哲学演讲（共5篇）

第一篇：哲学演讲

王雷泉教授：

真正的引导需要大师。二千五百年前，在世界的东方和西方出现过伟大的老子、孔子、释迦牟尼、苏格拉底、柏拉图等等。他们几乎在同一个时代出现，哲学家雅斯贝尔斯称那个时代为轴心时代。那么两千五百年以后，在世界走入了21世纪，这个世纪有很多变化，我们的物质文明已经发展到烂熟的地步，但是危机也随之而现，所以这个时代更加注重心灵的探求，心灵的重建，所以我们这次请来了浙江大学的教授、博士生导师、浙江大学基督教与跨文化研究中心的副主任王志成博士给我们讲解第二次轴心时代文明，讲解我们中国将怎么来解决自身的问题，同时考察我们中国能对整个人类的未来提供什么样的贡献。王志成博士虽然年纪比较小，比我小很多，可是著作等身，光翻译就有40本，涉及到东西方的宗教，自己的专著也有10部，是一位非常勤奋的学者。现在，他的眼光也关注到宗教学核心的内容，现在我们就以热烈掌声欢迎王志成教授为我们演讲。

王志成教授：

谢谢王老师，谢谢各位老师和同学。王老师跟我十多年前就已经认识，那时我准备去耶鲁大学访学，我们一起吃饭讨论过哲学。我于1986年进入杭州大学（后并入浙江大学），90年毕业，同年读研究生，我的导师是陈村富教授。1993年我跟随夏基松教授研究外国哲学，攻读博士学位。我的硕士论文研究古代希腊哲学中的怀疑主义神学，我的博士论文研究当代宗教哲学家约翰•希克（John Hick）的宗教多元论。之后，我一直和约翰•希克以及相关的人士保持联系，并持续地做一些翻译工作。1996年出版了我的博士论文《解释与拯救》。之后，我一直在大学教学和研究。

今天我很荣幸来到复旦大学来谈谈关于我个人最近几年思考的一些问题以及对此的一些想法。从2004年开始，我们开始在北京宗教文化出版社主编一套丛书：《第二轴心时代文丛》。这些书里面有些观点和我今天晚上讲的有一些关系。

今天晚上我要讲的主题是：全球化、第二轴心时代与中国宗教的未来。这个主题讲三个内容，第一是全球化问题，第二是第二轴心时代问题，第三是第二轴心时代与中国宗教的未来的关系。今天晚上的演讲将是比较宏大的，并不是非常具体，并且说的重点也不平衡，但希望给大家一个整体全面的印象。

一、全球化问题

全球化是当今我们人类的处境。有人说人类进入全球化时间是在18世纪，有人说在19世纪。但全球化真正给人带来一种强烈冲击感受的是20世纪，特别是二次世界大战之后，对我们多数中国人来说应该是改革开放之后。

这里，我要讲二点：首先，全球化这个观念发端于什么时候，一般来说我们不会把这个观念的起源推得很远，但是我在《中国宗教》上发表了一篇文章，谈到了全球化观念起源的问题，并提出该观念应该发端于轴心时代，也就是说在释迦牟尼时代、在耶律米时代、在老子和孔子的时代。因此，我的一个基本观念是：全球意识发端于轴心时代。之所以出现这种意识，这是一个很神秘的事情。在轴心时代之前，人们的观念发展受到了地域的限制，但在轴心时代（公元前8—2世纪）不同地区都出现了一批伟大的思想家、哲学家、宗教家、圣人。为什么会在那个时代集中出现这么一批伟大的人物呢？这是人们到现在都不能解释清楚的现象。因为，从时间观念来说，之前是比较原始的，而这时出现了一大批思想家，他们之间几乎都没有什么来往，他们的观念却又都在这个时代出现了，所以对于很多人来说这是一个神秘现象。

人类的智慧在那时发生了突变。对此，至今我们难以有一个理性的解释。雅斯贝尔斯最早提出了“轴心时代”一词。他自己也无法解释人类这种智慧的神秘的集中性的爆发，其他思想家也难以解释这个现象。但如果你是有信仰的，可能你说这来自于神圣的天启。

与全球化相关的全球意识，在它出现之后自身就会运动。当今时代，人人都可以感受到全球意识，而且越来越多的人接受这种全球意识。例如，我们今天的一些学术研究或者我们各个领域的工作自然而然地都需要通过这种意识来思考、观察和分析。

其次，我们不能说轴心时代的那些思想就可以被称为宗教，只可以说是宗教的源头思想，佛陀本人不是要创宗教，他实际上是觉悟者，孔子、老子以及庄子他们本人都没有创立宗教。而他们的思想却成了在此之后所创立的各种世界宗教思想的源头。在中国，我们可以说我们在解读先秦的思想家。先秦之后中国哲学几乎没有什么特别的原创思想。很多人因此说要重返轴心时代。对于基督徒来说，就是要回到圣经；对于佛教徒，就是要回到原始佛教；对于道教徒，就是要回到老庄时代。但是各个宗教的创始人的头衔是我们后人给予他们的，他们是被给予者，而他们本人并不很主动地去创造一个宗教，后人沿着他们的思想道路发展出一个个不同的宗教体系。

比如在佛教中，首先是佛陀的经验，而后沿着佛陀的经验继续践行。我们的佛教不断发展，我们不断证悟佛陀的思想、体验佛陀的思想，然后我们的意识因此也不断的扩展。所以，它是以佛陀的经验为根本，不断地延伸，慢慢地形成佛教传统。而这传统由于我们对它的解读上的差异以及在修行方法上的差异而产生了分化，细化为不同的宗派。慢慢地，它们共同构成一个巨大的传统，所以宗教就成了传统而不是单单一个人创立的宗教，不是依靠佛陀一个人构成的，它是一个包含了诸多亚传统的巨大传统。所以由一个原初的思想家变成一个传统，这个传统又有很多的亚传统。这个过程不是短时间内完成的，而是有一个历史的发生、发展的过程。所以佛教不是一下子到中国，也不是一下子到西方的，西方的佛教主要是在上世纪发展起来的。十九世纪时候的西方，没有多少西方人认识佛教。可能尼采了解一点，可是尼采对佛陀的了解准确吗？很多地方尼采对佛陀的了解是不准确的。叔本华对佛陀也了解一点，但叔本华对佛陀的理解很准确吗？到现在为止，据我所知，西方人一般对佛陀都难有正确的理解。

今天看来，佛教的力量在西方不断扩展，由一个人渐渐组成一个僧团，然后逐渐变成一个有经典文本、有自己特定组织的传统，从小乘到大乘，再传播到今天的西方，这是一个不断物化、具体化的过程。实际上存在着这么一种说法，《史记》里就有秦始皇要灭佛的记载。也就是说在秦始皇的时代佛教就已经传进了中国，但是我们对此并没有多少证据。佛教的发展和传播可以说是一个全球化的过程，是一个慢慢展开的过程。从历史的角度看，我们要特别感谢阿育王，他是一个很特别的人。另外，大家可以读一本佛经——《弥兰陀王问经》。在这部经中，一个来自希腊的国王和龙军菩萨展开对话。这个希腊的国王接受龙军的观念，皈依了佛门。这是一个很有名的经典。佛教的全球化过程，阿育王起到了非常大的作用。而且历代的很多高僧对佛教的全球化起到了非常重要的作用。中国的佛教在解放后到文革这段时间遭到了根本性的打击，但是在此之后佛教在中国开始了缓慢的恢复。

而西方基督教的全球化就要从耶稣开始说起了。耶稣说你们要把我的福音传到地极。这个观念给后来的门徒所指引的一个方向就是把他的福音传播开去。基督教的兴起是非常有意思的。理论上讲，耶稣是一个犹太教徒，一个拉比。他不是基督徒，也没有建立教会，但是他的思想、他的行动、他的榜样作用以及他的门徒沿着他的路线走下去，就形成了一个小的共同体，然后这个共同体逐渐地就变成了一个组织化了的但较为松散的群体。由于历史的偶然性，经过几百年的挣扎和斗争，这个宗教群体最后为罗马当局所接受，成为了国教。基督教在地位上的“翻盘”对于基督教来说具有革命性的意义，基督教的优点从此得以彰显、相应地，基督教的缺点也就被世人所知。这是一个国教化的过程。从今天来看，基督教的全球化是最为成功的。因为基督教的早期信徒大都为文化水平不高的民众，他们只是凭着坚定的信仰把基督教变成了一个巨大的传统，并且形成了三大亚传统——天主教、东正教、新教。相比于其他宗教，它的每个亚传统都非常强大，光天主教信徒就有十多亿人。在它的全球化过程中，基督教从西亚到欧洲、印度，乃至后来漂洋过海来到美洲，取代了美洲原有的文化根基，从此，美洲文化也就成为了一种基督教文化。

在当时的美洲，本土的文化传统和其信仰都是比较不牢固的，基督教进入美洲是比较容易的，并把其本土文化给吞并了。但是基督教进入亚洲如印度和中国情况却是非常的复杂。在唐朝时，基督教就进入中国（被称为景教），但是当时景教是依附于佛教的，在灭佛过程中，景教（基督教一支）也被打压下去了。在元朝，也里可温教（当时中国人对基督宗教的称呼）传入中国，但是随着元朝的灭亡而在中国消失。明末清初天主教进入中国传教。但是由于中国的文化自身的强大，直到清末，天主教在中国的传教并不很成功。相比而言，佛教的本土化过程却是非常成功的，因为它能够在中国两种文化传统——儒道——之间达到一种和而不同的融合。

基督教和中国宗教（儒佛道）两个异质的文化传统很难和平相处，这样，基督教的本地化过程不是很成功。而今天，从基督教人数上看是比较成功的，但是从思想上来看，至今我们也不能说基督教的中国化已经成功了。目前，中国大陆还没有中国神学。丁光训说要建立中国神学，但是还没有成功。香港道风山为推进汉语神学而不懈努力，但至今还不能说已经成功，还需要继续努力。在社会科学院世宗所，卓新平教授一直要推进学术神学，就是不依赖信仰进行纯学术的宗教研究。而这刚刚起步，其发展前景尚难预料。

在全球化的过程中，基督教得到了成功的发展。但在中国和印度，情况就比较复杂。因为中国和印度都具有悠久且博大的文明传统，长期以来，基督教的信徒人数在这两个国家难以有大的增进。基督教进入美洲非常成功，进入非洲我们也不能说不成功。在进入西方世界、希腊世界的过程中，是很成功的。可是全球化的今天，人们发现中国是块唐僧肉，是非常有发展前途的地方。因为，在英国、德国、荷兰等国家，基督教人数不断下滑，而在中国大陆，信徒人数直线上升。而在印度不大可能有一个大的量的飞跃。这是因为印度教本身就非常的强大，因此，基督教在印度的发展空间是很有限的。在中国，基督教的发展空间则非常巨大。很多人会担心中国传统文化的迷失，以及中国自己的文化身份认同感的丧失，而这样的担心也不是毫无理由的。

以上是我举的两个宗教全球化的例子，其实也可以举伊斯兰教的例子。伊斯兰教的全球化也是很成功的。尽管伊斯兰教出现在轴心时代之后，但也是沿着轴心时代的思想发展出来的一个世界性宗教。相比之下，中国的儒道的全球化不是很成功。并且现在我们多数人认为道教是一个地方性宗教而不是一个世界性宗教。印度教的全球化也在展开，在中国、在西方也会有所发展。现在还有一个所谓的新时代运动，新时代运动不属于传统宗教，但是新时代运动在推动宗教全球化的进程中的作用是非常巨大的。克里希拉穆提就是新时代运动的一个代表人物。他在中国很受欢迎。甚至有人把南怀瑾也归于新时代运动的人物。更有人说从广义上讲，瑜伽也可以属于新时代运动的一部分。瑜伽在全球化中非常成功，比“太极”成功多了。印度瑜伽在印度文明中是一个核心的东西，但是它在全球化的过程中发展没有障碍，没有受到意识形态的阻碍。瑜伽全球化的成功经验很值得我们去研究。

第一点我所讲的是世界的奥秘、神秘，在轴心时代出现了智慧爆发；第二点讲的是世界宗教的扩张，这是一个从神性到理性的过程。

二、第二轴心时代问题

轴心时代的思想随着时间的推移，在不断发展之后，出现了很多有益的东西，但与此同时也出现了很多消极的东西。有关于这些积极方面和消极方面的东西在此我不多谈。

轴心时代的思想发展到今天，或许由于现代人的自私以及自身存在的一些问题而未能得以完全的继承，于是我们会说历史堕落了、倒退了，比如现在经常提到的基督教的末世观，佛教所讲的末法时代，以及印度教所讲的卡利时代。为了变革这个并不让人满意的时代，一些人认为我们要进行人类文明的转化。最近，看了一个充满个人魅力的科学家关于2012的演讲，听似神秘莫测，令人觉得百惑不解。他的思考角度是基于对全球化的考察，通过考察当代人类的技术能力来思考人类命运的问题。这样的人在当今世界可能不少市场。而我们作为学术的探讨，也有很多关于源头的探讨。轴心时代发展至今，将进入一个新的时代。雅思贝斯首先提出：我们可能正在酝酿一个新的文明时代，只是它还没来到，我们正处在这个文明和轴心文明的间隙期。他说这话的时候，我们还不能说已经进入了新的轴心时代了。

但是，随着科学技术的发展，计算机网络的兴起，特别是上世纪九十年代全球化进程突然加剧，发生了许多事件。有人把1993年作为一个关节点，认为这是我们进入新的轴心时代的标识时间，这是因为1993年召开了世界宗教会议。在会议上，通过了《全球伦理宣言》。它预示着：人们需要一套全球伦理，需要全球各个宗教的合作，形成一个巨大的宗教共同体。

早在1893年，在美国召开了第一次世界宗教会议。印度教的辨喜参加了，并引起了很大的反响。过了100年又举行了第二次的世界宗教会议，在这过去的100年中，全球化进程加快了。在这种背景下，人们的时空观念发生了改变，文化上发生了震荡，人们之间的关系也有所变化。在这个过程中，我们有什么特别的改变？不同的思想家有不同的回答。迄今为止，研究新轴心文明的人中比较有影响的人是卡曾斯，但他已经去世。卡曾斯在1993年出版了一本叫做《21世纪的基督》的书，在这本书里他明确提出了“第二次轴心时代”这个观念，可是他也说，第二次轴心时代文明的源头应该回到圣方济各，要延伸到哥白尼那个时候。他说在二十世纪里有个在中国工作过的人—德日进，他是一个古生物学家，他认为人类文明是从一个原点发展到欧米伽点的过程，这个点也就是基督。从这个角度看，德日进也可以算是第二次轴心时代文明的一个先驱。

但是在学者看来，我们会提及若干人，刚才提到的卡曾斯就算是一个。凯伦•阿姆斯特朗也是其中的一个代表，她是一个英国畅销书作家，出版过许多著作。此外还有一个非常激进的哲学家叫库比特，他自身也认为自己是一个第二轴心时代的学者。还有一个叫推进全球宗教对话的天主教思想家斯维德勒，称第二轴心时代为称全球对话时代。他在他的有关论文里讨论了卡曾斯所说的第二轴心时代。人大出版社出版了他的一本书叫《走向全球对话时代》。另外我们也把孔汉思纳入为第二轴心时代学者的范畴之内，但孔汉思本人没有提第二轴心时代观念。在我们的新儒家的代表中，杜维明是一个代表，他自己也在宣言第二轴心时代的观念，想要对儒家文明进行第二轴心时代的转化。在北京论坛上，他曾经公开宣扬第二轴心时代。在北京大学汤一介先生，也在宣扬第二轴心时代，他出版过一本书叫《走向新轴心时代》。但这本书只有很少的篇幅谈论新（第二）轴心时代，但却是结合中国儒家来谈的。他认为我们儒家应进行一些变革、发展才好进入第二轴心时代。在美国，耶稣研究会的一些人在宣扬第二轴心时代的观念，他们也在2003年召开了一个会议，核心主题就是关于第二轴心时代的观念。

关于第二轴心时代的特征，我们可以概括为三点：第一，全球意识。各个领域里的学术研究都出现了从个体性意识上升到全球性意识的现象。第二，生态意识，也叫大地意识。这也被认为是第二轴心时代意识的一个基本观念。第三，对话意识。它强调通过对话来处理不同信仰传统之间的关系，不同文明之间的关系。我个人在做一个有关于宗教间以及信仰间灵性的探索。这方面研究比较少，但是在全球化时代这个问题却是非常的紧迫，是我们不得不面对的一个问题，即探讨儒教、佛教和基督教等宗教在相遇中我们应该如何修证、证悟，也就是说在一个人类共同体中如何共享灵性的境界。在轴心时代，印度、中东、中国、希腊各自的文明都是独立形成和发展的，而在今天这一全球化的时代开始了越来越频繁的互动，是否会出现一个共同的地球灵性，这个问题我个人在思考。很多时候我是从佛教的角度思考，很多时候我也很喜欢从印度教的角度去思考。而我翻译得最多，写得最多的是基督教方面的内容，所以我也不时地会从基督教的角度去思考。

