的办事处制定的。由安达信会计师事务所休斯敦办事处所审计的安然集团的倒闭便是一个很好的例子，证明办事处级别的审计质量的重要性之高。然而，现在许多审计研究都把焦点集中于国家级审计公司的特点，认为两个审计质量基本的决定性因素是审计公司规模和审计行业领导。

研究发现，一般而言，拥有国际知名商标的大审计公司（比如四大）或是有行业专长的公司比非有名及缺乏行业专长的小公司拥有更高质量的审计服务。这个研究隐含的假设是同一公司在不同城市的不同规模的办事处的审计质量是平均的。因此，我们几乎没有收集到不同办事处的审计质量的差别，特别是本土办事处的规模是否影响到审计质量或是审计定价。所以有一个问题：办事处规模是不是决定审计质量的另一个因素因此审计定价比审计公司规模和行业领先地位的高。我们只在为这个还没解决的问题提供直接的证据。最近有几项研究都提供直接证据证明同一公司的不同办事处的审计质量有所不同。例如，最初美国的雷诺和弗朗西斯使用单独的办事处作为研究的单位，他们发现当用具体办事处的客户来衡量客户规模时，“五大审计师对大客户更为谨慎。”此外，弗格森和弗朗西斯等发现，在澳大利亚和美国审计市场中，当市级行业领先水平与国家级领先水平联合时，审计收费是最高的。而单独国家级行业领先水平则没有这样的效果。随后，弗朗西斯等证实如果审计师是市级行业领导者或同时为国家级与市级领导水平时，非正常应计所代理的客户收益相对较高。换句话说，研究结果表明单独的国家级领先水平对审计质量没有特别显著的影响。最近，崔等人指出办事处与总部的地理集中程度和客户的应计质量成正相关，说明审计办事处的地理位置对审计质量是有决定性影响的。整合以上的发现，说明本地办事处规模对审计质量以及审计定价的决定起很重要的作用。这里需要指出的是，尽管如此，却没有研究者关注过本地办事处的规模是否与审计质量以及审计收费有系统性联系这个问题。

为了填补这一知识空缺，我们决定调查这个迄今还未被研究过的问题，即办事处规模是否与审计质量和定价有关系以及如何联系。首先我们假设办事处规模与审计质量有系统性关联，即使控制了国家标准的审计公司规模和行业专长这两个变量。如果大公司的审计质量比小公司高，则说明是正相关关联，这我们在下文会做进一步阐述。接着，我们还检验了办事处规模与审计定价之间的关系。之前有研究指出审计质量在市场上被标价。办事处规模与审计质量正相关，以此来看，我们可以推测，办事处规模越大，审计质量越高，因此审计费用也会越多。所以，我们可以由办事处规模和审计定价的正相关关系推出办事处规模和审计质量的正相关关系。

为了检验之前的假设，我们用有偏向性的收益报告来作关于审计质量的推论，另外我们用非正常应计的级数来代表审计质量。衡量非正常应计时，我们使用由保尔和库玛和科萨里等人开发的两个备择模型。此外，我们用审计分析数据库来估量本地办事处的规模，此数据库为美国证券交易委员会注册的客户提供审计办事处的身份认证。

衡量办事处规模大小的方法有多种，一种是基于每个办事处的审计客户数量，另一种是基于每个办事处所挣得的审计费用。

简单来说，研究结果指出在美国的审计市场，（控制审计公司规模为国家标准，行业领先水准为国家标准以及其他相关因素）审计质量和审计费用都与办事处规模呈正相关。这样的结果与我们所做的一连串灵敏度测试一致。

我们的研究完善了现存的文献，体现在几方面。第一，该论文论证了同一审计公司的不同办事处的审计质量并不是相同的。就我们所知，在美国，我们的论文是最先有直接证据证明审计办事处的规模是决定审计质量的重要因素。研究结果指出，今后有关审计质量差异的研究应多关注办事处审计师行为以及本地办事处的规模。其次，本文最先提出办事处规模是影响审计定价的关键因素。先前从未有研究验证审计费用是否被本地办事处规模所影响，我们的证据可以让人们更好地了解在审计定价下审计师与客户的关系。

最后，该研究结果为调查者和从业者提供了实用的关于审计质量和审计定价的见解。我们的研究结果建议调查者如果把质量等级比较改为大小公司审计员之分的比较，则该有一个更好的对于审计质量的评估。质量溢价的经济理论要求为不同的市场提供统一质量的产品和服务，消费者始终是维持质量溢价的关键。同样的，我们的证据显示，四大会计师行应该在不同规模的办事处维持相近水准的审计质量，因为一个当地办事处所犯的系统性低质量的服务错误能导致整个审计公司的名誉损失。

假说发展

越来越多的审计调查强调在本地公司或当地办事处工作的审计师的分析行为的重要性。但是，却没有一份调查是关注当地办事处规模大小背景下的审计质量。为什么公司规模对审计质量的影响超过另外两种著名审计公司的特征，也就是审计公司的品牌（四大和非四大）和工业的专门技能。

在迪安哥拉的体系中，一个审计师的动机对于审计质量的妥协是关于个别客户的经济意义决定并且和审计师的客户的投资组合有关。他的分析指出高级审计师比低级审计师更倾向于提供更高质量的审计服务给个别客户。因为对于审计师来说，他的经济观受客户的影响是可以忽略不计的，还有相比于低级审计师来说，高级审计师有更多可以去输（比方说，承受更高荣誉的损失）以防审计失误。迪安哥拉的理论还可以应用于造成大公司和小公司之间的审计质量的不同。因为当地的审计公司根据它的审计决定，客户群，收入来源还有其它事实可以看做是一个半自治的联盟。大的审计公司相对于小的审计公司来说更没可能依靠某些个别的客户因为前者有更为广泛的客户源，因此在经济上依赖个别客户的可能性更小。换言之，大公司更不可能像小公司一样在个别客户的施压下默认一些不符合标准的报告。

更进一步的说，本地审计公司，不管是大的还是小的，都不想因为审计失误而承受全部名誉的损失因为对于国家级别的公司来说它们只是更可能只是损失了一部分的名誉。万一因为审计失误发生荣誉损失，对于大公司来说更容易承受，这样的损失对大公司来说更好承担一些。因为这些代价对于特定的某些公司和一些大公司来说是不一样的。特别来说，这就意味着当地公司的规模比较小的时候会更多的考虑个别客户的经济的重要性而不是潜在可能造成官司的审计失误。上面的讨论可以让我们预测，在其它条件相同时，相对于客源小的公司，有一定的大范围的客户的大审计公司是更不可能对某些个别的客户在审计质量上由于尊重而妥协。因此他们更可能提供高水准的审计服务。在这种情况下，客户会对公司规模大小和审计质量产生乐观的联系。我们把这称之为经济信赖观点。

总结与评注

前面所述调研主要研究国家级审计办事处规模和市级或国家级的审计行业趋势是否对审计费用和审计质量造成影响，以及如何影响。此处声明，在审计质量和审计费用一定的情况下，此研究不考虑审计公司内部审计部门的影响。此论文主要探究办事处规模是否是除国家级审计公司规模和公司级审计行业标准外，影响审计质量和审计费用的一个额外的、有条件的因素。

首先，我们发现办事处的规模大小是与审计质量正相关,表现为无符号的异常收益。这个结果于我们所说的经济意义相一致；拥有忠实的公司级客户群的高级（或低级）办事处很少依赖于个别几个客户，因此，这些办事处就很少因为客户施压而虚假上报。其次，我们发现当地的高级办事处收费比小型的办事处要高。这也是和我们发现的高级办事处的审计质量普遍要高于小型办事处的结论，同时这种高质量的服务在市场上是作为审计溢价计算的。但是，以上结论却于另一种理论相矛盾。该理论认为大型办事处的优势在于提供与小型办事处相似的服务却有更高的收费，因而计费费率也较低。总而言之，我们的结论强调办事处规模是影响审计质量和审计费用的其中一个重要因素。最后一点，当我们使用这两种可互换的先进模型来减少在琼斯模型中对不正常收益的估计缺陷时，我们可能犯了一些很重要的计算错误。因此，我们无法排除在测试中所估算出的系数有偏差的可能性。但是，在根据Francis 和Yu的论述：审计质量和审计办事处规模成正相关，也就是说，审计师将越来越关注这两者的关系同时客户公司也将从中获取不少好处。我们自信这个结论没有任何破绽。