有人会有疑问，说你这样吃得消吗。如果我们有了这种全球意识，我们的文明可能就要重新发展，很多问题就要重新思考。从个人层面，如个人如何在当今世界上活得有意义，有人说我需要一个宗教，可是当你面对很多宗教的时候，你能够非常好的去相处，能够从其他文明中去吸收营养，去发展，这就有很多值得探讨的问题。所以我个人认为对话是一种灵性的探索方式，也是一种灵性的实践方式，也是宇宙本身的一个动力结构。

为什么是宇宙本身的一个动力结构？这是因为，譬如从基督教来说，如果神是三位一体，父子灵是互动的。三个位格之间是互动的。在印度教里我们讲三个主神是可以互动的。在佛教里面我们讲报身、法身、应身是互动。这些似乎有些玄奥，但是从灵修学的角度看，不同层面之间也是可以展开对话的。作为一个佛教徒，在内心深处，三个层面就可以展开对话。印度教里面也是如此。这些我们不多谈了，这就是说，第二轴心时代文明将是一个全新的文明，而这个文明基于轴心文明精神的弘扬。譬如说当时佛陀的慈悲以及实修证悟这些观念一直以来可能没有非常完整全面地展开，可是在这个全球化时代我们似乎有可能更快地展开，能够体现出来。我们可能很少人能达到佛陀的那个层面，可是佛陀与你的最终层面是通的。在基督教中，按照神学家的研究，按照旧约里面的经文，每个人都是神（god），也就是说人人都是有神性的，也就是说在终极层面你与上帝是一体的，从神话层面上看你就是上帝的生命之气。

第二轴心时代有多种意识，我们这里只谈了其中的部分。事实上，读者可以结合全球化时代的特征去反省第二轴心时代的意识特征。

三、第二轴心时代和中国宗教的未来

我在2007年参加过一次儒耶对话的会议，当时我就提出，儒家和基督教对话从明末清初就开始了（或许应该更早），到现在对话了几百年，但是依然是不成功的。反之，佛教和中国文化的对话是非常成功，佛教已经成为中国文化的一个有机部分。到现在为止，基督教在某种意义上还没有成为中国文化的有机部分，所以耶儒对话还要继续。在那次的香港儒耶对话会议上，一些基督教学者和儒教学者吵起来了，有的儒家学者从内心说，对基督教不屑一顾，批评得很凶，认为基督教非常霸权。我那时是中间派。我的论文被评为很客观，而基督教和儒教的学者基本上对对方多持有消极的态度。

但我们中国文明现在首先要面对的是基督教的进入。北派的一些儒家学者搞儒家报纸《儒教邮报》，宣言儒教文化。有一次我和他们谈，我说儒家在对话这个方面的立场是开放的，我完全可以成为一个儒士。儒家一直来是主张开放的，如《论语》主张“和而不同”，并主张 “有朋自远方来，不亦说乎”。2008年召开的北京奥运会上，我们就使用这个标语。我认为，儒家或者儒教从理论上说它是开放的，而且在走上全球化的道路上也没有任何障碍。只是在儒教本身的发展中，有人把儒教的一些支流末节的东西凝固起来，作为宝贝，说是国学里必须保留的东西，这就会出现很多批评。但儒家的精神本身是可以全球化的，而且在我看来是最容易被接受的观念就是儒家观念，因为儒家很多观念在发展中没有障碍。也就是说，儒家很容易走向全球化，很容易为世界所接受，但是儒家现在很多都是很保守的，会出现很多张力。

我是主张儒家应和基督教互动的，这并不是说彻底成为一个凝固不变的儒家，而应该是作为一个开放的、发展的儒家。所以说，轴心时代的中国宗教思想先为我们中华民族带来了福音，帮助了我们很多人，成为了我们中国的灵魂。道家其实也如儒家一样也可以走上全球化，它在轴心时代以及轴心时代以后已经滋养了无数人的精神生活。佛教传入中国以后已经成为了中国的佛教了，成为了中国文化的一部分，它也能并已经为中华民族提供营养。所以儒释道三家是兄弟，它们都为中华民族服务。

宗教不是为教服务，而是为人服务，所以它们应该造福于中国人民，也应该面向于世界人民。如果宗教是服务人的，那么宗教很多信念层面的东西是可以变革的。在轴心时代发端的文明已经发挥了很多作用，在它凝固的过程中，它有积极的也有消极的。而到今天真正的全球化时代，我认为儒家的东西是可以改革的。道家有很多东西也是可以改革的。它们在服务于中华民族的同时也可以服务世界，让这些轴心时代已有的资源在全球化的过程中可以重新展开，能够哺育世界。这样，这个世界就会更加和谐。

从灵修学的角度看，对个人灵性生活、个人灵性的成长可以提供非常好的营养。在中国，儒释道以及一些较原始宗教，如少数民族中那种特别关注人与自然关系的宗教对于今天来说也是十分重要的，对于今天现代人来说具有借鉴作用。现在，很多环境灾难都和我们人类自身的活动息息相关，从佛教上说，业很重，不仅中国的业很重，整个世界范围内的业都很重。人类的很多问题和人类的共业有关。这就是说在我们全球化时代，我们可以让儒释道和其他文明共同凝聚、创造一个新的人类的灵性或者说新时代的灵性，并可以服务于这个世界。在这个全球化的世界中不同的文化一定会相遇，一定会发生碰撞，融合。这个过程中出现了很多问题，很值得我们的学者去探讨去研究。从这个角度看，我们中国的儒释道都可以为第二轴心时代做出贡献！这不是为了迎合某个利益集团或者意识形态，而是这个信仰本身在宇宙里发挥它的功能，应该服务于这个世界的人，所以不是为了迎合某个利益集团或者意识形态讲的，而是它自身的生命、命运运动本身所需要的。

在这个全球化过程中，不同的信仰、不同的宗教会共同形成一个非常巨大的松散的灵性共同体。我认为这对我们的未来会更合理一些、更好一些。我们说第二轴心时代来临了，可是它不是说今天来了，明天世界就变了，它是一个进程。世界怎么走，未来是不确定的，因为在我们这个世界中我们本身就有很多不确定的因素。这只能说我们在努力创造一个未来，然后我们把这个轴心文明的精神或者灵魂在新的时代不断弘扬。结合这个时代的特征，我们进一步去发挥它的功能，发展它的潜能，以及在这个互动过程中去发挥、发现、发扬更新的东西。

谢谢大家。

王志成：浙江大学教授，博士生导师。联系地址：浙江大学西溪校区哲学系，310028；Email: dezxsd@126.com

第二篇：哲学与人生(演讲)

按照我国著名哲学家冯友兰先生的话说：什么是哲学？哲学，就是对人生有系统的反思。所以，我把同学们对人生的关切和对哲学的兴趣结合起来，和大家谈一下哲学与人生。

哲学：“使人作为人而能够成为人”

学科学，我不说，你糊涂；我一说，你明白。而学哲学，我不说，你明白；我一说，你糊涂。

哲学就是对于人生有系统的反思。在这个命题中，包含几层意思。一层意思是说，哲学是对于人生的一种反思。这种反思活动，应当说人人都会有。另一层意思是说，作为哲学的这样一种人类活动，它是对于人生的有系统的反思，也就是说，能够系统地反思人生的活动叫哲学活动；而进行这种活动的人呢，就是哲学家了。

系统地反思人生的哲学，它同其他科学的区别在什么地方？除了哲学之外的其他科学，使你成为“某种人”，也就是使你掌握某种具体的专业，掌握某种特殊的技能，扮演某种特定的角色，将来你可以从事某种特定的职业。我们把这称为科学，使你成为“某种人”。

与此不同，哲学使你“作为人而成为人”。这句话的含义是极为深刻的。虽然说你是人，但是在真正人的意义上，缺少一种哲学的修养，还不是冯先生所指认的那种真正意义上的人。所以，他作了这样的一种区别，其他学科使你成为某种特殊的人，用我们现在的通俗说法，就是成为一种“专门人才”；而学习哲学，使你作为人能够成为人，做一个有教养的现代人。这是哲学与科学的区别，也就是哲学的特殊的意义与价值。

这种对于人生的有系统的反思哲学，怎样才能够获得？ 冯先生说是“觉解”。我曾经写过《哲学修养十五讲》一书，在国内算一本畅销书吧。前几天这本书的编辑给我说，最近在台湾重新出版这本书，更名为《哲学修养的十五堂课》。

在书里，我说学习科学和学习哲学是两种完全不同的感觉。学科学是什么感觉呢？我不说，你糊涂；我一说，你明白。而学哲学则是，我不说，你明白；我一说，你糊涂。大家会觉得很怪，怎么会是这样呢？大家想一想，科学是把一些个别的现象，单称命题和观察名词，经过归纳推理，上升为理论名词和全称命题，然后再通过演绎推理，做出解释和预见。例如，我一说，三角形三内角之和等于180度，再一说边角关系，你就会作相关的几何题了。这就叫作我不说你糊涂，我一说你明白了。

而哲学恰好相反，它是把人们当作不言而喻的、毋庸置疑的东西作为批判反思的对象。我不说的时候，你清清楚楚的；我一说，你却可能糊涂了。例如，这里有一张桌子，我不说，它就是一张桌子，清清楚楚的；可是我一旦问你，你如果没有桌子的观念，为什么会把如此这般的一个东西把握为桌子呢？糊涂没？这就是哲学的“思维和存在的关系问题”。

内地的同学都知道，台湾的同学不知听到过没有？有一首歌叫《我心中的太阳》，歌词是：“天上的太阳和水中的月亮谁亮？山上的大树和山下的小树谁大？心中的恋人和身外的世界谁重要？”我不知道在座的同学怎么回答？歌曲中是：“我不知道，我不知道，我不知道！”

这个世界是极为复杂的！哲学就是要把这个世界的复杂性，特别是人生的复杂性揭示出来。我不说的时候，你很清楚；我一说的时候，你可能更糊涂了，这就需要冯先生所说的那个“觉解”。如果没有一种哲学的辩证智慧，你很容易走向极端，你今天是理想主义，明天可能是现实主义，最后可能是绝对主义，相对主义了，荣辱呀，祸福呀，你就不好把握了。所以，在这个意义上，哲学就是对于人生有系统的反思，使人作为人而能够成为人，是一种“觉解”的活动。

哲学的这种“觉解”活动，要达到的目的是什么呢？冯先生说是“境界”。他讲人生四境界：使人超越自然的境界、功利的境界、道德的境界，最后达到一种天地的境界。所以，中国哲学最讲究天人合一、知行合一、情景合一、养吾浩然之气。这是一种冯先生所理解的哲学，也就是哲学与人生的关系。

上面是谈了冯友兰先生对哲学的理解。下面，我就想从哲学与人生出发，从哲学层面上对人生有一个大体的解说，谈一下自己的体会。我想分成三个问题具体地来谈，一是人的存在；二是人的人化；三是人的世界。

哲学家冯友兰

人的存在，是一种超越性的存在 人无法忍受单一的颜色、无法忍受凝固的时空、无法忍受存在的空虚、无法忍受自我的失落和无法忍受彻底的空白。人的这五种无法忍受，意味着人是一种超越性的存在。

怎么样来理解人的存在呢？我的说法是，人是一种超越性的、理想性的、创造性的存在。我还有一本书《超越意识》。这本书开篇的第一句话：人是世界上最奇异的存在――超越性的存在。怎么理解呢？我首先是使用反证法:人无法忍受什么？尤其是青年人，我概括为五个方面：无法忍受单一的颜色、无法忍受凝固的时空、无法忍受存在的空虚、无法忍受自我的失落和无法忍受彻底的空白。人的这五种无法忍受，意味着人是一种超越性的存在。

世界就是自然，它自然而然地存在。那么人生呢，它也是自然。人自然而然地生，自然而然地死。然而，从自然当中生成的人，它恰好超越了这个自然！把自然而然的世界改造成了一个对于人来说真善美相统一的世界！这才是人！

我问在座的同学，你喜欢什么颜色？有的说喜欢红色，有的说喜欢绿色，有的说喜欢蓝色。但是，我说如果这个世界只是你所喜欢鲜艳的红色、纯洁的白色、娇嫩的绿色，你还能不能在世界上生活了？！那就像马克思所说的一段话，他说：“在太阳的辉映下，每一颗露水珠都会闪现出五颜六色的颜色。”人的世界是一个五彩缤纷的世界，丰富多彩的世界，人无法忍受单一的颜色。

生活的世界应当是丰富多彩的，这个丰富多彩的世界是人自己创造出来的，所以人无法忍受的第二个就是“凝固的时空”。用马克思的话说：“时间是人类存在的空间。” 前些天看鲁豫的一个访谈，被采访的那个女士说，回顾自己的一生，我没有浪费上帝给予我的时间。

时间构成了人真正的存在，所以人无法忍受凝固的时空，而是在时间中实现了自己的存在。人的生活是创造的过程，也就是改天换地的过程。人类世世代代的科学发现、技术发明、艺术创作、理论创新、政治变革，不都是在时间中构成自己存在和发展的空间吗？“凝固的时空”是人无法忍受的。

正因为人给自己创造了自己的时空世界，所以人又无法忍受“存在的空虚”。什么叫人？人是寻求意义的存在。人无法忍受无意义的生活。大家都知道，国内近30年改革开放，发生了翻天覆地的变化。国内有一本畅销的杂志叫《读者》，这是一本有情趣的人都会喜欢的杂志。那里边曾经先后登过两篇文章，一篇是《当我没有钱的时候》，另一篇是《当我有钱的时候》。这两篇文章表达了一个共同的思想，叫做人不是为了生存而生存，而是为了寻求意义而生活的。

所以，现在哲学有一个说法，说所谓现代病就是“形象大于存在”，就是“包装”，方方面面的“包装”。可是上世纪80年代流行的一首歌里就有这样的歌词：“你不用涂红又沫绿，只要你不断充实自己，人人都会喜欢你。”充实自己，就是获得存在的意义。人生的存在是大于它的形象的。它的存在的意义是最重要的。人无法忍受“存在的空虚”。

正因为如此，人又无法忍受“自我的失落”。大家都知道人本主义心理学家马斯洛的层次需要理论。生存的需要、安全的需要、归属的需要、审美的需要，最终升华为一种自我实现的需要。我想，对于每一个年青人来说，最能够使他激动起来的，就是自我实现的感觉。在心理学上称之为高峰的体验。最美的体验就是一种自我实现的高峰体验。每个人的人生，作为一个长卷，它是一部波澜壮阔的小说；作为每个瞬间，它是一首感动自己的诗篇。人生的幸福，既是在目标的实现中所获得的快乐的感觉，又是在快乐的感觉中实现自己的目标。所以人无法忍受自我的失落。

人生是有限的。人是一种能够自觉到死的存在。系统地反思人生的哲学，是“向死而思生”，所以有人把哲学叫作对死亡的练习。人能够意识到自己是一个有限的存在，人就想超越这种有限的人生，因为人无法忍受“彻底的空白”。哲人培根说，人的“复仇之心胜过死亡，爱恋之心蔑视死亡，荣誉之心希冀死亡，忧伤之心奔赴死亡，恐怖之心凝神于死亡”。这是心灵对死亡的超越。人的生命面对死亡，又以生命的追求超越死亡。古人讲立功、立德、立言，用这三种方式来使自己有限的人生燃烧起熊熊的生命之火，使生命得到无限的延续。

这就是我所说的人的超越性。有了寻求意义的人生，才能对人生进行有系统的反思哲学。

那么，究竟怎样理解人的存在？人既源于动物，又同动物具有根本性的区别。人和动物都是一种生命活动，两者的区别就在于，动物是一种生存的生命活动，而人是一种生活的生命活动。

生存是一种无意义的生命活动，生活是一种寻求意义的生命活动。在这一点上区分了人和动物。人是一种寻求意义的生活活动，动物是一种本能性的生存活动，动物和人的区别就在于是两种不同的生命活动。为什么是两种不同的生命活动呢？马克思说，动物只有一个生命的尺度，而人有两种尺度。动物只有自己所属的物种的一个尺度，所以它只能是本能的生命活动。人有两个尺度，既是按照自己的目的活动，又是按照所有物种的尺度活动，这就是既“合目的”又“合规律”的活动，是把世界变成对人来说是真善美的世界的活动。所以作为一个人的存在，是一个超越性的存在，一个理想性的存在，人是一个把自己的理想不断地变为现实的活动过程。这是一个创造的过程。