总的来说，我们的结论是：鉴于个别客户对小型审计办事处来说，经济意义更大，通常这类公司会更加注重审计质量。因此，审计监察部门和审计公司应该多加关注小型办事处的相关做法，从而提高自身的审计质量。特别是四大会计师事务所在处理相似的审计服务时，更应该实施跨规模的措施，因为任何一个审计部门的审计失误都将使公司名声扫地。在全球化的今天，各大跨国公司遍布全球各地，拥有国际化的客户，保障“始终如一的高质服务”是所有跨国公司的高级审计师越来越关注的问题。例如，由于各会计事务所所在国家或地区的不同，所需遵循的司法体系也有很大不同，如何在这样的环境中“保持始终如一的高质服务”对四大会计师事务所来说无疑是一种挑战。再者，处于不同司法体系下的事务所又拥有不同的客户群，这些事务所在制定审计方法方面需要比在美国当地的分公司有更大的自主权。因此，当地事务所对审计质量的影响可能要比在美国相同规模的事务所大。鉴于，国际上很少有人论证审计办事处规模对审计质量和审计费用的影响，我们希望大家能从这个角度共同来探究不同体系下的国际案例。

第四篇：英文毕业论文文献综述的写法及

英文毕业论文文献综述的写法及范文

英文（例子）：

[1] Bn, H D Tehing by Piniples: An Ineive ApphLnguge Pedggy[M] Penie Hll Regens, 1994

[] Bn, J Se l Siued Cgniin nd he Culue f Lening[J] Eduinl Resehe, 1, 1989

[3] Chis, Dede The Evluin f Cnsuivis Lening Envi-nens: Iesin in Disibued Viul Wlds[J] Ed-uinl Tehnlgy, Sep-O, 1995

[4] Hyes, DOn uniive peene[M] J B Pide;J Hles(eds)Silinguisis Hndsh: Penguin, 19

[5] L E Sbugh Ineulul uniin[M] Ne Buns-ik, NJUSA: Tnsin Bks, 1988

[6] Puhl, A Clss A ssessen[J] EnglishTehing Fu, 199

[] Ths, Jenny Css-ulul Pgi Filue[J] Applied Linguisis, 1983,(4): 91-111

[8] Willi B Gudykuns Ineulul uniin hey[M] Bevely Hills, CA: Sge Pub, 1983

第五篇：英文文献

民营企业文化建设研究

本文转自浅论天下

民营企业是我国经济建设中的重要力量。但许多民营企业经营管理上存在一个共同的问题，即忽视企业文化建设，缺乏优秀的企业文化。21世纪的企业竞争将突出地体现在企业文化力的竞争上，企业文化管理将是继经验管理和科学管理之后的一种新的管理方式。在文化管理日益受到重视的今天，民营企业必须加强企业文化建设，以此改善经营管理，为企业的发展提供持久的内在动力。民营企业文化的发展有一个历史的过程，形成了民营企业文化多样的特征。本文总结了民营企业文化建设的现状，对目前民营企业文化建设存在的误区进行了详细分析。在此基础上，本文提出了民营企业文化建设的指导原则、方向、方法和相应措施，并对如何培育有特色的民营企业文化提出了相应的对策。最后，以正泰集团为例，进行了民营企业文化建设的案例分析。

Private-owned enterprises are very important force in our country“s economic construction.However, there is a common issue existing in many private-owned enterprises in their business administration that is they neglect the enterprise culture construction and lack of excellent enterprise culture.The competitions of enterprise in 21st century will highlight in competition of culture strength.The enterprise culture management will become a new management way after the management way of experience and science.The private-owned enterprises must strengthen culture construction so as to improve business administration and provide permanent internal impetus for the development of enterprises.The development of the private-owned enterprise”s culture has a historical process and forms a diversiform character.The article sums up the actuality of the Private-owned enterprise“s culture construction and provides detailed analysis for mistakes in the private-owned enterprise”s culture construction at present.On the basis of it, the article put forwards the instructional principia, direction, method and corresponding measure for the private-owned enterprise“s culture construction and provides the corresponding suggestion for how to develop the private-owned enterprise”s culture that has distinguished features.According to the case of Zhengtai Company, this article also gives empirical analysis of the enterprise culture construction.本文转自浅论天下