中国社会科学院的老院长胡绳，在一篇文章中讲到：人类在20世纪的后五十年所创造的科学技术，超过了人类在20世纪五十年代以前的几千年所创造的总和！

什么叫现代化？现代化首先是日常生活科学化，接着是日常消遣文化化，接着是日常交往社交化，日常生活法治化，农村生活城市化。人创造了自己的历史，实现了生活的现代化。所以人的存在是超越性的、理想性的、创造性的存在。这才是人的存在。

大学生正处在一个人生的最有理想、最有创造性的时期，你们一定很喜欢哲学。这是对于人生的一种有系统的反思。通过这种反思，我们能够觉解生活，更加自觉地去拥抱生活，更加自觉地去创造生活，从而把我们的世界建设成为更美好的世界，把我们的人生塑造成更美好的人生。

伦敦海格特公园的马克思墓

人的人化，人使自己成为人

人是一个人化的产物，是一种人化的结果，是一种历史性的存在。这是人和动物的不同。动物是一代又一代的复制自己，而人是一代又一代地发展自己。这是人和动物的不同。

法国著名哲学家萨特，有一个著名的哲学命题：“存在先于本质”。人以外的所有的存在都是本质先于存在，而人这种存在是存在先于本质。除了人之外，我们中国人有一句俗话，叫作种瓜得瓜，种豆得豆。本质先于存在，本质就规定了它的存在。

但是，人就不是这样了。生下来的无论是男孩女孩，我们说他是人，但是长大了，未必就成为人。为什么？人是一个人化的产物，是一种人化的结果，是一种历史性的存在。这是人和动物的不同。动物是一代又一代的复制自己，而人是一代又一代地发展自己。

用马克思说，什么叫历史？“历史不过是追求自己的目的人的活动的过程而已”。人的这种活动的过程，成了人的历史。所以，马克思说，什么叫作社会存在？社会存在就是人们的实际的生活过程。我们的实际的生活过程，构成我们人自己的生活的历史。人的自己的生活历史，就是我们每个人成为人的过程。我们每个人成为人的过程，既构成了历史的前提，又构成了历史的结果；而人只有首先作为历史的结果，才能够成为历史的前提，因为每代人总是上代人遗留的文化的产物。我们正是在历史文化的进程中而成为今天的存在。正是在这个意义上，人是“存在先于本质”，人是人化的过程。

关于人的人化，今天我要特殊地谈一个我对教育的理解。

那么，什么是教育呢？教育是一种社会遗传的机制，它以自身为中介而实现双向的认同：一方面，是个体向历史社会文化的一种认同；另一方面，它同时又是历史社会文化对个体的认可。教育就是这种“认同”与“认可”的双向互动过程。

在这个意义上，广义的教育实际上是哲学教育；或者说，哲学教育，就是使人作为人能够成为人。教育首先不是使人成为某种人，而是使人作为人能够成为人。人不仅仅是一种自然意义上的遗传性的获得，它还是一种文化意义上的获得性的遗传。所以，真实的教育，最根本的目的是提高人的素养。它是使人作为人能够成为人。教育是使你首先能够成为一个认同这个社会、这个时代、这个历史的现代公民。我们只有能够成为人，才能够成为某种人，才能够去掌握某种专门的知识、技能，去从事某种专门的职业，去扮演某种特殊的角色，在社会生活中实现自我。

人作为一个历史文化的存在，自身是一个人化的过程，使自己作为人能够成为人的过程。这种成为人的过程，最重要的就是以教育为中介的社会遗传和文化遗传。从十九世纪中叶以来的现代哲学，所解决的一个根本的问题就在于，它不是把人当作一个抽象的存在，而是当作一个历史具体的文化存在。近代以来的哲学，它是一个上帝的人本化过程。上帝的自然化，上帝的物质化，上帝的精神化到整个的上帝的人本化的过程。

所以，有的同学即使不是学习哲学的可能也知道，美国出版了一套丛书叫作“导师哲学家丛书”，我推荐给不是学习哲学专业的同学。它把中世纪叫作“信仰的时代”，把文艺复兴时期叫作“冒险的时代”，把十七世纪叫作“理性的时代”，把十八世纪叫作“启蒙的时代”，把十九世纪叫作“思想体系的时代”，而把刚刚过去的二十世纪叫作“分析的时代”。

近一个时期以来，内地的哲学家们也想用五个字概括当今的时代，有的人叫它“物化的时代”，有的人叫它“体验的时代”，有的人叫它“信息的时代”，如此等等。

总而言之，哲学，恰如哲学家黑格尔所说的，它是思想中所把握到的时代，就是思想中所把握到的人生。它是以一种理论的方式表征了人的特定的历史的存在。

刚才说到的“导师哲学家丛书”所概括的历史时代，特别是在座的有学哲学的，有学历史的，你们就会很清楚，这正是一个人的人化的过程。中世纪“信仰的时代”，先上帝而后自我，先信仰而后理解。那么，从文艺复兴以来就发生了一个巨大的颠倒，笛卡尔说“我思故我在”，意思是说我先有思想然后才有我的存在吗？不是！他是说先自我而后上帝，先理解而后信仰，这才是从封建社会的自然经济到资本主义社会的市场经济的转化。

什么叫作从自然经济转向市场经济呢？这是一种人的存在方式的转化，是一个人化的过程。自然经济条件下，是一种经济生活的禁欲主义，精神生活的蒙昧主义，政治生活的专制主义。走向市场经济以来，在经济生活当中反对禁欲主义而要求现实幸福，精神生活反对蒙昧主义而要求理性自由，在政治生活当中反对专制主义而要求民主法治。市场经济实际上蕴含着三条基本原则：经济生活的功利主义的价值取向，精神生活的工具理性的思维取向，政治生活的民主法治的政治取向。三位一体构成了马克思所说的，市场经济是以“物的依赖性为基础的人的独立性”的存在。这就是我们现代人的存在方式，这就是近代以来的人之为人的人化的过程。人是一种教养，而教养源于教育。这就是受教育的意义。所以无论是内地的同学还是台湾的同学，你最应当珍视的就是能够接受到高等教育，这是你作为人能够成为现代人的一个最基本的前提。这就是人的人化。人是一个人化的过程。这就是我要跟大家讲的第二个问题。

哲学家萨特

人的世界，有限世界的超越

哲学赋予人的生活以目的和意义的世界观。哲学作为人类心灵的最深层的伟大创造，其主旨即在于使人的精神境界不断地升华，在精神境界的升华中崇高起来。哲学的修养与创造，是人们追求崇高的过程，也是使人们自己崇高起来的过程。它要求学习哲学的人永葆理想性的追求。祝愿大家终生与哲学为伴，让哲学引导我们对真理、正义和更美好事物的追求！谢谢大家！

马克思在1867年8月16日看完《资本论》序言的校样后，写给恩格斯的信，感谢恩格斯所作的自我牺牲。

什么叫作神话的世界？神话的世界是自然世界的超越。什么叫作宗教的世界？宗教的世界是世俗世界的超越。什么叫作艺术的世界？艺术的世界是无情世界的超越。什么叫作伦理世界？伦理世界是小我世界的超越。什么叫作科学的世界？科学的世界是经验世界的超越。什么叫作哲学的世界？哲学的世界是有限世界的超越。

人的人化过程，是一个形成人的世界、属于人的世界的过程。世界这个概念，可以在两个意义上去使用它:一是在自然的意义上去使用，另一个真实的意义，是在人给自己创造的世界的意义上去使用。

我在1988年曾经写过一篇文章，正标题是“从两极到中介”，副标题是“现代哲学的革命”。其中，谈到怎么理解人的存在方式，怎么理解语言？语言既然是人的世界的积极界限，也是人的世界的消极界限，世界在人的语言中生成为有。

语言之外的世界，对于人来说，正如哲学家黑格尔所说的，是“有之非有”，“存在着的无”。语言是人的存在方式，又是我们的世界的存在的方式。我们在语言当中才构成了属于人的世界。语言不是仅仅作为能指和所指的统一，而是作为历史文化的水库而存在的。它表明人是一种历史文化的存在。人是历史文化的结果，历史文化的产物。人是以人类自己把握世界的方式而构成了属于人的丰富多彩的世界。

人都以什么方式把握世界？是以常识的方式，神话的方式，宗教的方式，艺术的方式，伦理的方式，科学的方式和哲学的方式把握世界，因此对于我们来说有无限丰富的世界。

现代哲学和现代科学给了我们几个最基本的命题，叫作观察渗透理论，观察负载理论，没有中性的观察，观察总是被理论污染的。我们原来总认为科学始于观察，甚至有人说，正确的科学研究和科学试验，首先应当把我们自己的偏见像脱掉大衣一样放到走廊里边，用没有偏见的头脑进到实验室。你只有有了相应的理论，才能够有相应的世界。

马克思说，人只有有了欣赏音乐的耳朵，才能够欣赏音乐。你有什么样的音乐修养，才能够欣赏什么样的音乐。想一想，没有看罗曼・罗兰，没有看莎士比亚，没有看巴尔扎克，没有看托尔斯泰，怎么能有相应的修养去享受那样一些相应的作品呢？正如黑格尔说的，有之非有，存在着的无！观察负载理论，没有中性的观察，观察总是被理论污染的。每个人所拥有的世界，同每个人所拥有的知识、理论、修养是密不可分的。

中国有一句古话叫作“君子坦荡荡，小人常戚戚”;西方人叫作“仆人眼中无英雄”。因为什么？就是因为你的背景不一样么！知识背景，理论背景不一样，你对生活的感受和理解也就不一样了。

为什么君子坦荡荡？就因为他心中有老子、有孔子、有庄子，有孟子，养我浩然之气，万物皆备于我。

为什么小人常戚戚呢？因为他只知道张三李四，矶矶喳喳，尔虞我诈，蝇蝇苟苟。

为什么仆人眼中无英雄呢？因为英雄有英雄的事业，英雄有英雄的情怀。不理解英雄的事业，不懂得英雄的情怀，当然就“眼中无英雄”了。北国风光，千里冰封，万里雪飘。这是毛泽东在《沁园春・雪》中对自然的礼赞。接着毛泽东写历史人物:惜秦皇汉武，略输文采，唐宗宋祖，稍逊风骚，一代天骄，成吉思汗，只识弯弓射大雕。最后毛泽东说什么？俱往矣，数风流人物还看今朝！这就是政治家的一种博大而深邃的情怀!这也是艺术家的一种空灵而凝重的情怀！你如果不是作为政治家和艺术家的话，你就理解不了他的这种情怀。

我最强调一个年轻人必须得有两个修养，一是文学修养，二是哲学修养。一个大学生没有文学修养和哲学修养，肯定不会有一个完整的美好的人生，因为只有有了文学修养和哲学修养，有一种真实的审美的境界，才有这样一种最强烈的理性之美。有了这样两个修养，这个世界对于你来说才是丰富多彩的。

这个属于人的世界，它首先是一个常识的世界，同时它又是一个宗教的世界，一个艺术的世界，一个伦理的世界，一个科学的世界和一个哲学的世界。同学们需要学习，你有了哪种把握世界的方式，对你来说就有了哪种世界。因此，一个人只有在适当的年龄，受到适当的教育，他才是人。

因为，它使你获得了那种把握世界的基本方式。什么叫作神话的世界？神话的世界是自然世界的超越。什么叫作宗教的世界？宗教的世界是世俗世界的超越。什么叫作艺术的世界？艺术的世界是无情世界的超越。什么叫作伦理世界？伦理世界是小我世界的超越。什么叫作科学的世界？科学的世界是经验世界的超越。什么叫作哲学的世界？哲学的世界是有限世界的超越。你拥有了人类把握世界的基本方式，真正实现了人自身的超越性，才真正有了一个五彩缤纷的人的世界！

对于人来说，首先就是一个常识的世界。常识是源于经验、适用于经验但却不能超越经验的知识。常识是每个正常的健全人都普遍认同的，在经验中所获得的知识。人人都在生活经验中分享常识、体验常识、重复常识和贡献新的常识。在常识中，人们的经验世界得到最广泛的相互理解，人们的思想感情得到最普遍的相互沟通，人们的行为方式得到最直接的相互协调，人们的内心世界得到最便捷的自我认同。常识既为我们构成经验的世界图景，又为我们构成经验的思维方式，还为我们构成经验的价值规范。常识是人类把握世界的最具普遍性的基本方式。没有常识的人是不正常的，正常的人就得有常识。

常识构成经验的世界，而人的情感、意志和思想却总是超越经验的常识，总是以超越常识的各种方式去构成丰富多彩的人的世界。神话就是对自然世界的超越。很多人看神话小说。其实，神话并不只是一种文学样式，它还是人类把握世界的一种方式。人在神话世界当中，既把人的世界宇宙化了，又把宇宙的世界拟人化了。在那个被拟人化的宇宙世界当中，人找到了自身存在的意义和价值，所以人总是给自己构成一个神话的世界。金庸、梁羽生，为什么大家愿意看他们的书呢？因为从某种意义上，它使人们获得了一个神话的世界。在神话的世界中，人们把自己的向往和追求、烦恼和忧伤对象化了。

宗教世界是世俗世界的超越。宗教使人们的生活获得了一种神圣的意义。宗教里面，特别是西方上帝的观念，是很值得思考的。

按照我自己的说法，什么叫作上帝？上帝就是规范人的思想和行为的根据、标准和尺度，哲学本体意义上的观念构成心中的上帝。上帝不是一种对象性的存在，是你心中的一种观念。

用马克思的话说，宗教就是没有获得自我或者是再度丧失了自我的一种自我意识或自我感觉。因为人要超越自己所生活的世俗的世界，从一种神圣的存在来获得生活的意义和价值。所以哲学家尼采说，上帝被杀死了，一切都是可能的。这句话是什么意思呢？它正好是说了这样的两层意思。一层是说，整个的哲学和科学，它的理性的求索杀死了上帝，上帝不再作为人的思想和行为的根据、标准和尺度。上帝不存在了，上帝被人本化了。一旦这个神圣的意义不再存在了，人的一切就都是可能的了。

所以，我曾经给我的学生讲了一段很长的话：“在自然经济的条件下，是在一种没有选择标准的生命中不堪忍受之重的本质主义的肆虐；而在市场经济的条件下，是一种失去了标准的选择的生命中不能承受之轻的存在主义的焦虑。”

什么叫本质主义的肆虐呢？没有选择的标准，给你什么标准就是什么标准，你自己没有选择的余地。这就是生命中不堪忍受之重的本质主义的肆虐。你们现在的生活，我把它叫作一种失去了标准的选择的、生命中不能承受之轻的存在主义的焦虑。

现在有的人穿的短衫上写，烦死了，别理我;或者干脆就写一个字：烦！这不就是存在主义的焦虑么！生命中不能承受之轻。这是今天向我们提出的问题。为什么呢？马克思曾经说过，市场经济撕去了封建社会的田园诗般的温情脉脉的面纱，抹去了一切职业的灵光，把一切都沉浸到金钱的冰水当中去了。这就是存在方式的变化，上帝被杀死了，上帝被人本化了，我们用什么东西使我们的生活有真实的意义呢？我们需要艺术的世界，伦理的世界，科学的世界和哲学的世界。

什么是艺术的世界？艺术的世界是对无情世界的超越，艺术是一种生命的形式。美学家苏珊・朗格说，艺术叫作创造。为什么？舞蹈家是创造了胳膊还是创造了腿？画家是创造了油彩还是创造了画布？文学家是创造了语言还是创造了文字？没有，但他们创造了意义！我非常欣赏鲁迅先生在三十年代翻译的一本书《苦闷的象征》，其中说，愤怒出诗人。

在今天这个市场经济的条件下，最难出的就是诗人。你看看在80年代的台湾校园歌曲里边，你还能够深切地感受到外婆的澎湖湾呀这样的一些诗情画意当中所蕴含着的一种恬淡的生活的境界。现在呢？在市场经济的条件下，最难感受到的就是海德格尔最欣赏的荷尔德林的那句诗：人，诗意地栖居在大地上。哲学和文学呀，只不过是帮助我们大家诗意地栖居在这个大地上。艺术的真实是人生境界的升华。所以你看徐悲鸿画的马，它并不是草原奔驰的骏马;齐白石画的虾，也不是水中游曳的虾；但是，你看看徐悲鸿画的马、齐白石画的虾，你不感到是一种生命的跃动吗？这不就叫作艺术么！艺术使我们体验到了生活的深度，使我们的情感获得了一种真实的深度。

再说伦理的世界。我把今天的社会思潮概括为两极对立模式的消解，英雄主义时代的隐退，高层精英文化的失落，理性主义权威的弱化和人类精神家园的困惑。人类面对着许多共同的问题。前几天联合国教科文组织在我们这里举办的世界哲学节，在大会上我写了一句话：“趋利避害，这个不言而喻的生存逻辑却成为当代人类的最为严峻的行为选择”。

人就是趋利避害的么，趋利避害这个不言而喻的生存逻辑却构成了当代人类最为严峻的行为选择了。为什么现在凸显了环境问题呢？大家都知道，现在内地正在讲科学发展观，叫作全面、协调、可持续发展。为什么？这就是今天人类面对着的共同的问题。解决这个问题，决不仅仅是依赖技术手段，更重要的是解决社会问题，解决人之间的关系问题，解决发展的标准与选择问题。伦理的世界呢，它是一种小我世界的超越，在我们今天的社会生活当中就具有更加重要的作用了。

马克思说，人的本质在其现实性上，是社会关系的总和。人不是一种纯自然的存在，而是一种社会性的存在，而这种社会性的存在最重要的问题就是，小我与大我的关系，离开了大我没有小我的存在。所以这种伦理的世界是一种小我世界的超越。

人类面对着的一个共同的问题，是发展的问题。我们在自己的行为选择当中必须深切地思考发展的问题。今天不是都讲经济全球化么，在经济全球化的过程当中，我们必须有一种深层的时代意识，关于人类生存和发展的自我意识。

为什么20世纪80年代以来由罗尔斯的《正义论》为标志的政治哲学会成为显学？因为公平、正义问题成为当代人类面对的重大问题。我们在座的学文史哲的、政经法的都有，无论你在文科的意义上学习哪门学科，一个共同的问题都是为当代人类的发展提供一种理论的前提。用解释学大师伽达默尔的话说，理论是实践的反义词，理论就是对实践的反驳，我们只有掌握了理论才能够使我们作出一种比较好的选择。

大家都在学习科学。科学同样是人类把握世界的一种基本方式，它是经验世界的超越。什么叫科学？科学给予我们一种普遍必然性的认识，从而对经验世界作出规律性的解释和预见。科学的世界是一个超验的世界，超越了经验的世界。

正因为是这样，所以卡西尔在《人论》里边说，科学在这个世界上具有无与伦比的作用，它使人类的思维达到了一种极致。“在我们现代世界中，再没有第二种力量可以与科学思想的力量相匹敌”。科学改变了我们的世界图景，改变了我们的思维方式，也改变了我们的价值观念。科学改变了我们的生活。我们以科学的方式去把握这个世界，从而以科学的方式规范我们自己的思想和行为。这就是一种经验世界的超越。

最后我们再回到哲学。人类面对千差万别、千变万化、无边无际、无始无终的茫茫宇宙，又面对有生有死、有爱有恨、有聚有散、有得有失的有限人生，总会驰骋自己的探索宇宙、人生奥秘的智慧，超越自己所理解的有限的世界。哲学是对有限世界的超越。人们俯仰古今而觉时间之无限，环顾天地而觉空间之永恒，回顾自身而觉人之立于两者间的万千感慨！人总是试图超越“哀吾生之须臾，羡长江之无穷”的困惑与迷惘，以自己的超越性为人生寻求“安身立命之本”。“爱智”的哲学，就是一种超越有限对永恒的无奈、实现“天人合一”的渴望。人的超越性，以哲学的方式迸发出无比瑰丽的光彩。

文艺复兴时期意大利画家拉斐尔绘的《雅典学派》，图中站立者为柏拉图和

亚里士多德。

第三篇：维特根斯坦 哲学演讲(英文)

维特根斯坦 哲学演讲（英文）

2006年6月27日

来源:论坛主题I am going to exclude from our discussion questions which are answered by experience.Philosophical problems are not solved by experience, for what we talk about in philosophy are not facts but things for which facts are useful.Philosophical trouble arises through seeing a system of rules and seeing that things do not fit it.It is like advancing and retreating from a tree stump and seeing different things.We go nearer, remember the rules, and feel satisfied, then retreat and feel dissatisfied.2 Words and chess pieces are analogous;knowing how to use a word is like knowing how to move a chess piece.Now how do the rules enter into playing the game? What is the difference between playing the game and aimlessly moving the pieces? I do not deny there is a difference, but I want to say that knowing how a piece is to be used is not a particular state of mind which goes on while the game goes on.The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feeling that attaches to the words.“How is the word used?” and “What is the grammar of the word?” I shall take as being the same question.The phrase, “bearer of the word”, standing for what one points to in giving an ostensive definition, and “meaning of the word” have entirely different grammars;the two are not synonymous.To explain a word such as “red” by pointing to something gives but one rule for its use, and in cases where one cannot point, rules of a different sort are given.All the rules together give the meaning, and these are not fixed by giving an ostensive definition.The rules of grammar are entirely independent of one another.Two words have the same meaning if they have the same rules for their use.Are the rules, for example, ~ ~ p = p for negation, responsible to the meaning of a word? No.The rules constitute the meaning, and are not responsible to it.The meaning changes when one of its rules changes.If, for example, the game of chess is defined in terms of its rules, one cannot say the game changes if a rule for moving a piece were changed.Only when we are speaking of the history of the game can we talk of change.Rules are arbitrary in the sense that they are not responsible to some sort of reality-they are not similar to natural laws;nor are they responsible to some meaning the word already has.If someone says the rules of negation are not arbitrary because negation could not be such that ~~p =~p, all that could be meant is that the latter rule would not correspond to the English word “negation”.The objection that the rules are not arbitrary comes from the feeling that they are responsible to the meaning.But how is the meaning of “negation” defined, if not by the rules? ~ ~p =p does not follow from the meaning of “not” but constitutes it.Similarly, p.p ?q.?.q does not depend on the meanings of “and” and “implies”;it constitutes their meaning.If it is said that the rules of negation are not arbitrary inasmuch as they must not contradict each other, the reply is that if there were a contradiction among them we should simply no longer call certain of them rules.“It is part of the grammar of the word 'rule' that if 'p' is a rule, 'p.~p' is not a rule.” 3 Logic proceeds from premises just as physics does.But the primitive propositions of physics are results of very general experience, while those of logic are not.To distinguish between the propositions of physics and those of logic, more must be done than to produce predicates such as experiential and self-evident.It must be shown that a grammatical rule holds for one and not for the other.4 In what sense are laws of inference laws of thought? Can a reason be given for thinking as we do? Will this require an answer outside the game of reasoning? There are two senses of “reason”: reason for, and cause.These are two different orders of things.One needs to decide on a criterion for something's being a reason before reason and cause can be distinguished.Reasoning is the calculation actually done, and a reason goes back one step in the calculus.A reason is a reason only inside the game.To give a reason is to go through a process of calculation, and to ask for a reason is to ask how one arrived at the result.The chain of reasons comes to an end, that is, one cannot always give a reason for a reason.But this does not make the reasoning less valid.The answer to the question, Why are you frightened?, involves a hypothesis if a cause is given.But there is no hypothetical element in a calculation.To do a thing for a certain reason may mean several things.When a person gives as his reason for entering a room that there is a lecture, how does one know that is his reason? The reason may be nothing more than just the one he gives when asked.Again, a reason may be the way one arrives at a conclusion, e.g., when one multiplies 13 x 25.It is a calculation, and is the justification for the result 325.The reason for fixing a date might consist in a man's going through a game of checking his diary and finding a free time.The reason here might be said to be included in the act he performs.A cause could not be included in this sense.We are talking here of the grammar of the words “reason” and “cause”: in what cases do we say we have given a reason for doing a certain thing, and in what cases, a cause? If one answers the question “Why did you move your arm?” by giving a behaviouristic explanation, one has specified a cause.Causes may be discovered by experiments, but experiments do not produce reasons.The word “reason” is not used in connection with experimentation.It is senseless to say a reason is found by experiment.The alternative, “mathematical argument or experiential evidence?” corresponds to “reason or cause?” 5 Where the class defined by f can be given by an enumeration, i.e., by a list,(x)fx is simply a logical product and(?x)fx a logical sum.E.g.,(x)fx.=.fa.fb.fc, and(?x)fx.=.fa v fb v fc.Examples are the class of primary colours and the class of tones of the octave.In such cases it is not necessary to add “and a, b, c,...are the only f's” The statement, “In this picture I see all the primary colours”, means “I see red and green and blue...”, and to add “and these are all the primary colours” says neither more nor less than “I see all...”;whereas to add to “a, b, c are people in the room” that a, b, c are all the people in the room says more than “(x)x is a person in the room”, and to omit it is to say less.If it is correct to say the general proposition is a shorthand for a logical product or sum, as it is in some cases, then the class of things named in the product or sum is defined in the grammar, not by properties.For example, being a tone of the octave is not a quality of a note.The tones of an octave are a list.Were the world composed of “individuals” which were given the names “a”, “b”, “c”, etc., then, as in the case of the tones, there would be no proposition “and these are all the individuals”.Where a general proposition is a shorthand for a product, deduction of the special proposition fa from(x)fx is straightforward.But where it is not, how does fa follow? “Following” is of a special sort, just as the logical product is of a special sort.And although(?x)fx.fa.=.fa is analogous to p v q.p.=.p, fa “follows” in a different way in the two cases where(?x)fx is a shorthand for a logical sum and where it is not.We have a different calculus where(?x)fx is not a logical sum fa is not deduced asp is deduced in the calculus of T's and F's from p v q.p.I once made a calculus in which following was the same in all cases.But this was a mistake.Note that the dots in the disjunctions v fb v fc v...have different grammars:(1)“and so on” indicates laziness when the disjunction is a shorthand for a logical sum, the class involved being given by an enumeration,(2)“and so on” is an entirely different sign with new rules when it does not correspond to any enumeration, e.g., “2 is even v 4 is even v 6 is even...”,(3)“and so on” refers to positions in visual space, as contrasted with positions correlated with the numbers of the mathematical continuum.As an example of(3)consider “There is a circle in the square”.Here it might appear that we have a logical sum whose terms could be determined by observation, that there is a number of positions a circle could occupy in visual space, and that their number could be determined by an experiment, say, by coordinating them with turns of a micrometer.But there is no number of positions in visual space, any more than there is a number of drops of rain which you see.The proper answer to the question, “How many drops did you see?”, is many, not that there was a number but you don't know how many.Although there are twenty circles in the square, and the micrometer would give the number of positions coordinated with them, visually you may not see twenty.6 I have pointed out two kinds of cases(I)those like “In this melody the composer used all the notes of the octave”, all the notes being enumerable,(2)those like “All circles in the square have crosses”.Russell's notation assumes that for every general proposition there are names which can be given in answer to the question “Which ones?”(in contrast to, “What sort?”).Consider(?x)fx, the notation for “There are men on the island” and for “There is a circle in the square”.Now in the case of human beings, where we use names, the question “Which men?” has meaning.But to say there is a circle in the square may not allow the question “Which?” since we have no names “a”, “b”, etc.for circles.In some cases it is senseless to ask “Which circle?”, though “What sort of circle is in the square-a red one?, a large one?” may make sense.The questions “which?” and “What sort?” are muddled together [so that we think both always make sense].Consider the reading Russell would give of his notation for “There is a circle in the square”: “There is a thing which is a circle in the square”.What is the thing? Some people might answer: the patch I am pointing to.But then how should we write “There are three patches”? What is the substrate for the property of being a patch? What does it mean to say “All things are circles in the square”, or “There is not a thing that is a circle in the square” or “All patches are on the wall”? What are the things? These sentences have no meaning.To the question whether a meaning mightn't be given to “There is a thing which is a circle in the square” I would reply that one might mean by it that one out of a lot of shapes in the square was a circle.And “All patches are on the wall” might mean something if a contrast was being made with the statement that some patches were elsewhere.7 What is it to look for a hidden contradiction, or for the proof that there is no contradiction? “To look for” has two different meanings in the phrases “to look for something at the North Pole”, “to look for a solution to a problem”.One difference between an expedition of discovery to the North Pole and an attempt to find a mathematical solution is that with the former it is possible to describe beforehand what is looked for, whereas in mathematics when you describe the solution you have made the expedition and have found what you looked for.The description of the proof is the proof itself, whereas to find the thing at the North Pole it is not enough to describe it.You must make the expedition.There is no meaning to saying you can describe beforehand what a solution will be like in mathematics except in the cases where there is a known method of solution.Equations, for example, belong to entirely different games according to the method of solving them.To ask whether there is a hidden contradiction is to ask an ambiguous question.Its meaning will vary according as there is, or is not, a method of answering it.If we have no way of looking for it, then “contradiction” is not defined.In what sense could we describe it? We might seem to have fixed it by giving the result, a not= a.But it is a result only if it is in organic connection with the construction.To find a contradiction is to construct it.If we have no means of hunting for a contradiction, then to say there might be one has no sense.We must not confuse what we can do with what the calculus can do.8 Suppose the problem is to find the construction of a pentagon.The teacher gives the pupil the general idea of a pentagon by laying off lengths with a compass, and also shows the construction of triangles, squares, and hexagons.These figures are coordinated with the cardinal numbers.The pupil has the cardinal number 5, the idea of construction by ruler and compasses, and examples of constructions of regular figures, but not the law.Compare this with being taught to multiply.Were we taught all the results, or weren't we? We may not have been taught to do 61 x 175, but we do it according to the rule which we have been taught.Once the rule is known, a new instance is worked out easily.We are not given all the multiplications in the enumerative sense, but we are given all in one sense: any multiplication can be carried out according to rule.Given the law for multiplying, any multiplication can be done.Now in telling the pupil what a pentagon is and showing what constructions with ruler and compasses are, the teacher gives the appearance of having defined the problem entirely.But he has not, for the series of regular figures is a law, but not a law within which one can find the construction of the pentagon.When one does not know how to construct a pentagon one usually feels that the result is clear but the method of getting to it is not.But the result is not clear.The constructed pentagon is a new idea.It is something we have not had before.What misleads us is the similarity of the pentagon constructed to a measured pentagon.We call our construction the construction of the pentagon because of its similarity to a perceptually regular five-sided figure.The pentagon is analogous to other regular figures;but to tell a person to find a construction analogous to the constructions given him is not to give him any idea of the construction of a pentagon.Before the actual construction he does not have the idea of the construction.When someone says there must be a law for the distribution of primes despite the fact that neither the law nor how to go about finding it is known, we feel that the person is right.It appeals to something in us.We take our idea of the distribution of primes from their distribution in a finite interval.Yet we have no clear idea of the distribution of primes.In the case of the distribution of even numbers we can show it thus: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,..., and also by mentioning a law which we could write out algebraically.In the case of the distribution of primes we can only show: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,...Finding a law would give a new idea of distribution just as a new idea about the trisection of an angle is given when it is proved that it is not possible by straight edge and compasses.Finding a new method in mathematics changes the game.If one is given an idea of proof by being given a series of proofs, then to be asked for a new proof is to be asked for a new idea of proof.Suppose someone laid off the points on a circle in order to show, as he imagined, the trisection of an angle.We would not be satisfied, which means that he did not have our idea of trisection.In order to lead him to admit that what he had was not trisection we should have to lead him to something new.Suppose we had a geometry allowing only the operation of bisection.The impossibility of trisection in this geometry is exactly like the impossibility of trisecting an angle in Euclidean geometry.And this geometry is not an incomplete Euclidean geometry.9 Problems in mathematics are not comparable in difficulty;they are entirely different problems.Suppose one was told to prove that a set of axioms is free from contradiction but was supplied with no method of doing it.Or suppose it was said that someone had done it, or that he had found seven 7's in the development of pi.Would this be understood? What would it mean to say that there is a proof that there are seven 7's but that there is no way of specifying where they are? Without a means of finding them the concept of pi is the concept of a construction which has no connection with the idea of seven 7's.Now it does make sense to say “There are seven 7's in the first 100 places”, and although “There are seven 7's in the development” does not mean the same as the italicised sentence, one might maintain that it nevertheless makes sense since it follows from something which does make sense.Even though you accepted this as a rule, it is only one rule.I want to say that if you have a proof of the existence of seven 7's which does not tell you where they are, the sentence for the existence theorem has an entirely different meaning than one for which a means for finding them is given.To say that a contradiction is hidden, where there is nevertheless a way of finding it, makes sense, but what is the sense in saying there is a hidden contradiction when there is no way? Again, compare a proof that an algebraic equation of nth degree has n roots, in connection with which there is a method of approximation, with a proof for which no such method exists.Why call the latter a proof of existence? Some existence proofs consist in exhibiting a particular mathematical structure, i.e., in “constructing an entity”.If a proof does not do this, “existence proof” and “existence theorem” are being used in another sense.Each new proof in mathematics widens the meaning of “proof”.With Fermat's theorem, for example, we do not know what it would be like for it to be proved.What “existence” means is determined by the proof.The end-result of a proof is not isolated from the proof but is like the end surface of a solid.It is organically connected with the proof which is its body.In a construction as in a proof we seem first to give the result and then find the construction or proof.But one cannot point out the result of a construction without giving the construction.The construction is the end of one's efforts rather than a means to the result.The result, say a regular pentagon, only matters insofar as it is an incitement to make certain manipulations.It would not be useless.For example, a teacher who told someone to find a colour beyond the rainbow would be expressing himself incorrectly, but what he said would have provided a useful incitement to the person who found ultra-violet.10 If an atomic proposition is one which does not contain and, or, or apparent variables, then it might be said that it is not possible to distinguish atomic from molecular propositions.For p may be written as p.p or ~ ~p, and fa as fa v fa or as(?x)fx.x = a.But “and”, “or”, and the apparent variables are so used that they can be eliminated from these expressions by the rules.So we can disregard these purportedly molecular expressions.The word “and”, for example, is differently used in cases where it can be eliminated from those in which it cannot.Whether a proposition is atomic, i.e., whether it is not a truth-function of other propositions, is to be decided by applying certain methods of analysis laid down strictly.But when we have no method, it makes no sense to say there may be a hidden logical constant.The question whether such a seemingly atomic proposition as “It rains” is molecular, that it is, say, a logical product, is like asking whether there is a hidden contradiction when there is no method of answering the question.Our method might consist in looking up definitions.We might find that “It's rotten weather”, for example, means “It is cold and damp”.Having a means of analysing a proposition is like having a method for finding out whether there is a 6 in the product 25 x 25, or like having a rule which allows one to see whether a proposition is tautologous.Russell and I both expected to find the first elements, or “individuals”, and thus the possible atomic propositions, by logical analysis.Russell thought that subject-predicate propositions, and 2-term relations, for example, would be the result of a final analysis.This exhibits a wrong idea of logical analysis: logical analysis is taken as being like chemical analysis.And we were at fault for giving no examples of atomic propositions or of individuals.We both in different ways pushed the question of examples aside.We should not have said “We can't give them because analysis has not gone far enough, but we'll get there in time”.Atomic propositions are not the result of an analysis which has yet to be made.We can talk of atomic propositions if we mean those which on their face do not contain “and”, “or”, etc., or those which in accordance with methods of analysis laid down do not contain these.There are no hidden atomic propositions.11 In teaching a child language by pointing to things and pronouncing the words for them, where does the use of a proposition start? If you teach him to touch certain colours when you say the word “red”, you have evidently not taught him sentences.There is an ambiguity in the use of the word “proposition” which can be removed by making certain distinctions.I suggest defining it arbitrarily rather than trying to portray usage.What is called understanding a sentence is not very different from what a child does when he points to colours on hearing colour words.Now there are all sorts of language-games suggested by the one in which colour words are taught: games of orders and commands, of question and answer, of questions and “Yes” and “No.” We might think that in teaching a child such language games we are not teaching him a language but are only preparing him for it.But these games are complete;nothing is lacking.It might be said that a child who brought me a book when I said “The book, please” would not understand this to mean “Bring me a book”, as would an adult.But this full sentence is no more complete than “book”.Of course “book” is not what we call a sentence.A sentence in a language has a particular sort of jingle.But it is misleading to suppose that “book” is a shorthand for something longer which might be in a person's mind when it is understood.The word “book” might not lack anything, except to a person who had never heard elliptic sentences, in which case he would need a table with the ellipses on one side and sentences on the other.Now what role do truth and falsity play in such language-games? In the game where the child responds by pointing to colours, truth and falsity do not come in.If the game consists in question and answer and the child responds, say, to the question “How many chairs?”, by giving the number, again truth and falsity may not come in, though it might if the child were taught to reply “Six chairs agrees with reality”.If he had been taught the use of “true” and “false” instead of “Yes” and “No”, they would of course come in.Compare how differently the word “false” comes into the game where the child is taught to shout “red” when red appears and the game where he is to guess the weather, supposing now that we use the word “false” in the following circumstances: when he shouts “green” when something red appears, and when he makes a wrong guess about the weather.In the first case the child has not got hold of the game, he has offended against the rules;in the second he has made a mistake.The two are like playing chess in violation of the rules, and playing it and losing.In a game where a child is taught to bring colours when you say “red”, etc., you might say that “Bring me red” and “I wish you to bring me red” are equivalent to “red”;in fact that until the child understands “red” as information about the state of mind of the person ordering the colour he does not understand it at all.But “I wish you to bring me red” adds nothing to this game.The order “red” cannot be said to describe a state of mind, e.g., a wish, unless it is part of a game containing descriptions of states of mind.“I wish...” is part of a larger game if there are two people who express wishes.The word “I” is then not replaceable by “John”.A new multiplicity means having another game.I have wanted to show by means of language-games the vague way in which we use “language”, “proposition”, “sentence”.There are many things, such as orders, which we may or may not call propositions;and not only one game can be called language.Language-games are a clue to the understanding of logic.Since what we call a proposition is more or less arbitrary, what we call logic plays a different role from that which Russell and Frege supposed.We mean all sorts of things by “proposition”, and it is wrong to start with a definition of a proposition and build up logic from that.If “proposition” is defined by reference to the notion of a truth-function, then arithmetic equations are also propositions-which does not make them the same as such a proposition as “He ran out of the building”.When Frege tried to develop mathematics from logic he thought the calculus of logic was the calculus, so that what followed from it would be correct mathematics.Another idea on a par with this is that all mathematics could be derived from cardinal arithmetic.Mathematics and logic were one building, with logic the foundation.This I deny;Russell's calculus is one calculus among others.It is a bit of mathematics.12 It was Frege's notion that certain words are unique, on a different level from others, e.g., “word”, “proposition”, “world”.And I once thought that certain words could be distinguished according to their philosophical importance: “grammar”, “logic”, “mathematics”.I should like to destroy this appearance of importance.How is it then that in my investigations certain words come up again and again? It is because I am concerned with language, with troubles arising from a particular use of language.The characteristic trouble we are dealing with is due to our using language automatically, without thinking about the rules of grammar.In general the sentences we are tempted to utter occur in practical situations.But then there is a different way we are tempted to utter sentences.This is when we look at language, consciously direct our attention on it.And then we make up sentences of which we say that they also ought to make sense.A sentence of this sort might not have any particular use, but because it sounds English we consider it sensible.Thus, for example, we talk of the flow of time and consider it sensible to talk of its flow, after the analogy of rivers.13 If we look at a river in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to these, e.g., “When the 105th log passed, I ate dinner”.Suppose the log makes a bang on passing me.We can say these bangs are separated by equal, or unequal, intervals.We could also say one set of bangs was twice as fast as another set.But the equality or inequality of intervals so measured is entirely different from that measured by a clock.The phrase “length of interval” has its sense in virtue of the way we determine it, and differs according to the method of measurement.Hence the criteria for equality of intervals between passing logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are different.We cannot say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in degree from those an hour apart, for we have no feeling of rhythm if the interval is an hour long.And to say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than another is different from saying that the interval between these two bangs passed much more slowly than the interval between another pair.Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal distances apart.We have an experience of what might be called the velocity of these(though not what is measured by a clock).Let us say the river moves uniformly in this sense.But if we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and 100 than between logs 100 and 200, this is only an analogy;really nothing has passed more quickly.To say time passes more quickly, or that time flows, is to imagine something flowing.We then extend the simile and talk about the direction of time.When people talk of the direction of time, precisely the analogy of a river is before them.Of course a river can change its direction of flow, but one has a feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed.The reason is that the notion of flowing, of something, and of the direction of the flow is embodied in our language.Suppose that at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that someone said time was circular.Would this be right or wrong? Neither.It would only be another way of expression, and we could just as well talk of a circular time.However, the picture of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one that suggests itself very vigorously.Suppose someone said that the river on which the logs float had a beginning and will have an end, that there will be 100 more logs and that will be the end.It might be said that there is an experience which would verify these statements.Compare this with saying that time ceases.What is the criterion for its ceasing or for its going on? You might say that time ceases when “Time River” ceases.Suppose we had no substantive “time”, that we talked only of the passing of logs.Then we could have a measurement of time without any substantive “time”.Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the logs came to an end.We could in this sense talk of time coming to an end.Can time go on apart from events? What is the criterion for time involved in “Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago”? Has time been created, or was the world created in time? These questions are asked after the analogy of “Has this chair been made?”, and are like asking whether order has been created(a “before” and “after”).“Time” as a substantive is terribly misleading.We have got to make the rules of the game before we play it.Discussion of “the flow of time” shows how philosophical problems arise.Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by extending it on looking at it.We form sentences and then wonder what they can mean.Once conscious of “time” as a substantive, we ask then about the creation of time.14 If I asked for a description of yesterday's doings and you gave me an account, this account could be verified.Suppose what you gave as an account of yesterday happened tomorrow.This is a possible state of affairs.Would you say you remembered the future? Or would you say instead that you remembered the past? Or are both statements senseless? We have here two independent orders of events(1)the order of events in our memory.Call this memory time.(2)the order in which information is got by asking different people, 53 o'clock.Call this information time.In information time there will be past and future with respect to a particular day.And in memory time, with respect to an event, there will also be past and future.Now if you want to say that the order of information is memory time, you can.And if you are going to talk about both information and memory time, then you can say that you remember the past.If you remember that which in information time is future, you can say “I remember the future”.15 It is not a priori that the world becomes more and more disorganised with time.It is a matter of experience that disorganisation comes at a later rather than an earlier time.It is imaginable, for example, that by stirring nuts and raisins in a tank of chocolate they become unshuffled.But it is not a matter of experience that equal distributions of nuts and raisins must occur when they are swished about.There is no experience of something necessarily happening.To say that if equal distribution does not occur there must be a difference in weight of the nuts and raisins, even though these have not been weighed, is to assume some other force to explain the unshuffling.We tend to say that there must be some explanation if equal distribution does not occur.Similarly, we say of a planet's observed eccentric behaviour that there must be some planet attracting it.This is analogous to saying that if two apples were added to two apples and we found three, one must have vanished.Or like saying that a die must fall on one of six sides.When the possibility of a die's falling on edge is excluded, and not because it is a matter of experience that it falls only on its sides, we have a statement which no experience will refute-a statement of grammar.Whenever we say that something must be the case we are using a norm of expression.Hertz said that wherever something did not obey his laws there must be invisible masses to account for it.This statement is not right or wrong, but may be practical or impractical.Hypotheses such as “invisible masses”, “unconscious mental events” are norms of expression.They enter into language to enable us to say there must be causes.(They are like the hypothesis that the cause is proportional to the effect.If an explosion occurs when a ball is dropped, we say that some phenomenon must have occurred to make the cause proportional to the effect.On hunting for the phenomenon and not finding it, we say that it has merely not yet been found.)We believe we are dealing with a natural law a priori, whereas we are dealing with a norm of expression that we ourselves have fixed.Whenever we say that something must be the case we have given an indication of a rule for the regulation of our expression, as if one were to say “Everybody is really going to Paris.True, some don't get there, but all their movements are preliminary”.The statement that there must be a cause shows that we have got a rule of language.Whether all velocities can be accounted for by the assumption of invisible masses is a question of mathematics, or grammar, and is not to be settled by experience.It is settled beforehand.It is a question of the adopted norm of explanation.In a system of mechanics, for example, there is a system of causes, although there may be no causes in another system.A system could be made up in which we would use the expression “My breakdown had no causes”.If we weighed a body on a balance and took the different readings several times over, we could either say that there is no such thing as absolutely accurate weighing or that each weighing is accurate but that the weight changes in an unaccountable manner.If we say we are not going to account for the changes, then we would have a system in which there are no causes.We ought not say that there are no causes in nature, but only that we have a system in which there are no causes.Determinism and indeterminism are properties of a system which are fixed arbitrarily.16 We begin with the question whether the toothache someone else has is the same as the toothache I have.Is his toothache merely outward behaviour? Or is it that he has the same as I am having now but that I don't know it since I can only say of another person that he is manifesting certain behaviour? A series of questions arises about personal experience.Isn't it thinkable that I have a toothache in someone else's tooth? It might be argued that my having toothache requires my mouth.But the experience of my having toothache is the same wherever the tooth is that is aching, and whoever's mouth it is in.The locality of pain is not given by naming a possessor.Further, isn't it imaginable that I live all my life looking in a mirror, where I saw faces and did not know which was my face, nor how my mouth was distinguished from anyone else's? If this were in fact the case, would I say I had toothache in my mouth? In a mirror I could speak with someone else's mouth, in which case what would we call me? Isn't it thinkable that I change my body and that I would have a feeling correlated with someone's else's raising his arm? The grammar of “having toothache” is very different from that of “having a piece of chalk”, as is also the grammar of “I have toothache” from “Moore has toothache”.The sense of “Moore has toothache” is given by the criterion for its truth.For a statement gets its sense from its verification.The use of the word “toothache” when I have toothache and when someone else has it belongs to different games.(To find out with what meaning a word is used, make several investigations.For example, the words “before” and “after” mean something different according as one depends on memory or on documents to establish the time of an event.)Since the criteria for “He has toothache” and “I have toothache” are so different, that is, since their verifications are of different sorts, I might seem to be denying that he has toothache.But I am not saying he really hasn't got it.Of course he has it: it isn't that he behaves as if he had it but really doesn't.For we have criteria for his really having it as against his simulating it.Nevertheless, it is felt that I should say that I do not know he has it.Suppose I say that when he has toothache he has what I have, except that I know it indirectly in his case and directly in mine.This is wrong.Judging that he has toothache is not like judging that he has money but I just can't see his billfold.Suppose it is held that I must judge indirectly since I can't feel his ache.Now what sense is there to this? And what sense is there to “I can feel my ache”? It makes sense to say “His ache is worse than mine”, but not to say “I feel my toothache” and “Two people can't have the same pain”.Consider the statement that no two people can ever see the same sense datum.If being in the same position as another person were taken as the criterion for someone's seeing the same sense datum as he does, then one could imagine a person seeing the same datum, say, by seeing through someone's head.But if there is no criterion for seeing the same datum, then “I can't know that he sees what I see” does not make sense.We are likely to muddle statements of fact which are undisputed with grammatical statements.Statements of fact and grammatical statements are not to be confused.The question whether someone else has what I have when I have toothache may be meaningless, though in an ordinary situation it might be a question of fact, and the answer, “He has not”, a statement of fact.But the philosopher who says of someone else, “He has not got what I have”, is not stating a fact.He is not saying that in fact someone else has not got toothache.It might be the case that someone else has it.And the statement that he has it has the meaning given it, that is, whatever sense is given by the criterion.The difficulty lies in the grammar of “having toothache”.Nonsense is produced by trying to express in a proposition something which belongs to the grammar of our language.By “I can't feel his toothache” is meant that I can't try.It is the character of the logical cannot that one can't try.Of course this doesn't get you far, as you can ask whether you can try to try.In the arguments of idealists and realists somewhere there always occur the words “can”, “cannot”, “must”.No attempt is made to prove their doctrines by experience.The words “possibility” and “necessity” express part of grammar, although patterned after their analogy to “physical possibility” and “physical necessity”.Another way in which the grammars of “I have toothache” and “He has toothache” differ is that it does not make sense to say “I seem to have toothache”, whereas it is sensible to say “He seems to have toothache”.The statements “I have toothache” and “He has toothache” have different verifications;but “verification” does not have the same meaning in the two cases.The verification of my having toothache is having it.It makes no sense for me to answer the question, “How do you know you have toothache?”, by “I know it because I feel it”.In fact there is something wrong with the question;and the answer is absurd.Likewise the answer, “I know it by inspection”.The process of inspection is looking, not seeing.The statement, “I know it by looking”, could be sensible, e.g., concentrating attention on one finger among several for a pain.But as we use the word “ache” it makes no sense to say that I look for it: I do not say I will find out whether I have toothache by tapping my teeth.Of “He has toothache” it is sensible to ask “How do you know?”, and criteria can be given which cannot be given in one's own case.In one's own case it makes no sense to ask “How do I know?” It might be thought that since my saying “He seems to have toothache” is sensible but not my saying a similar thing of myself, I could then go on to say “This is so for him but not for me”.Is there then a private language I am referring to, which he cannot understand, and thus that he cannot understand my statement that I have toothache? If this is so, it is not a matter of experience that he cannot.He is prevented from understanding, not because of a mental shortcoming but by a fact of grammar.If a thing is a priori impossible, it is excluded from language.Sometimes we introduce a sentence into our language without realising that we have to show rules for its use.(By introducing a third king into a chess game we have done nothing until we have given rules for it.)How am I to persuade someone that “I feel my pain” does not make sense? If he insists that it does he would probably say “I make it a rule that it makes sense”.This is like introducing a third king, and I then would raise many questions, for example, “Does it make sense to say I have toothache but don't feel it?” Suppose the reply was that it did.Then I could ask how one knows that one has it but does not feel it.Could one find this out by looking into a mirror and on finding a bad tooth know that one has a toothache? To show what sense a statement makes requires saying how it can be verified and what can be done with it.Just because a sentence is constructed after a model does not make it part of a game.We must provide a system of applications.The question, “What is its verification?”, is a good translation of “How can one know it?”.Some people say that the question, “How can one know such a thing?”, is irrelevant to the question, “What is the meaning?” But an answer gives the meaning by showing the relation of the proposition to other propositions.That is, it shows what it follows from and what follows from it.It gives the grammar of the proposition, which is what the question, “What would it be like for it to be true?”, asks for.In physics, for example, we ask for the meaning of a statement in terms of its verification.I have remarked that it makes no sense to say “I seem to have toothache”, which presupposes that it makes sense to say I can or cannot, doubt it.The use of the word “cannot” here is not at all like its use in “I cannot lift the scuttle”.This brings us to the question: What is the criterion for a sentence making sense? Consider the answer, “It makes sense if it is constructed according to the rules of grammar”.Then does this question mean anything: What must the rules be like to give it sense? If the rules of grammar are arbitrary, why not let the sentence make sense by altering the rules of grammar? Why not simply say “I make it a rule that this sentence makes sense”? 17 To say what rules of grammar make up a propositional game would require giving the characteristics of propositions, their grammar.We are thus led to the question, What is a proposition? I shall not try to give a general definition of “proposition”, as it is impossible to do so.This is no more possible than it is to give a definition of the word “game”.For any line we might draw would be arbitrary.Our way of talking about propositions is always in terms of specific examples, for we cannot talk about these more generally than about specific games.We could begin by giving examples such as the proposition “There is a circle on the blackboard 2 inches from the top and 5 inches from the side”.Let us represent this as “(2,5)”.Now let us construct something that would be said to make no sense: “(2,5,7)”.This would have to be explained(and you could give it sense), or else you could say it is a mistake or a joke.But if you say it makes no sense, you can explain why by explaining the game in which it has no use.Nonsense can look less and less like a sentence, less and less like a part of language.“Goodness is red” and “Mr.S came to today's redness” would be called nonsense, whereas we would never say a whistle was nonsense.An arrangement of chairs could be taken as a language, so that certain arrangements would be nonsense.Theoretically you could always say of a symbol that it makes sense, but if you did so you would be called upon to explain its sense, that is, to show the use you give it, how you operate with it.The words “nonsense' and ”sense“ get their meaning only in particular cases and may vary from case to case.We can still talk of sense without giving a clear meaning to ”sense“, just as we talk of winning or losing without the meaning of our terms being absolutely clear.In philosophy we give rules of grammar wherever we encounter a difficulty.To show what we do in philosophy I compare playing a game by rules and just playing about.We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a word.But there is no such thing as a completed grammar.However, giving a rule has a use if someone makes an opposite rule which we do not wish to follow.When we discover rules for the use of a known term we do not thereby complete our knowledge of its use, and we do not tell people how to use the term, as if they did not know how.Logical analysis is an antidote.Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words.18 To return to the differing grammars of ”I have toothache“ and ”He has toothache“, which show up in the fact that the statements have different verifications and also in the fact that it is sensible to ask, in the latter case, ”How do I know this?“, but not in the former.The solipsist is right in implying that these two are on different levels.I have said that we confuse ”I have a piece of chalk“ and ”He has a piece of chalk“ with ”I have an ache“ and ”He has an ache“.In the case of the first pair the verifications are analogous, although not in the case of the second pair.The function ”x has toothache“ has various values, Smith, Jones, etc.But not I.I is in a class by itself.The word ”I“ does not refer to a possessor in sentences about having an experience, unlike its use in ”I have a cigar“.We could have a language from which ”I“ is omitted from sentences describing a personal experience.{Instead of saying ”I think“ or ”I have an ache“ one might say ”It thinks“(like ”It rains“), and in place of ”I have an ache“, ”There is an ache here“.Under certain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away with the simple use of ”I“.We constantly judge a language from the standpoint of the language we are accustomed to, and hence we think we describe phenomena incompletely if we leave out personal pronouns.It is as though we had omitted pointing to something, since the word ”I“ seems to point to a person.But we can leave out the word ”I“ and still describe the phenomenon formerly described.It is not the case that certain changes in our symbolism are really omissions.One symbolism is in fact as good as the next;no one symbolism is necessary.The solipsist who says ”Only my experiences are real“ is saying that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are real.This is absurd if taken to be a statement of fact.Now if it is logically impossible for another person to have toothache, it is equally so for me to have toothache.To the person who says ”Only I have real toothache“ the reply should be: ”If only you can have real toothache, there is no sense in saying 'Only I have real toothache'.Either you don't need 'I' or you don't need 'real'...'I' is no longer opposed to anything.You had much better say 'There is toothache'.“ The statement, ”Only I have real toothache,“ either has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is a grammatical proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule.The solipsist wishes to say, ”I should like to put, instead of the notation 'I have real toothache' 'There is toothache' “.What the solipsist wants is not a notation in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego vanishes.Were the solipsist to embody in his notation the restriction of the epithet ”real“ to what we should call his experiences and exclude ”A has real toothache“(where A is not he), this would come to using ”There is real toothache“ instead of ”Smith(the solipsist)has toothache“.Getting into the solipsistic mood means not using the word ”I “ in describing a personal experience.Acceptance of such a change is tempting] because the description of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ.Ask yourself, How do I, the person, come in? How, for example, does a person enter into the description of a visual sensation? If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it.We can say the visual field has certain internal properties, but its being mine is not essential to its description.That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or a pain, to belong to someone.There will be no such thing as my image or someone else's.The locality of a pain has nothing to do with the person who has it: it is not given by naming a possessor.Nor is a body or an organ of sight necessary to the description of the visual field.The same applies to the description of an auditory sensation.The truth of the proposition, ”The noise is approaching my right ear“, does not require the existence of a physical ear;it is a description of an auditory experience, the experience being logically independent of the existence of my ears.The audible phenomenon is in an auditory space, and the subject who hears has nothing to do with the human body.Similarly, we can talk of a toothache without there being any teeth, or of thinking without there being a head involved.Pains have a space to move in, as do auditory experiences and visual data.The idea that a visual field belongs essentially to an organ of sight or to a human body having this organ is not based on what is seen.It is based on such facts of experience as that closing one's lids is accompanied by an event in one's visual field, or the experience of raising one's arm towards one's eye.It is an experiential proposition that an eye sees.We can establish connections between a human body and a visual field which are very different from those we are accustomed to.It is imaginable that I should see with my body rather than with my eyes, or that I could see with someone else's eyes and have toothache in his tooth.If we had a tube to our eyes and looked into a mirror, the idea of a perceiving organ could be dispensed with.Were all human bodies seen in a mirror, with a loudspeaker making the sounds when mouths moved, the idea of an ego speaking and seeing would become very different.20 The solipsist does not go through with a notation from which either ”I“ or ”real“ is deleted.He says ”Only my experiences are real“, or ”Only I have real toothache“, or ”The only pain that is real is what I feel“.This provokes someone to object that surely his pain is real.And this would not really refute the solipsist, any more than the realist refutes the idealist.The realist who kicks the stone is correct in saying it is real if he is using the word ”real“ as opposed to ”not real“.His rejoinder answers the question, ”Is it real or hallucinatory?“, but he does not refute the idealist who is not deterred by his objection.They still seem to disagree.Although the solipsist is right in treating ”I have toothache“ as being on a different level from ”He has toothache“, his statement that he has something that no one else has, and that of the person who denies it, are equally absurd.”Only my experiences are real“ and ”Everyone's experiences are real“ are equally nonsensical.21 Let us turn to a different task.What is the criterion for ”This is my body“? There is a criterion for ”This is my nose“: the nose would be possessed by the body to which it is attached.There is a temptation to say there is a soul to which the body belongs and that my body is the body that belongs to me.Suppose that all bodies were seen in a mirror, so that all were on the same level.I could talk of A's nose and Any nose in the same way.But if I singled out a body as mine, the grammar changes.Pointing to a mirror body and saying ”This is my body“ does not assert the same relation of possession between me and my body as is asserted by ”This is A's nose“ between A's body and A's nose.What is the criterion for one of the bodies being mine? It might be said that the body which moved when I had a certain feeling will be mine.(Recall that the ”I“ in ”I have a feeling“ does not denote a possessor.)Compare ”Which of these is my body?“ with ”Which of these is A's body?“, in which ”my“ is replaced by ”A's“.What is the criterion for the truth of the answer to the latter? There is a criterion for this, which in the case of the answer to ”Which is mine?“ there is not.If all bodies are seen in a mirror and the bodies themselves become transparent but the mirror images remain, my body will be where the mirror image is.And the criterion for something being my nose will be very different from its belonging to the body to which it is attached.In the mirror world, will deciding which body is mine be like deciding which body is A's? If the latter is decided by referring to a voice called ”A“ which is correlated to the body, then if I answer ”Which is my body?“ by referring to a voice called Wittgenstein, it will make no sense to ask which is my voice.There are two kinds of use of the word ”I“ when it occurs in answer to the question ”Who has toothache?“.For the most part the answer ”I“ is a sign coming from a certain body.If when people spoke, the sounds always came from a loudspeaker and the voices were alike, the word ”I“ would have no use at all: it would be absurd to say ”I have toothache“.The speakers could not be recognised by it.)Although there is a sense in which answering ”I“ to the question, ”Who has toothache?“, makes a reference to a body, even to this body of mine, my answer to the question whether I have toothache is not made by reference to any body.I have no need of a criterion.My body and the toothache are independent.Thus one answer to the question ”Who?“ is made by reference to a body, and another seems not to be, and to be of a different kind.22 Let us turn to the view, which is connected with ”All that is real is my experience“, namely, solipsism of the present moment: ”All that is real is the experience of the present moment“.(Cf.Wm.James' remark ”The present thought is the only thinker“, which makes the subject of thinking equivalent to the experience.)We may be inclined to make our language such that we will call only the present experience ”experience“.This will be a solipsistic language, but of course we must not make a solipsistic language without saying exactly what we mean by the word which in our old language meant ”present“.Russell said that remembering cannot prove that what is remembered actually occurred, because the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago, with acts of remembering intact.We could go on to say that it might have been created one minute ago, and finally, that it might have been created in the present moment.Were this latter the situation we should have the equivalent of ”All that is real is the present moment“.Now if it is possible to say the world was created five minutes ago, could it be said that the world perished five minutes ago? This would amount to saying that the only reality was five minutes ago.Why does one feel tempted to say ”The only reality is the present“? The temptation to say this is as strong as that of saying that only my experience is real.The person who says only the present is real because past and future are not here has before his mind the image of something moving.past < present < future.This image is mispast present future leading, just as the blurred image we would draw of our visual field is misleading inasmuch as the field has no boundary.That the statement ”Only the present experience is real“ seems to mean something is due to familiar images we associate with it, images of things passing us in space.When in philosophy we talk of the present, we seem to be referring to a sort of Euclidean point.Yet when we talk of present experience it is impossible to identify the present with such a point.The difficulty is with the word ”present“.There is a grammatical confusion here.A person who says the present experience alone is real is not stating an empirical fact, comparable to the fact that Mr.S.always wears a brown suit.And the person who objects to the assertion that the present alone is real with ”Surely the past and future are just as real“ somehow does not meet the point.Both statements mean nothing.By examining Russell's hypothesis that the world was created five minutes ago I shall try to explain what I mean in saying that it is meaningless.Russell's hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear it out or refute it.Whatever our experience might be, it would be in agreement with it.The point of saying that something has happened derives from there being a criterion for its truth.To lay down the evidence for what happened five minutes ago is like laying down rules for making measurements.The question as to what evidence there can be is a grammatical one.It concerns the sorts of actions and propositions which would verify the statement.It is a simple matter to make up a statement which will agree with experience because it is such that no proposition can refute it, e.g., ”There is a white rabbit between two chairs whenever no observations or verifications are being carried out.“ Some people would say that this statement says more than ”There is no white rabbit between the chairs“, just as some would say it means something to say the world was created five minutes ago.When such statements are made they are somehow connected with a picture, say, a picture of creation.Hence it is that such sentences seem to mean something.But they are otiose, like wheels in a watch which have no function although they do not look to be useless.I shall try to explain further what I mean by these sentences being meaningless by describing figures on two planes, one on plane I, which is to be projected, and the other, on plane II, the projection: Now suppose the mode of projecting a circle on plane I was not orthogonal.In consequence, to say ”There is a circle in plane II“ would not be quite the same as saying that there is a circle in plane I.For a range of angles through which the circle is projected, the figures on plane II are all more or less circular.But now suppose the rays of light effecting the projection were allowed to vary through any range of angles.Then what meaning has it to say there are circles in plane II? When we give the method of projection such freedom, assertions about the projection become meaningless, though we still keep the picture of a circle in mind.Russell's assertion about the creation of the world is like this.The fact that there is a picture on plane I does not make a verifiable projection on plane II.We are accustomed to certain pictures being projected in a given way.But as soon as we leave this mode of projection, statements do not have their usual significance.When I say ”That means nothing“ I mean that you have altered your mode of projection.That it seems to mean something is due to an image of well-known things.23 The words ”thinkable“ and ”imaginable“ have been used in comparable ways, what is imaginable being a special case of what is thinkable, e.g., a proposition and a picture.Now we can replace a visual image by a painted picture, and the picture can be described in words.Pictures and words are intertranslatable, for example, as A(5,7), B(2,3).A proposition is like, or something like, a picture.Let us limit ourselves to propositions describing the distribution of objects in a room.The distribution could be pictured in a painting.It would be sensible to say that a certain system of propositions corresponds to those painted and that other propositions do not correspond to pictures, for example，that someone whistles.Suppose we call the imaginable what can be painted, and the thinkable only what is imaginable.This would limit the word ”thinkable“ to the paintable.Now of course one can extend the way of picturing, for example, to someone whistling:

This is a new way of picturing, for a ”rising“ note is different from a vertical rise in space.With this new way we can imagine more, i.e., think more.People who make metaphysical assertions such as ”Only the present is real“ pretend to make a picture, as opposed to some other picture.I deny that they have done this.But how can I prove it? I cannot say ”This is not a picture of anything, it is unthinkable“ unless I assume that they and I have the same limitations on picturing.If I indicate a picture which the words suggest and they agree, then I can tell them they are misled, that the imagery in which they move does not lead them to such expressions.It cannot be denied that they have made a picture, but we can say they have been misled.We can say ”It makes no sense in this system, and I believe this is the system you are using'?.If they reply by introducing a new system, then I have to acquiesce.My method throughout is to point out mistakes in language.I am going to use the word “philosophy” for the activity of pointing out such mistakes.Why do I wish to call our present activity philosophy, when we also call Plato's activity philosophy? Perhaps because of a certain analogy between them, or perhaps because of the continuous development of the subject.Or the new activity may take the place of the old because it removes mental discomforts the old was supposed to.24 With regard to a proposition about the external world or to a proposition of mathematics it is frequently asked “How do you know it?” There is an ambiguity here between reasons and causes.The interpretation we do not want is “How, causally, did you reach the result?” It does not matter what caused you to get the result;this is irrelevant.The important thing is to determine what you know when you are knowing it.To illustrate the distinction between reason and cause, let us take the question, How does one know the molecules of a gas are in motion? The answer might be psychological, for example, that you will see them if you have had enough to eat.If the kinetic theory were wrong, then no experience at all need correspond to it;but at the same time there would be a criterion for movement of molecules in a gas.The inventor of the theory would say “I am going to take such-and-such as a criterion”.What is taken as a reason for belief in a theory is thus not a matter of experience but a matter of convention.If I believe the theory after taking clear soup, this is a cause of my belief, not a reason.When I am asked for a reason for the belief, what is expected, as part of the answer, is what I believe.The different ways of verifying “It rained yesterday” help to determine the meaning.Now a distinction should be made between “being the meaning of” and “determining the meaning of”.That I remember its raining yesterday helps determine the meaning of “It rained yesterday”, but it is not true that “It rained yesterday” means “I remember that...” We can distinguish between primary and secondary criteria of its raining.If someone asks “What is rain?”, you can point to rain falling, or pour some water from a watering can.These constitute primary criteria.Wet pavements constitute a secondary criterion and determine the meaning of “rain” in a less important way.Two questions have been raised, which need to be answered now.(I)How could the meaning of a sentence about the past be given by a sentence about the present?(2)The verification of a proposition about the past is a set of propositions involving present and future tenses.If the verification gives the meaning, is part of the meaning left out? My reply is to deny that the verification gives the meaning.It merely determines the meaning, i.e., determines its use, or grammar.25 When we understand a statement we often have certain characteristic experiences connected with it and with the words it contains.But the meaning of a symbol in our language is not the feelings it arouses nor the momentary impression it makes on us.The sense of a sentence is neither a succession of feelings nor one definite feeling.If you want to know the meaning of a sentence, ask for its verification.I stress the point that the meaning of a symbol is its place in the calculus, the way it is used.Of course if the symbol were used differently there might be a different feeling, but the feeling is not what concerns us.To know the meaning of a symbol is to know its use.We can regard understanding a symbol, when we take its meaning in at a glance, as intuitive.Or understanding it may be discursive: knowing its meaning by knowing its use.Knowing the use of a sign is not a certain state lasting a certain time.(If we say knowing how to play chess is a certain state of mind, we have to say it is a hypothetical state.)Attending to the way the meaning of a sentence is explained makes clear the connection between meaning and verification.Reading that Cambridge won the boat race, which verifies “Cambridge won”, is obviously not the meaning, but it is connected with it.“Cambridge won” is not a disjunction, “I saw the race or I read the result or...” It is more complicated.Yet if we ruled out any one of the means of verifying the statement we would alter its meaning.It would upset our grammar if we excluded as a verification something that always accompanied winning.And if we did away with all means of verifying it we would destroy the meaning.It is clear that not every sort of verification is actually used to verify “Cambridge won”, nor would just any verification give the meaning.The different verifications of the boat race being won have different places in the grammar of “boat race being won”.There is a mistaken conception of my view concerning the connection between meaning and verification which turns the view into idealism.This is that a boat race = the idea of a boat race.The mistake here is in trying to explain something in terms of something else.It lies back of Russell's definition of number, which we expect to tell us what a number is.The difficulty with these explanations in terms of something else is that the something else may have an entirely different grammar.Consider the word “chair”.If there could be no visual picture of a chair, the word would have a different meaning.That one can see a chair is essential to the meaning of the word.But a visual picture of a chair is not a chair.What would it mean to sit on the visual picture of a chair? Of course we can explain what a chair is by showing pictures of it.But that does not mean that a chair is a complex of views.The tendency is to ask “What is a chair?”;but I ask how the word “chair” is used.An intimately connected consideration concerns the words “time” and “length”.People have felt that time is independent of the way it is measured.This is to forget what one would have to do to explain the word.Time is what is measured by a clock.To verify “The concert lasted an hour” you must tell how you measured time.It is a misunderstanding about both time and length that they are independent of measurement.If we have many ways of measuring which do not contradict, we do not assume any one way of measuring in explaining these words.The measuring which is connected with the meaning of a term is not exact, though in physics we do sometimes specify the temperature of the measuring rod.If, for example, we try to make the notion of a “precise time” more exact, we do not push it back far, for the striking of a clock at “precisely 4:30” takes time.And “to be here at precisely 4:30” is also not precise: should one be opening the door or be inside? Likewise with “having the same colour”.The verification of “These have the same colour” may be that one can't see a colour transition when they are put side by side, or that one can't tell the difference when they are apart, or that one can't tell one from the other when one is substituted for the other.These ways of testing give different meanings for “having the same colour”.26 If the meaning of a word is determined by the rules for its use, does this mean that its meaning is the list of rules? No.Nor is the meaning, as is sometimes the case with the bearer, something one can point to.The use of money and the use of words are analogous.Money is not always used to buy things which can be pointed to, e.g., when it buys permission to sit in a theatre, or a title, or one's life.The ideas of meaning and sense are obsolete.Unless “sense” is used in such sentences as “This has no sense” or “This has the same sense as that”, we are not concerned with sense.In some cases it is not clear whether a statement is experiential or grammatical.How far is giving the verification of a proposition a grammatical statement about it? So far as it is, it can explain the meaning of its terms.Insofar as it is a matter of experience, as when one names a symptom, the meaning is not explained.27 There is a problem connected with our talk of meaning: Does such talk indicate that I think meaning to be the subject matter of philosophy? Are we talking about something of more general importance than chairs, etc., so that we can take it that questions of meaning are the central questions of philosophy? Is meaning a metalogical idea? No.For there are problems in philosophy that are not concerned with the meaning of “meaning”, though perhaps with the meaning of other words, e.g., “time”.The word “meaning” has no higher place than these.What gives it a different place is that our investigations are about language and about puzzles arising from the use of language.“Grammar”, “proposition”, “meaning” thus figure more often than other words, though investigation concerning the word “meaning” is on the same level as a grammatical investigation of the word “time”.Of course there isn't a philosophical grammar and ordinary English grammar, the former being more complete since it includes ostensive definitions such as the correlation of “white” with several of its applications, Russell's theory of descriptions, etc.These are not to be found in ordinary grammar books;but this is not the important difference.The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher.One obvious difference is that the linguist is concerned with history, and with literary qualities, neither of which is of concern to us.Moreover, we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not interested in, e.g., puzzles arising from the expression “Time flows”.We shall have to justify calling our comments on such a sentence grammar.If we say time flows in a different sense than water does, explaining this by an ostensive definition, we have indicated a way of explaining the word.And we have left the realm of what is generally called grammar.Our object is to get rid of certain puzzles.The grammarian has no interest in these;his aims and the philosopher's are different.We are pulling ordinary grammar to bits.28 Let us look at the grammar of ethical terms, and such terms as “God”, “soul”, “mind”, “concrete”, “abstract”.One of the chief troubles is that we take a substantive to correspond to a thing.Ordinary grammar does not forbid our using a substantive as though it stood for a physical body.The words “soul” and “mind” have been used as though they stood for a thing, a gaseous thing.'what is the soul?“ is a misleading question, as are questions about the words ”concrete“ and ”abstract“, which suggest an analogy with solid and gaseous instead of with a chair and the permission to sit on a chair.Another muddle consists in using the phrase ”another kind“ after the analogy of ”a different kind of chair“, e.g., that transfinite numbers are another kind of number than rationals, or unconscious thoughts a different kind of thought from conscious ones.The difference in the case of the latter pair is not analogous to that between a chair we see and a chair we don't see.The word ”thought“ is used differently when prefaced by these adjectives.What happens with the words ”God“ and ”soul“ is what happens with the word ”number“.Even though we give up explaining these words ostensively, by pointing, we don't give up explaining them in substantival terms.The reason people say that a number is a scratch on the blackboard is the desire to point to something.No sort of process of pointing is connected with explaining ”number“, any more than it is with explaining ”permission to sit in a seat at the theatre“.Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word ”God“.I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one.For example, people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God.This would throw light on the use of the word.What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word.29 Changing the meaning of a word, e.g., ”Moses“, when one is forced to give a different explication, does not indicate that it had no meaning before.The similarity between new and old uses of a word is like that between an exact and a blurred boundary.Our use of language is like playing a game according to the rules.Sometimes it is used automatically, sometimes one looks up the rules.Now we get into difficulties when we believe ourselves to be following a rule.We must examine to see whether we are.Do we use the word ”game“ to mean what all games have in common? It does not follow that we do, even though we were to find something they have in common.Nor is it true that there are discrete groups of things called ”games“.What is the reason for using the word ”good“? Asking this is like asking why one calls a given proposition a solution to a problem.It can be the case that one trouble gives way to another trouble, and that the resolution of the second difficulty is only connected with the first.For example, a person who tries to trisect an angle is led to another difficulty, posed by the question ”Can it be done?“ Proof of the impossibility of a trisection takes the place of the first investigation;the investigation has changed.When there is an argument about whether a thing is good, the discussion shows what we are talking about.In the course of the argument the word may begin to get a new grammar.In view of the way we have learned the word ”good“ it would be astonishing if it had a general meaning covering all of its applications.I am not saying it has four or five different meanings.It is used in different contexts because there is a transition between similar things called ”good“, a transition which continues, it may be, to things which bear no similarity to earlier members of the series.We cannot say ”If we want to find out the meaning of 'good' let's find what all cases of good have in common“.They may not have anything in common.The reason for using the word ”good“ is that there is a continuous transition from one group of things called good to another.30 There is one type of explanation which I wish to criticise, arising from the tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause, and then to try to show the phenomenon to be ”really“ another.This tendency is enormously strong.It is what is responsible for people saying that punishment must be one of three things, revenge, a deterrent, or improvement.This way of looking at things comes out in such questions as, Why do people hunt?, Why do they build high buildings? Other examples of it are the explanation of striking a table in a rage as a remnant of a time when people struck to kill, or of the burning of an effigy because of its likeness to human beings, who were once burnt.Frazer concludes that since people at one time were burnt, dressing up an effigy for burning is what remains of that practice.This may be so;but it need not be, for this reason.The idea which underlies this sort of method is that every time what is sought is the motive.People at one time thought it useful to kill a man, sacrifice him to the god of fertility, in order to produce good crops.But it is not true that something is always done because it is useful.At least this is not the sole reason.Destruction of an effigy may have its own complex of feelings without being connected with an ancient practice, or with usefulness.Similarly, striking an object may merely be a natural reaction in rage.A tendency which has come into vogue with the modern sciences is to explain certain things by evolution.Darwin seemed to think that-an emotion got its importance from one thing only, utility.A baby bares its teeth when angry because its ancestors did so to bite.Your hair stands on end when you are frightened because hair standing on end served some purpose for animals.The charm of this outlook is that it reduces importance to utility.31 Let us change the topic to a discussion of good.One of the ways of looking at questions in ethics about good is to think that all things said to be good have something in common, just as there is a tendency to think that all things we call games have something in common.Plato's talk of looking for the essence of things was very like talk of looking for the ingredients in a mixture, as though qualities were ingredients of things.But to speak of a mixture, say of red and green colours, is not like speaking of a mixture of a paint which has red and green paints as ingredients.Suppose you say ”Good is a quality of human actions and events“.This is apparently an intelligible sentence.If I ask ”How does one know an action has this quality?“, you might tell me to examine it and I would find out.Now am I to investigate the movements making up the action, or are they only symptoms of goodness? If they are a symptom, then there must be some independent verification, otherwise the word ”symptom“ is meaningless.Now there is an important question which arises about goodness: Can one know an action in all its details and yet not know whether it is good? A similar question arises about beauty.Consider the beauty of a face.If all its shapes and colours are determined, is its beauty determined also? Or are these merely symptoms of beauty, which is to be determined otherwise? You may say that beauty is an indefinable quality, and that to say a particular face is beautiful comes to saying it has the indefinable quality.Is our scrutiny intended to find out whether a face has this indefinable quality, or merely to find out what the face is like? If the former, then the indefinable quality can be attributed to a particular arrangement of colours.But it need not be, and we must have some independent verification.If no separate investigation is required, then we only mean by a beautiful face a certain arrangement of colours and shapes.32 The attribute beauty has been analysed as what all beautiful things have in common.Consider one such property, agreeableness.I call attention to the fact that in studying the laws of harmony in a harmony text there is no mention of ”agreeableness“;psychology drops out.To say Lear is agreeable is to say something nondescriptive.And to many things this adjective is wholly inapplicable.Hence there is no basis for building up a calculus.The phrase ”beautiful colour“, for example, can have a hundred meanings, depending on the occasion on which we use it.Very often the adjectives we use are those applicable to the face of a person.This is the case with ”beautiful“ and ”ugly“.Consider how we learn such words.We do not as children discover the quality of beauty or ugliness in a face and find that these are qualities a tree has in common with it.The words ”beautiful“ and ”ugly“ are bound up with the words they modify, and when applied to a face are not the same as when applied to flowers and trees.We have in the latter a similar ”game“.For example, the adjective ”stupid“ is inapplicable to coals, except as you see a face in them.By a face being stupid we may mean it is the sort of face that really belongs to a stupid person;but usually not.Instead, it is a character of the particular expression of a face.This is not to say it is a character of the distribution of lines and colours.If it were, then one might ask how to find out whether the distribution is stupid.Is stupidity part of the distribution? The word ”stupid“ as applied to hands is still another game.The same is the case with ”beautiful“.It is bound up with a particular game.And similarly in ethics: the meaning of the word ”good“ is bound up with the act it modifies.How can one know whether an action or event has the quality of goodness? And can one know the action in all of its details and not know whether it is good? That is, is its being good something that is independently experienced? Or does its being good follow from the thing's properties? If I want to know whether a rod is elastic I can find out by looking through a microscope to see the arrangement of its particles, the nature of their arrangement being a symptom of its elasticity, or inelasticity.Or I can test the rod empirically, e.g., see how far it can be pulled out.The question in ethics, about the goodness of an action, and in aesthetics, about the beauty of a face, is whether the characteristics of the action, the lines and colours of the face, are like the arrangement of particles: a symptom of goodness, or of beauty.Or do they constitute them? a cannot be a symptom of b unless there is a possible independent investigation of b.If no separate investigation is possible, then we mean by ”beauty of face“ a certain arrangement of colours and spaces.Now no arrangement is beautiful in itself.The word ”beauty“ is used for a thousand different things.Beauty of face is different from that of flowers and animals.That one is playing utterly different games is evident from the difference that emerges in the discussion of each.We can only ascertain the meaning of the word ”beauty“ by seeing how we use it.33 What has been said of ”beautiful“ will apply to ”good“ in only a slightly different way.Questions which arise about the latter are analogous to those raised about beauty: whether beauty is inherent in an arrangement of colours and shapes, i.e., such that on describing the arrangement one would know it is beautiful, or not;or whether this arrangement is a symptom of beauty from which the thing's being beautiful is concluded.In an actual aesthetic controversy or inquiry several questions arise:(1)How do we use such words as ”beautiful“?(2)Are these inquiries psychological? Why are they so different, and what is their relation to psychology?(3)What features makes us say of a thing that it is the ideal, e.g., the ideal Greek profile? Note that in an aesthetic controversy the word ”beautiful“ is scarcely ever used.A different sort of word crops up: ”correct“, ”incorrect“, ”right“, ”wrong“.We never say ”This is beautiful enough“.We only use it to say, ”Look, how beautiful“, that is, to call attention to something.The same thing holds for the word ”good“.34 Why do we say certain changes bring a thing nearer to an ideal, e.g., making a door lower, or the bass in music quieter.It is not that we want in different cases to produce the same effect, namely, an agreeable feeling.What made the ideal Greek profile into an ideal, what quality? Actually what made us say it is the ideal is a certain very complicated role it played in the life of people.For example, the greatest sculptors used this form, people were taught it, Aristotle wrote on it.Suppose one said the ideal profile is the one occurring at the height of Greek art.What would this mean? The word ”height“ is ambiguous.To ask what ”ideal“ means is the same as asking what ”height“ and ”decadence“ mean.You would need to describe the instances of the ideal in a sort of serial grouping.And the word is always used in connection with one particular thing, for there is nothing in common between roast beef, Greek art, and German music.The word ”decadence“ cannot be explained without specific examples, and will have different meanings in the case of poetry, music, and sculpture.To explain what decadence in music means you would need to discuss music in detail.The various arts have some analogy to each other, and it might be said that the element common to them is the ideal.But this is not the meaning of ”the ideal“.The ideal is got from a specific game, and can only be explained in some specific connection, e.g., Greek sculpture.There is no way of saying what all have in common, though of course one may be able to say what is common to two sculptures by studying them.In the statement that their beauty is what approaches the ideal, the word ”ideal“ is not used as is the word ”water“, which stands for something that can be pointed to.And no aesthetic investigation will supply you with a meaning of the word ”ideal“ which you did not have before.When one describes changes made in a musical arrangement as being directed to bringing the arrangement of parts nearer to an ideal, the ideal is not before us like a straight line which is set before us when we try to draw it.(When questioned about what we are doing we might cite another tune which we thought not to be as near the ideal.)Some people say we have an ideal before our minds in the same way we have a memory image when we recognise a colour.It may happen that you have a picture in mind with which the colour recognised is compared, but this is rare.To see how the ideal comes in, say in making the bass quieter, look at what is being done and at one's being dissatisfied with the music as it is.Can one call this ”action“ of making the bass quieter an investigation? No, not in the sense of scientific investigation.No truth is found, except the psychological fact that I am satisfied with the result.In what sense is aesthetic investigation a matter of psychology? The first thing we might say of a beautiful arrangement of colours-a flower, a meadow, or a face-is that it gives us pleasure.In saying these all give pleasure we speak as if the pleasure differed in degree rather than that the pleasures were of a different sort.Pain and pleasure do not belong on one scale, any more than the scale from boiling hot to ice cold is one of degree.They differ in kind.When a man jumps out of the window rather than meet the police he is not choosing the ”more agreeable“.Of course there are cases where we do weigh pleasures, as in choosing between cinemas.But this is not always the case.And it happens only sometimes that when we do not choose the lesser pain or the greater pleasure we choose what will produce these in the long run.One might think that it is entirely a matter of psychology whether something is good or beautiful, that in comparing musical arrangements, for example, one is making a psychological experiment to determine which produces the more pleasing effect.If this were true then the statement that beauty is what gives pleasure is an experiential one.But what people who say this wish to say is that it is not a matter of experience that beauty is what gives pleasure.Their statement is really a sort of tautology.In aesthetic investigation the thing we are not interested in is causal connections, whereas in psychology we are.This is the main point of difference.To the question ”Why is this beautiful?“ we are accustomed to being satisfied with answers which cite causes instead of reasons.To name causal connections is to give an hypothesis.Giving a cause does not remove the aesthetic puzzle one feels when asked what makes a thing beautiful.It is useful to remind yourself of the answers given to the opposite question, ”What is wrong with this poem or melody?“, for the answer to the first question is of the same kind.The answer to ”What is wrong with this melody?“ is like the statement, ”This is too loud“, not like the statement that it produces sulphur in the blood.The sort of experiment we carry on to discover people's likes and dislikes is not aesthetics.If it were, then you could say aesthetics is a matter of taste.In aesthetics the question is not ”Do you like it?“ but ”Why do you like it?“ Whenever we get to the point where the question is one of taste, it is no longer aesthetics.In aesthetic discussion what we are doing is more like solving a mathematical problem.It is not a psychological one.Aesthetic discussion is something that goes on inside the range of likes and dislikes.It goes on before any question of taste arises.A statement about a visual or auditory impression, as against what causes it, need not be psychological.That a sorrowful face becomes more sorrowful as the mouth turns downward is not a statement of psychology.In aesthetics we are not interested in causal connections but in description of a thing.35 What is the justification for a feature in a work of art? I disagree with the answer ”Something else would produce the wrong effect“.Is it that you are satisfied, once something is found which removes the difficulty? What reasons can one give for being satisfied? The reasons are further descriptions.Aesthetics is descriptive.What it does is to draw one's attention to certain features, to place things side by side so as to exhibit these features.To tell a person ”This is the climax“ is like saying ”This is the man in the puzzle picture“.Our attention is drawn to a certain feature, and from that point forward we see that feature.The reasons one gives for feeling satisfied have nothing to do with psychology.These, the aesthetic reasons, are given by placing things side by side, as in a court of law.If one gave psychological reasons for choosing a simile, those would not be reasons in aesthetics.They would be causes, not reasons.Stating a cause would be offering a hypothesis.Insofar as the remedy for the disagreeable feeling of top-heaviness of a door is like a remedy for a headache, a question concerning what remedy to prescribe is not a question of aesthetics.The aesthetic reason for feeling dissatisfied, as opposed to its cause, is not a proposition of psychology.A good example of a cause for dissatisfaction which I might have, say, with the way someone is playing a waltz, is that I have seen the waltz danced and know how it should be played.This does not give a reason for my dissatisfaction.The person who plays it, and I, have a different ideal of the waltz, and to give the reason for my dissatisfaction demands a description.Similarly, if a composition is felt to have a wrong ending.36 I wish to remark on a certain sort of connection which Freud cites, between the foetal position and sleep, which looks to be a causal one but which is not, inasmuch as a psychological experiment cannot be made.His explanation does what aesthetics does: puts two factors together.Another matter which Freud treats psychologically but whose investigation has the character of an aesthetic one is the nature of jokes.The question, ”What is the nature of a joke?“, is like the question, ”What is the nature of a lyric poem?“ I wish to examine in what way Freud's theory is a hypothesis and in what way not.The hypothetical part of his theory, the subconscious, is the part which is not satisfactory.Freud thinks it is part of the essential mechanism of a joke to conceal something, say, a desire to slander someone, and thereby to make it possible for the subconscious to express itself.He says that people who deny the subconscious really cannot cope with post-hypnotic suggestion, or with waking up at an unusual hour of one's own accord.When we laugh without knowing why, Freud claims that by psychoanalysis we can find out.I see a muddle here between a cause and a reason.Being clear why you laugh is not being clear about a cause.If it were, then agreement to the analysis given of the joke as explaining why you laugh would not be a means of detecting it.The success of the analysis is supposed to be shown by the person's agreement.There is nothing corresponding to this in physics.Of course we can give causes for our laughter, but whether those are in fact the causes is not shown by the person's agreeing that they are.A cause is found experimentally.The psychoanalytic way of finding why a person laughs is analogous to an aesthetic investigation.For the correctness of an aesthetic analysis must be agreement of the person to whom the analysis is given.The difference between a reason and a cause is brought out as follows: the investigation of a reason entails as an essential part one's agreement with it, whereas the investigation of a cause is carried out experimentally.”What the patient agrees to can't be a hypothesis as to the cause of his laughter, but only that so and-so was the reason why he laughed." Of course the person who agrees to the reason was not conscious at the time of its being his reason.But it is a way of speaking to say the reason was subconscious.It may be expedient to speak in this way, but the subconscious is a hypothetical entity which gets its meaning from the verifications these propositions have.What Freud says about the subconscious sounds like science, but in fact it is just a means of representation New regions of the soul have not been discovered, as his writings suggest.The display of elements of a dream, for example, a hat(which may mean practically anything)is a display of similes.As in aesthetics, things are placed side by side so as to exhibit certain features.These throw light on our way of looking at a dream;they are reasons for the dream.But his method of analysing dreams is not analogous to a method for finding the causes of stomach-ache.It is a confusion to say that a reason is a cause seen from the inside.A cause is not seen from within or from without.It is found by experiment.In enabling one to discover the reasons for laughter psychoanalysis provides merely a representation of processes.

第四篇：在哲学课上的一次演讲

在哲学课上的一次演讲

各位老师，各位同学下午好： 今天很高兴也很荣幸能站在这个讲台上和大家一起共同探讨对一些问题的看法。我知道接下来我讲的内容可能并不是十分的精彩，甚至还有什么不妥的地方，还请各位老师和同学多多包涵。在这我只是起一个抛砖引玉的作用，因为我相信接下来会有很多更优秀的同学带来更精彩的发言。直奔主题，今天我想和大家一起探讨的是关于“开放民间信贷”的问题。通俗点说就是“高利贷”。可以这么说，自古以来，高利贷都是躲在阳光背后的东西，它不被社会和政府认可，原因是高利贷的确存在着某些负面影响。可唯物辩证法也告诉我们，万事万物都是变化发展的，我们一定要用发展的眼光看问题。绝不能以现在的标准去否定过去，当然，也不能以过去的观点评定现在。你不能因为某个人在过去犯了错误就将他一棍子打死。所有这些静止的观点都是形而上学，都应该是我们所反对的。同样，对于高利贷，对于民间信贷，我们也需要用发展的眼光重新审视。为什么这么说呢？ 中国改革开放30年来，经济发展突飞猛进，中小企业的发展也不可谓不迅速，他们在发展中对资金的需求也越来越大。可遗憾的是，中国的银行信贷却跟不上时代的步伐，他们对中小企业和个体工商户的金融服务少之又少，导致中小企业融资困难重重，有的甚至因为缺乏资金而不得不关门大吉，这不能不算是中国资本社会的一大悲哀。所以，在新形势下，是政府该开放民间信贷，让高利贷，地下钱庄从黑暗走向光明，从地下走到地上的时候了。虽然高利贷一直都没有实现合法化，可中国的地下金融交易却一直非常之繁荣。有调查结果显示，以存贷款总额作为衡量指标，2005年中国的民间金融，地下金融和非法金融总量约为2.9万亿元左右。由此可见，民间信贷市场之大，前景之广阔是不言而喻的。所以开发民间信贷，不仅可以打破现在银行金融机构的信贷垄断地位，加快中国金融体制改革的步伐。还可以充分利用民间闲散资金，活跃产品和资本市场，拉动经济增长。所以，政府开放民间信贷将是顺应历史潮流的伟大选择，是大势所趋，也是刻不容缓的。我们知道，美国从二战以来就建立了以美元为中心的资本主义货币体系，成为当今世界上唯一的超级大国，所以就时不时的喜欢干涉这个，指责那个，到处插手别国内政，把别国都看作它的“小弟”。我们想想，美国为什么能够这样霸道呢？有人可能会说因为它有强大的军事实力和先进的科技，可我认为这些都还不是主要的。主要的是什么？是因为它拥有强大的资本市场。你们知道吗？美国以华尔街为中心编织了一张庞大的资本之网，这张网遍布了世界的各个角落，牵动着全球的经济动向，2008年由美国的次贷危机而引起的全球金融危机就是最好的证明。所以说，中国想要有一天超越美国，成为世界的主宰，就必须大力发展资本市场，加快金融体制创新，要让中国的上海超越美国的纽约，要让中国拥有自己的“华尔街”，也只有这样中国才能实现弯道超越！现在流传这样一个说法，未来的战争是货币的战争，谁掌握的货币谁就统治世界！但这归根到底还是要有完善和健全的资本市场。所以，加快中国的金融体制创新是中国领先世界的必经之路。当然，我们也都很清楚，中国要实现发展，实现超越并不是一两句话那么简单的事情，他需要我们中国一代又一代人的共同努力和奋斗，需要我们为了一个信念而坚持，所以我希望在中国复兴的道路上也能够留下在座的每一位同学的足迹和身影！我相信，有我们的共同努力，中国的复兴之路不会遥远，中国的复兴之梦也将不再是梦！谢谢！

2011-11-8

第五篇：哲学读后感（共3篇）

篇1：哲学读后感

哲学读后感

对于中国哲学简史以及其他部分哲学书表面处理之后得到的读后感：

全部--部分--相对立面

死亡----生存:相对的解释.没有死亡的感觉体会不到你还在生存.死亡可以给你存在的相对感觉.如一切明天都没有了,你会珍惜今天的所有一切.大多数时间死亡不在我们考虑范围之内,或者是我们不可能清晰的体验到死亡的感觉.所以我们一直认为我们还有明天.实际上有太多的意外不在我们掌控中.grey里面的,t如果爱就说吧,也许明天一切都没有了.任何一个感觉和词语,都是要一个反衬才能体现出它的价值.如果世界尚没有悲伤,那也不会有快乐了.如果某一种感觉全部的占据了你的内心,那么你要留意去寻找相对的感觉,因为那个全部的感觉一定不是真实的也根本没有价值.

日常--->惯性动作可以让人产生惰性.就是上面的全部感觉,你必须要找到如何突破惰性,找到那种相对立的感觉去突破自己.

灵魂的电流--->应该是部分感性的存在.回忆对人是重要的.是人最宝贵的财富,在一生中不停的做着计划和回忆的互动动作.虽然很多理论让你把握当前,其实,这很难.至少从以上的文字可以看出.多数是在幻想未来,和回味过去.只是今天也会成为回忆,未来也会成为今天.把握当前的心态就是要突破惰性,要在一种全部的感觉中找到那种相对立的感觉.比如你有一个钻石,你会永远拥有它.它放在你的仓库里面.永远不去提取.你偶尔会想想它的光芒,但实际生活中你不会天天带着它.但是有一天你的仓库失窃,钻石没有了.你就会经常想起那个钻石,想如果天天带着它的话也许仓库失窃的时候就不会丢了.但是你不知道哪天你的仓库会失窃.失窃前,你也会经常忘记你拥有这个钻石,这个就是计划之内的东西,也是在你回忆里面的东西,其实不属于你的'现在.

我觉得,改变,或者是体验到存在感,或者价值等方法就是一定要知道相对立的体验感觉.事物矛盾的对立面是促进事物发展的原始动力。灵魂的电流基本是一种情感发挥到一定程度所体现出来的物理现象.

存在主义哲学家卡尔.雅斯贝尔斯（karljaspers的观点:他把我们体验到存在边缘的状态定义为“边缘状态”。通常，我们如此地执迷于和熟悉日常的生活，以至于我们不能够看破世俗--我们用自己的观点造了一个藩篱。只有当我们处于边缘状态，如疾病、痛苦、烦恼或者破产使我们远离正常的生活，把我们放置在一个新的位置时，我们才会像一个旁观者一样去看待和重新审视我们的生活.我们可以说生命和死亡就像在镜子里互相观望一样，当我们说已经为死亡做好了准备的时候，也就意味着我们活得没有任何遗憾；而当我们说自己生活得很幸福的时候，就意味着我们已经为死亡做好了准备。

其实内心中,生活应该正在朝着这么一个轨迹发展吧

篇2：哲学读后感

哲学读后感精选

当真正用理性思考经验之后，就能知道自己应该如何做，知道哪一种人生更为理想，也更适合自己。理想代表针对未来，哲学的思考就是要让人能够在过去、现在、未来三个时间向度中连贯起来，让自己的生命不再只是活在当下那片片断断，刹那生灭的过程中而已。”

爱因斯坦曾说过“专家只是训练有素的狗。”这句话的用意并不在骂人，而是要提醒我们，不要只是做一个专家，还要设法透过自己的知识进一步体验到智慧。智慧也有其自身的特点，总结为两点：“完整”与“根本”。

因为人体是物质的，有重量、有惰性同时也是软弱的。这种软弱会妨碍人类拥有智慧。比如，有时候我们希望自己能够早起，却怎么也爬不起来，这时候会觉得身体实在是自己最大的敌人。身体如此沉重，就是因为它是物质，所以有惰性。又有时候我们很愿意帮助别人，这代表心灵上的美好，却可能因为需要花时间、花力气，所以懒得行动。由此可知，人的身体是软弱的。人应该减少身体的控制程度，亦即要让身体的惰性无法对个人产生影响力。如此，才能让心灵自由地追求智慧。

“人生所有一切都不能带走，故要与人分享。这种分享不单指财务，还应包括关怀、信念、尊重等。”是啊，人本是赤条条地来又赤条条地去，何必一定要固守自己的东西，封闭自己的心灵呢？这样或许守住了自己的财产，却错失了许多机会，但与人分享后也许就不同了

烦恼不值得担心，因为能磨练出智慧；死亡不值得害怕，害怕的是不知为何而死。”这很值得我们深思，现在人们多把拥有大量金钱和物质的人当作自己的偶像，以至于许多人接受教育的目的就是为了挣钱。其实拥有越多并不见得就越快乐，傅先生在介绍存在主义时就说，“一个人‘有’的越多越不‘是’他自己。因为拥有越多，越没有时间做自己。”在介绍道家思想时又说，“一个人若多思多欲就不可能快乐，因为欲望没有满足会痛苦，一旦满足之后，又生出更多欲望，更多痛苦。”

“一个人活在世界上，可以没有丰富的物质享受，可以没有良好的制度，却不能没有正确的理念”。――

很多人不快乐，就是因为找不到人生的意义。然而，人生的意义又是什么？一个人在念中学的时候，人生的'意义是要考大学；念大学的时候，人生的意义则是要顺利毕业或继续深造。这样的意义一直往后推延，最后总是要碰到结束，而在这个关卡上，不能在以一个具体的东西作为意义了（如赚到多少钱、当到什么官）。这个意义是一个人在生命过程中无法达成的，因此不能向外探求，只能内向寻找，也就是一种对自己的要求，要求自己达成一种最高的、圆满的境界。”

篇3：哲学读后感600字

人生就好象航海一样，如果你没有罗盘，就不知道自己往哪里走。罗盘就是哲学，哲学是对人生的经验做全面的反省。人们可以向哲学家借这样的一个罗盘或者指南针，参考他们思考后的见解，也可以在自己内心里面启发这样的智慧，其实每个人的内心都有他的罗盘，只不过他不一定经过严格的训练或者是适当地去反省而找到。

所以离开人生，哲学是空洞的，它没有内容。如果离开哲学的话，人生是盲目的，人生变成找不到方向，不知道该往哪里走。

很多时候教师不知不觉的在给学生们说“你要懂人生的道理，要走好人生的每一步”，这里就有哲学的含义在里面。所以，人生的智慧，它归结为生命历程中不同的抉择。

书的作者傅佩荣用三句话来描写哲学：第一句，培养智慧，这跟西方的传统很接近。第二，发现真理。因为人常常发现变化的事物，觉得非常迷惘，你就要发现变化背后有没有不变真实的东西。比如道家，道就是最后的真实，让你知道这些变化有来源，有归宿。第三，验证价值。价值不能离开主体，不能离开你我他每一个人。

前面培养智慧，然后发现真理，然后去验证价值。这样就会使生活产生具体的改变，懂得自己往哪里走，就像在航海的时候我有指南针，别人说这个路线不好，但是自己知道自己为什么这样选择。人最怕不知道，这样选择是受风气的影响，受别人的影响，甚至是别人的操纵，结果走的路好像很多人都走，到最后不见得是自身愿意走的路。

由此看来哲学是人在早或者晚一定要碰到的题材。在生命的阶段，尤其是遇到重大的转折点、重大的痛苦、罪恶或者是灾难，在这种情况下，人们特别需要能不能有一个方向让我知道我这样做是对的，或者给自身这样一个选择的机会，让自身可以改变生命不同的路线。

哲学读后感600字范文